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A m an picks up a problem and calls it his, w ith perhaps slight 
appreciation that he is taking up a task which arises out of the 
conflict of insistent social processes, for the solution of which he has 
volunteered. He makes it his own, but he did not originate it. The 
academic attitude of creating problems for Doctors' theses is not 
favorable to the just realization of what problems are when they are 
genuine.
—Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, 1938, p. 99
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In this dissertation I attempt to construct a framework for an alternate theory 
of instruction, starting from the position that education has no theory of 
learning; instead, what passes for a theories of learning are actually descriptions 
of the conditions under which knowledge is acquired. Descriptive theorizing 
does not serve education well because it is not likely, being a description of 
w hat is known told in terms of assumed categories, to be generative or 
adaptive.
I question the naturalness of current assumptions about thought and 
learning by tracing the consolidation of the present discursive formation 
around a presumed unity of logic, language, and causality based on the forms 
of geometry. A crucial move in that consolidation was Descartes' formulation of 
thought as essentially logical. As our culture deals with the contradictions 
inherent in this formulation, new disciplines of knowledge arise. Most 
interestingly for education, the new disciplines of cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence have pushed the idea that humans are "computers," that 
we reason by calculation, to the breaking point. It has become increasingly 
obvious that humans cannot think according to the forms of logic and 
connectionist theories which propose alternate images of mind are gaining 
ascendance.
The implications for education are large. I extensively explore the 
implications of connectionist modeling for a distinctively educational model of 
learning. These connectionist theories substitute a shifting and uncertain web of 
associations for the solid storage metaphor common to most educational 
theorizing and methods. The stability which can no longer be located in the
sovereign self m ust instead be found in the world and in the socially-based 
practices that constitute both the world and the individual. Situated cognition, 
pragmatists, and poststructural sociologists are explored to understand the new 
constellation surrounding learning. A short exploratory study, based on the 
principles that emerged from the study, of an alternate way to teach categories 
is experimentally explored and found successful. This work was extended to a 
computer-based implementation which allowed theoretical ideas concerning 
time and activity to be explored. Includes a Macintosh disk.
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Learning Problem s
The cognitive revolution simply absorbed the concept of learning into 
the broader concept of "the acquisition of knowledge."
—Jerome Bruner, 
Acts of Meaning, 1990, p. 105
The first task of a study such as this is to establish its problem as a problem
for the reader and to leave that reader in a position to understand why the
author is concerned. The explanation given is always translatable as a story, a
story about a fascination, a problematic situation, an attempt to understand the
situation and to draw a useful meaning out of the problem and our reaction to
it. I offer the following as a metaphor for the story that I would like to tell.
I want to tell a story, a story about learning and a story about love; a story
which is finally about meaning.
This is always a particular story. It is a simple story, perhaps the simplest of
all stories. So simple and so true that we have never questioned the full
implications of it....
I sit in a room and watch a young child in a crib beneath an open 
window. She is beautiful, or I think she is. I sit immobilized, fascinated.
A cool gust of wind moves the curtains, annoying the child. Her mother, 
harried, returns and bends over the crib. The baby perceives motion, 
turns her head and recognizes her mother. She gurgles, smiles, reaches 
out and is softly gathered in ....
There are any number of miracles in this story but I want to focus on a 
particular one: the child recognizes her mother's face.
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It is miraculous, but in more than our common sense of being wonderful. It 
is miraculous in the older sense of being inexplicable, in the older sense of being 
quite literally impossible to explain logically.
But we do explain it logically, or at least we impute the forms of formal 
logic: if X, then Y. If the baby is cold and if the baby knows that Mother has 
been warm, then she holds out her arms to be picked up. I choose this story, in 
part, because we have an intuitive sense that in this case our explanation is 
inadequate. Something within tells us that there is more to this story.
Logic is how, almost universally, our culture frames our understanding of 
thought. But we are uneasy about making the claim that the baby actually 
operates in this formal, propositional way. We are not uneasy in making the 
claim that a six-year-old child learning his letters operates in this way. We do 
make the claim that our bosses operate this way. We even make the claim that 
we operate this way.
I think that we are wrong. I think that thought cannot be propositional. I 
think that it cannot take the form of formal logic. And I believe that this is not 
an inconsequential mistake. At stake here is the very making of meaning. Our 
society—and especially our schools and our academic practices—are predicated 
on the idea that the process of thought takes the form of logic and that what is 
not "logical" can only be a source of "error." Real meaning, canonical meaning, 
is logical; it is known by what it is not—not contextual, not particular, and 
certainly not uncertain. This leads us to ignore "lesser" forms of learning that 
are, obviously and intrinsically, contextual, particular, and ambiguous. By 
ignoring perceptually-based learning such as the child exhibits in favor of the 
acquisition of decontextualized facts, schools implicitly deny the sort of 
connected, meaningful learning that comes easily to every child in favor of a 
regime of knowledge that is disconnected and difficult. If it is a mistake to
believe that the kind of learning that the child does when she comes to 
recognize her mother's face is inconsequential, and that such learning has a 
very direct relationship to the sorts of meaningful learning that leads to 
competence on the part of students, then rectifying that mistake may have far- 
reaching consequences for the practice of education.
Learning and Descriptive Theorization
The child's coming to recognize the mother is arguably the first instance of 
learning for each child. That we have not been able to credibly explain hoiv this 
is possible stands as a profound indictment of our understanding of learning.
We are generally content to simply describe the conditions under which 
such knowledge is acquired.1 Or, more accurately, we describe the conditions 
under which knowledge is acquired and then the conditions under which 
acquisition fails and attribute the failure to the difference between the two 
descriptions. The weakness of this approach is most vividly revealed in 
situations where learning typically succeeds. The success cannot be explained 
because there are no differences to which we may attribute it. Because we can 
find almost no conditions under which the child does not learn to recognize 
faces—or form categories or learn language—we conclude that processes which 
underlie these powers have little to teach us. But this conclusion depends on the 
crucial assumption that learning can be explicated by referring to the conditions 
under which knowledge (understood as learning's residue) is acquired. The 
sleight-of-hand, behaviorist substitution of the observable conditions of 
knowledge acquisition for the process of learning is what allows us to dismiss,
1 For a recent synthetic article in this vein, see: Margaret C. Wang, Geneva D. Haertel, and 
Herbert J. Walberg, "Toward a Knowledge Case for School Learning," Review of Educational 
Research 63 (Fall, 1993): 249-294.
as "unproblematic" and therefore uninteresting in the context of schooling, 
facial recognition, category formation, and language acquisition. We are led to 
abandon the study of learning, and especially learning that almost always 
succeeds, in order to study the conditions under which knowledge acquisition 
fails.
In this crucial regard the much-touted cognitive revolution fails to break 
w ith its behaviorist antecedents. It fails to move from knowledge and its 
acquisition to learning. It simply admits, in a structuralist response, that 
structures can exist within the head that correspond to the structures of the 
world. This simple admission does not differentiate cognitivists from 
behaviorists. Many behaviorists would not dispute the existence of mental 
structures; rather, cognitivism differs from behaviorism in its attitude toward 
the profitability of pursuing the question of mental structures.2 As such, simple 
cognitivism does not break with traditional approaches, and educators are left 
w ith the same old wine repackaged in new bottles.
By not attempting to understand context-dependent, successful learning and 
its implications, education effectively abandons the possibility of constructing 
an understanding of learning that is not fundamentally descriptive. Descriptive 
theorizing, while often necessary when the material processes which constitute 
phenomena are opaque, is fundamentally conservative—it describes already 
established practices and cannot generate new ones. Descriptive theories start 
w ith the categories that tradition offers. It takes these categories as "natural"— 
as self-evident. If these categories are taken as natural then any difficult, 
conflicting data resulting from further inquiry into the matter at hand is likely
2 This point is often underemphasized and a casual reader of cognitive literature could come 
away with the impression that the difference between the two schools is based on the existence 
of mental structures. See Howard Gardner, The Mind's New Science (Basic Books: New York, 
1985).
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to result in finer and finer subdivisions of the categories and more and more
conditional rules being generated to account for the anomalous results of
inquiry. Without the limits which a material process imposes on the possible
relations that constitute objects the radical xmderdetermination of descriptive
theory encourages the theoretician to postulate an ever more complex and
numerous entities to elaborate the traditional scheme. It was just this process
that resulted in the elaboration of the Ptolemaic system of astronomy w ith its
circles within circles. The functional, modularist school of cognitive psychology,
starting with the objects offered it by the traditional folk psychologies appears
well advanced down this road. "Memory," for instance is broken into long and
short term memories with various relational rules governing their interaction
and fundamentally different processes of thinking are argued for language and
sense-based forms of thought.
While others have rebelled against descriptive theorizing, few have done so
with such fine invective as John Dewey:
. . .  such logic only abstracts some aspect of the existing course of events 
in order to reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle by which to 
explain the very changes of which it is a formalization.3
Dewey was objecting to substituting a reifying, "objective" description,
which he saw as grounded in an unhealthy reliance on the transcendent forms
of logic for the preferable grounds of perception and inference in an attempt to
ground our understanding in the interactions "of changing things."4
Because descriptive theories can have access only to the "products" of
learning, they are necessarily reifying theories of knowledge rather than
3 John Dewey, "The influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," chap. in The Influence ofD am in  
on Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1965), 14-15.
4 Ibid., p 7.
theories of learning. They can only describe w hat is known and the conditions 
under which this knowledge came to be known, abstract a simplified form, and 
impose this pattern on future instances. Critically, descriptive theories have no 
principled method to discover new ways to organize the data that they take as 
basic. By and large they m ust start w ith the categories that the history of their 
society offers them—and this systematically limits their explanation to the 
traditional categories and divisions.
The reliance on descriptive theorization has resulted in the conflation of 
theories of knowledge acquisition with theories of learning.5 Theories of 
knowledge acquisition are concerned with the conditions under which 
knowledge is acquired. Theories of learning, by contrast, should be concerned 
with the processes by which that change that we call learning occurs. In the 
final analysis, a better understanding of both learning and knowledge will be 
necessary to develop a fuller theory of instruction—but we most acutely lack a 
credible theory of learning.
It is a central contention of this study that coming to an understanding of 
learning which is not simply descriptive, but which instead is an account of 
material processes, is basic to reconceptualizing learning in a way that can lead 
to the improvement of educational practice.
Psychologism and Learning Theory
Descriptive theorizing makes a priori, culturally normative assumptions as 
to the appropriate level of description. Traditionally, learning theories have 
focused on the individual level. As such, learning fit—however 
uncomfortably—into the discipline of psychology. Academic psychology thus
5 A point well made by Bruner in the quotation that heads this chapter. Jerome S. Bruner, 
Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 105.
became the theoretical well from which the practice in the applied field of 
education was drawn. In adopting this psychologistic approach, education has 
largely ignored the crucial social elements of learning and the fully social basis 
of knowledge.
Critique of psychologistic theory and practice has been a bracing part of the 
recent discourse of educational theory.6 Theoretical inspiration is now being 
draw n from such diverse fields as literary theory, sociology, anthropology, 
cognitive science, discourse theory, narrative theory, aesthetics, practice theory, 
post-structuralism, post-modernism, and linguistics.7 Either explicitly or 
implicitly (by emphasizing particular social practices as narrative theory does), 
such critiques move the focus of educational theory away from the sovereign 
individual. Nonetheless, the thrust of such critiques has been to oppose 
particular psychological theories and practices justified by these particular 
theories rather than to oppose psychologism itself.8 Generally speaking, 
interpretations draw n from these fields do not challenge the centrality of the 
individual in questions which concern the actual tasks of teaching and learning.
This appropriation of ambiguous or even patently anti-individualistic 
theories to the service of individualistic practice is neither new nor, in an 
historical context, surprising.9 But it is under-appreciated in the current
6 See, for instance: Bruner, Acts of Meaning, 105.
7 See the wide array of voices in: William F. Pinar, ed., Contemporary Curriculum Discourses 
(Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick, 1988).
8 Exceptions distinguish themselves by their rarity. For two good examples, see: Jean Lave 
and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning; Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Valerie Walkerdine, The Mastery of Reason: Cognitive 
Development and the Production of Rationality (London: Routledge, 1988).
9 This misuse has been a particular problem with the pragmatists. Readers may wish to 
persuade themselves that the pragmatists were not individualists in the sense used here. See, as
circumstance. Potentially progressive theories are bravely used to shore up the 
status quo while exuding the pretense of radical change.10 Taking one extreme 
as an example, E. D. Hirsh has combined elements suggested by cognitive 
science and discourse theory11 to suggest that discursive competence can be 
achieved via the didactic teaching and simple memorization of a list of 
culturally significant elemental facts. These unstructured facts are taken as 
examples of schemata which subserve discursive competence. Most proponents 
of either theoretical school would reject his construction as representing their 
theoretical convictions. Similarly, insights from sociology, anthropology, and 
organization theory are used to inform and buttress "cooperative learning 
strategies," but such strategies are finally understood as more effective ways to 
achieve the unaltered endpoint: individual learning.
Quite simply, nothing has interrupted the preunderstanding of schooling in 
which learning is distinctively individualistic and hence psychologistic. As long 
as we regard learning as essentially a task accomplished by individuals to the 
end of increasing their store of useful knowledge, it is hard to see how the 
fundamentally psychologistic orientation of education can be altered.
The need for a broader definition of the problem of education has long been 
acknowledged. The educational work of Dewey, and the more thoroughly 
elaborated pragmatic descriptions of the constitution of the self and the 
importance of the act put forth by George Herbert Mead, give a firm historical
examples: John Dewey and Arthur F. Bently, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon, 1949) and 
George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
10 John A. St. Julien, "Situated Cognition, Apprenticeship, and Sdiooling," Paper presented 
at the Fourteenth Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Dayton, OH, 14- 
17 October 1992.
11 E. D. Hirsh, Cultural Literacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), 33-93.
grounding to more social ways of understanding the context of learning.12 
Current theories based on the work of such as Pierre Bordieu, Jean Lave and 
Valerie Walker dine offer ways to extend theories of experience and action by a 
fine-grained analysis of the practice, or habitus, of which they are composed.
But, like older theories, m odern work does not propose a learning process. 
Like theories that they are set in opposition to, they describe the conditions 
under which learning occurs. They differ by describing the distinctive social 
context in which learning occurs and by problematizing the relation of the 
individual to that social context. Still, such theories are finally theories of 
knowledge acquisition, not learning, and insofar as educational adopters 
remain free to assume that learning remains at its root the memorization of 
facts, the full value of this advance will not be available to students.
Education and the Need to Go Beyond the Theorization Given
Because descriptive theorizing is not generative—being a description of 
w hat is already perceived projected onto unknown situations—it often proves 
sterile in practice. Education, caught in a basically descriptive account of 
learning, has suffered from this effect. One of the most troubling aspects of 
education's long crisis is the oft-noted institutional tendency to persist in the 
practice of discredited methods and strategies of teaching. It is a contention of 
this work that—at least in part—current practices continue to exist, even 
though repeatedly and convincingly critiqued, because no plausible alternative 
is understood to exist for the current understanding of learning and knowledge 
that supports them.
12 Two fine examples are: Dewey and Bently, Knowing and the Known and Mead, The 
Philosophy of the Act.
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An example may serve: memorization is "bad." This is a central credo of 
almost any program of teacher education and is routinely repeated by 
practicing teachers. Such a critique is not empty of content, research-based or 
lived. Research demonstrates and teachers' experience confirms that material 
understood as lists for memorization is poorly remembered and (even when 
retrievable) seldom brought to bear on appropriate problems. Nonetheless, 
from teaching the alphabet to making lists of characteristics which distinguish 
eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells, memorization is the first and often the last 
task set for the student. The implicit contradiction between omnipresent 
practice and substantiated judgments concerning the value of such practice is a 
painful condition of educational life.
But given the classic assumptions about knowledge, the commitment of facts 
to memory is necessary. Learning simply is the commitment of facts to memory. 
At root, almost no one quarrels with that. The most progressive will insist that 
the facts that are learned m ust be useful in a real-world context—and will 
attem pt to teach methods of problem solving to students. Ironically, what is 
most often offered is a list of strategies to be memorized in addition to the list of 
facts. W hat follows from the conjunction of the demonstrated ineffectiveness of 
memorization and the understanding that memorization is what learning 
consists of is the conclusion that it is how we teach students to memorize that is 
at fault.
Hence arises the plethora of "strategies" that constitute the staple of teacher 
instruction. The solution is to "sweeten" memorization, to make it fun, and to 
make sure peripheral factors like "low self-esteem" do not interfere with the 
process. Indicative of the poverty of this approach is the cyclical nature of 
educational reform in the area. There are only so many ways to "sweeten" 
memorization and as each strategy tries and fails to secure a basic improvement
11
in student competence, veteran teachers notice, with understandable cynicism, 
the recycling of previously failed strategies.
W hen we look at educational problems in this light, we begin to suspect that 
either experience—both research-based and lived—or our conception of 
learning is wrong. This dissertation is largely dedicated to the task of affirming 
experience and to demonstrating that a viable alternative to the traditional 
conception of learning is emerging and may be able to help us exit the 
(un)merry-go-round of educational reform.
In short, our psychologistic, descriptive orientation has focused our attention 
narrowly on the conscious individual to the exclusion of perceptual and 
unconscious processes which lie "before" the individual and to the exclusion of 
the socially organized regularities in which everyday cognition takes place. The 
sterile recycling-of educational solutions presses us toward the conclusion that 
learning needs to be reconceptualized in order to serve our students 
adequately.
But if psychological perspectives do not and cannot create the intellectual 
apparatus to interrupt the present organization of schooling practices, then in 
what direction can the teacher turn? This question arises in education with 
particular force for, unlike many academic fields—most saliently, anthropology 
and cognitive science—education is intimately tied to the world of practical 
application. Simple disproof of an organizing theory is not enough to change 
practice; both a basic disproof and an alternative, positive conception are 
needed to effect fundamental change. Previous attempts to displace the 
individualistic or logocentric positions which have characterized educational 
practice have foundered by not producing a convincing case for abandoning the 
theoretical assumptions which underlie such traditional practice. This has made 
it possible to adopt the rhetoric and even the surface form of the practices
advocated by educators such as Dewey without making a fundamental 
commitment to a different conceptual universe. Dewey's work, and other forms 
of active learning, are (mis)understood as mere strategies to sugar coat in yet 
another way the traditional assumption that learning consists of listing and 
memorizing facts.
What is needed is an understanding of the material process of learning that 
competes directly w ith the logocentric assumptions of the Western tradition. 
Only a perspective that directly challenges the idea that thought is logic can 
provide a firm basis for altering educational practice. It will be argued below 
that education is prey to a specie of the "intentionality problem." It is not 
apparent to our students what most of the curriculum is "about." The 
decontextualization of school knowledge is a recurrent theme in curriculum 
theory. But it is seldom recognized how deeply the decontextualized 
knowledge that we object to in schooling is due to our basic understanding of 
thought and learning themselves. It is no accident that schools teach as if 
knowledge were constructed of atomistic, decontextualized fragments. The 
dominant tradition of our culture holds that just this is true. Schools simply 
enact what society proposes. W hat is needed is a way to tie the processes which 
are the basis for the child's recognition of her mother to the competencies that 
are sought by schooling. A child's recognition of her mother is manifestly about 
her mother. And her reaching out to be held is an inarguably competent 
response.
A student should leave school similarly competent to act in the world; it is 
becoming progressively clearer that this is not the same as being able to 
manipulate formal symbolic systems. Instead, current work empirically
demonstrates that competence in the world is embedded in the network of 
practices that social groups share and which organize their interaction.13
Connectionist Learning, Situated Knowledge
This dissertation will attem pt to make sensible the potential importance of 
connectionist approaches to learning when understood in conjunction with 
situated perspectives on knowledge. As developed here, this program attempts 
to evade the bifurcation of self and the world which has produced the problem 
of intentionality. The connection between the symbol and the object it 
represents is taken as entirely arbitrary and hence essentially meaningless in 
most popular theories of meaning. In opposition, the approach advocated here 
finds meaningful connections between symbols and objects in the world in the 
social, lived practices experienced by the actor.
Initially, connectionist learning and situated knowledge may seem like 
unlikely partners. They emerge from very different venues and appear to 
pursue different paths toward the question of hum an meaning-making. 
Comiectionism emerges out of computational theory, systems theory, and 
neurology. Situated perspectives on knowledge emphasize sociological and 
phenomenological factors and are particularly indebted to the socially oriented 
theories exemplified by Lev Vygotsky.
13 For an overview of recent research, see: Bonnie A. Nardi, "Studying Context: A 
Comparison of Activity Theory, Situated Action Models, and Distributed Cognition," Paper 
presented at the East-West HCI Conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, 4-8 August 1992. For 
particular instances, see also: Lave and Wenger, Situated Learning; Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation, 1991; Valerie Walkerdine, "Redefining the subject in situated cognition theory," 
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San 
Francisco, CA, 20-24 April 1992; Donald A. Norman, The Psychology of Everyday Things (New  
York: Basic Books, 1988), and Edward Hutchins, "The Social Organization of Distributed 
Cognition," in Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, ed. Lauren B. Resnick, John M. Levine, 
and Stephanie D. Teasley (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1991), 283-307.
In part they meet in their absences. Situated cognition and connectionism 
both avoid a focus on the traditional hero of the story of learning: the 
individual. They also provide complementary stories which fill out each other's 
shortcomings. Connectionism tells an intriguing and suggestive story of just 
how context-dependent learning, associative memory, and other educationally 
central mysteries can arise in the material world. But its explanation of these 
factors leaves new questions of how stability of representation is maintained. 
Situated cognition, w ith its emphasis on embodied practices, fills in this gap 
w ith socially organized regularities found in the world which substitute for 
stable symbols found in the head. Similarly, situated cognition, while providing 
a true advance in explaining the context dependence of knowledge and tracing 
out the ways in which this is intersubjectively organized, leaves us with no 
sense of how individuals can act across situations and is crippled in explaining 
how the powerful abstractions which are the chief object of school learning can 
arise. Connectionism can fill those gaps without forcing situated perspectives 
back onto the questionable path of individualism.
More positively, connectionism and situated perspectives meet in their 
common analytical stance. Both focus on network architecture and the material 
processes that constitute, respectively, learning and knowledge. Network 
architectures suggest that cause is not so much determinative as it is 
constrained. That is, Newtonian, billiard-ball conceptions of causality are 
traded for a dense network of relational connections which, in concert, limit the 
paths that their system can take over time. This analytical model, often 
associated with Darwin's introduction of evolution into scientific discourse,14 
remains an underutilized intellectual tool which has proven powerful in the
14 Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, 
Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue With Nature (New York: Bantam, 1984).
hands of researchers in both of these fields. Both areas of research also 
determinedly keep their eye on the ball of material process. They avoid purely 
general, descriptive theorizing in favor of the analysis of the small-grained, 
material, interlocking networks which constitute the phenomena they study.
It is w orth noting that because of the style of theorizing they share, they are 
not in a position to offer prescriptive advice about any and all situations in 
which their analytical tools could be used. In an educational context this means 
that while they both point toward constraints on educational practice, they do 
not suggest "the best" strategy. Rather, they reveal w hat is unlikely to result in 
the learning of useful knowledge. Neither is in a position to suggest a single, 
best method for education. The choices, finally, are our own.
Strategic Choices
This project is committed to working toward a basis for a theory of 
instruction in schools; it examines connectionist and situated perspectives with 
an eye toward that goal and not a general, abstract theory of cognition. On the 
basis of a synthesis of the relevant research, it suggests that a more useful 
educational approach to learning would join the "about-ness" of connectionist 
perception to the competent knowledge embedded in practices. This is not a 
prescriptive project which seeks to define the best teaching method, but one 
which hopes to constrain theory and practice by eliminating particular, 
untenable assumptions about learning. Beyond eliminating approaches, it also 
hopes to offer intellectual instrumentalities15 through which to perceive and 
think about learning which will prove useful in the interpretation of research
15 The phrase "intellectual instumentalities " is drawn from Kliebard, who in turn attributes 
it to John Dewey. Herber M. Kliebard, "What is a Knowledge Base, and Who Would Use it If 
We Had One?" Reviezv of Educational Research 63 (Fall, 1993): 295-303.
and the design of instruction. In fact, it provides support for the position that 
the creative act of teaching lies ineradicably in the teacher's hands by 
emphasizing unique particularity of any act of cognition in a way that casts 
doubt on the universalistic assumptions that support teacher-proof curricula.
I have argued that our culture in general and the dominant strand of 
educational discourse in particular ignore the possibilities of focusing on 
learning in favor of a culturally preferred focus on the conditions under which 
knowledge is acquired. Metaphorically, we ignore the child who learns to 
recognize her mother's face in favor of the adolescent who (sometimes) learns 
geometry. The descriptive, psychologistic theory that has resulted from this 
predilection has not served students well.
By substituting a theory of knowledge acquisition for a theory of learning, 
we are largely unable to reconceive our practice in a way which will benefit our 
students. Such a substitution occludes the fact that we have no theory of 
learning and this blind spot is a surer bar to our creative thought on these 
matters than an incorrect theory would be, for it diverts our attention from the 
heart of the educational enterprise—learning it does so by substituting what is 
taught and how reliably w hat is taught is transmitted for how learning takes 
place and how effective, meaningful learning can be encouraged.
The project, then, is not so much to critique the old framework—this has 
been convincingly done by others. Nor, finally, is it only to present a new 
theoretical framework that is more useful. This, too, has been convincingly 
assayed, not only in the current framework but as far back as John Dewey. 
Neither incisive critiques nor enticing alternatives have had much effect on the 
practice of education. I will ask, why not? If socially situated approaches to 
cognition have been implicit in the most sophisticated approaches to the 
problems of learning (including socialization and perception as forms of
learning), why haven't practices been adopted which reflect these insights? 
Crucially for educators, why has education not been noticeably affected by 
these insights into what we take to be our basic task: encouraging learning?
I suspect that a major reason is that taking such a viewpoint on learning 
implies deep differences from the culturally canonical position on individuality 
and thought. It is difficult to imagine a more difficult and counterintuitive 
position than one which asks us to see that our very experience of ourselves 
and our thought is historically specific, culturally interpreted, and potentially 
problematic. Thorough-going situated perspectives go further and make the 
claim that not only is our self-conception problematic, it is wrong—or at least 
profoundly misleading. Previous impulses in the direction of a socially 
grounded, perceptually aware cognition have failed to overcome this barrier 
which is strategically situated in our very perception of ourselves. Insights 
emerging from the various isolated disciplines were simply swamped by the 
larger framework which supported the canonical position. Perception became 
an isolated technical field, anthropology was marginalized, and perspectives in 
psychology and education were ignored or their meaning was transformed in 
their implementation. The history of Dewey's attempt to insert a social 
conception of learning into the discourses of both philosophy and education is 
uncomfortably instructive in this regard.16 G. H. Mead's social psychology 
became a pale imitation of its basic intuition as it was transmuted into the 
symbolic interactionist school of sociology. James' associative psychology and 
the gestalt psychology of pattern recognition (in both its perceptual and 
hum anist forms) fared no better against the logicist alternatives.
16 As with much of Dewey's work, it seems more fruitful to go to Dewey when discussing 
misinterpretations and misappropriations than to his commentators. See: Dewey, "Appendix: 
Letter to a Friend," in Knowing and the Known, 313-329; Dewey, "Preface," in The Influence of 
Danvin on Philosophy, iii-vi.
We need to ask ourselves, what is to prevent the same things from 
happening to a perspective based on connectionist pattern recognition and the 
socially aware alternative of situated cognition? How can we avoid having 
valuable insights swamped by the "natural," already established framework of 
explanation?
Perhaps the greatest advantage of alternate perspectives in the present day is 
an awareness of this problematic history. An awareness that past attempts have 
not been as successful as could be wished leads to an attempt to understand the 
historical conditions under which such attempts have labored and the tactics 
that they have employed. More specifically, observing the history of past 
attempts allows us to see that the force of the canonical assumption that 
thought is logical cannot be countered by simply pointing out that this is a 
descriptive theoretical frame—an implication of Dewey's work cited above— 
that has not worked and positing a presumptively better theoretical frame. The 
history of pragmatism gives testimony to this. The canonical assumption of 
thought as logic apparently needs to be challenged at the level of its root, not its 
fruit.
In addition, alternate perspectives have labored under the weight and 
against the systematicity of the way that our culture regards the self and 
thought, the world and the real. The pervasive and mutually reinforcing 
relationships that compose this system of thought work against change in any 
single area.17 The most strikingly different insights (and Dewey is always a
17 The need to embed particular theoretical advances in a larger context which supports 
them is beginning to enter educational discourse. Both Gee and Clancey in recent work argue 
that their particular work needs to be embedded in a larger story stretching from biology to 
sociality to be effective. See: James Paul Gee, The Social Mind; Language, Ideology and Social 
Practice (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1992) and William J. Clancey and Jeremy Roschelle, 
"Situated Cognition: How Representations are Created and Given Meaning," Paper presented 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, IL, 3-7 
April 1991.
good example) are interpreted in ways that make sense in terms of the 
background understanding and are then implemented in "rational" ways. Any 
valuable, distinctively different, contribution that they might have made is 
washed out during this process.
Third, and this is a particularly educational demand, some real, tangible 
difference that can be seen as an improvement over current instructional 
strategies needs to flow from the new perspective.
This array of problems implies a triadic strategy. First, the basic 
understanding of learning itself needs to be the fundamental issue. Second, 
granting the deep embeddedness and systematic nature of the current 
conception, a wide spectrum of evidence which provides the foundations for an 
alternate conception of learning m ust be arrayed across historical, biological, 
social, and even computational fields. Third, the framework proposed should 
imply differences in how the field of educational practice—research, materials, 
and instructional design—is conducted.
The Plan of this Dissertation
This dissertation tries to fill in some of the holes in an alternate, more useful, 
story about the nature of learning. It is a daunting project. Broadly, I will argue 
that at a deeply cultural level the West has taken a turn away from learning 
which has proven unproductive from the point of view of education. This turn 
has deprived educators of the tools with which to think productively about 
crucial aspects of their enterprise. The task that is taken up here is to build new 
lenses with which to view education and new tools w ith which to build 
educational practice.
This first chapter attempts to bring the reader into the problem. It works to 
show w hy learning theory, or rather its absence, is a problem and w hy the 
absence of a learning theory based in material change has not been seen as a 
problem.
Chapter 2 pursues the history of the current discursive structure and the 
relationship between that structure, its contradictions, and the development of 
cognitive science. It attempts to demonstrate that the received understanding of 
our selves and our relationship to the world is not natural, but is a response to 
an earlier crisis of representation. In trying to bridge a gap which the dynamics 
of the earlier discourse of patterning had opened up between the word and the 
thing represented, the current analytico-referential discourse posits three 
parallel systems. Language, logic, and the world are held to have the same 
form—to operate according to the same rules over similar objects. Because they 
are identical in this way they can be arranged to operate in parallel. The world 
is taken as logical, logic is taken as analogous to causal relations in the world, 
and language is taken as capable of reflecting accurately both of these relations. 
As this discourse develops, its dynamics also produce evidence that this 
ordering is not so much a description of things as they are but an unrealistic 
assumption about how meaning is made.
Viewed against the background of an unraveling discourse, debates within 
cognitive science between logic and statistics, biology and formalism, and 
knowledge acquisition and learning take on heightened significance. 
Understanding the historical context allows the reader to see the emergence of 
connectionist alternatives to logical formalism as a particularly crucial site—the 
location of our own self-image—for reformulating our sense of how meaning is 
made. This context also highlights the reasons that perspectives such as 
connectionism are, at least initially, counter-intuitive: they are discursively
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"unnatural" and threaten the current structures which organize our meaning 
making.
Chapter 3 dives into an exposition of connectionism as a theory of learning. 
This chapter attempts to reconstruct some of our common mental conceptions 
on a connectionist basis. Relying in places on computer simulations 
redeveloped by the author, a model of context-dependent associative memory 
and category formation is built which demonstrates a robustness which 
artificial intelligence constructs, founded as they are on the logocentric 
assumptions of the analytico-referential discourse, cannot match. This approach 
leads to understanding learning as a change which takes place in a material, 
relational network. A web of such networked relations makes possible the 
crucial phenomena of distributed representation, and increasingly complex 
layering and recursive interactions between layers are shown to enable more 
and more sophisticated forms of learning. The chapter examines the 
psychological, computational, and neurological plausibility of connectionist 
architectures, concluding that in each realm connectionist perspectives are more 
plausible than its competitors'. This, however, does not mean that accepting 
connectionism as a viable learning theory solves the educational problems that 
followed on the conflation of learning and knowledge acquisition. 
Disentangling these two concepts leaves us with a theory of learning but 
without a compatible theory of knowledge. Knowledge, the knowledge valued 
by the community, is what teachers are charged to teach, and a learning theory 
which hopes to aid educators in  the construction of better a pedagogy m ust ally 
itself with a congruent theory of knowledge if a useful theory of instruction is 
to be developed.
Pursuing the question of a theory of knowledge adequate to the task of 
instruction, chapter 4 develops a focus on practices as recurring patterns of
interaction which form the basis for a social theory of knowledge. This chapter 
enters the subject by reviewing the ongoing "representation debate" in the 
academy and pointing to the distinctive position implied by connectionist 
architectures—a position which offers a third path to competing formalist and 
imagist alternatives. A connectionist viewpoint inverts the usual perspectives 
concerning representation and finds the stability, not the instability, of 
representation a problem in need of explanation. Because connectionist 
networks are inherently unstable, and because this instability is associated with 
the useful characteristics that move researchers to adopt the stance, some other 
source of representational stability m ust be sought. This chapter pursues the 
possibility of locating the necessary and observable stability in the 
intersubjectively regularized interactions which comprise our relations with the 
socially-organized world we inhabit.
While focusing on Vygotskian and situated approaches to cognition, chapter 
4 remains mindful of the obligation that theorization has to schools and 
students. It will not be enough to claim that the sorts of learning most easily 
understandable from a situated connectionist perspective are not the learning 
that we honor in schools. Rather, it will be necessary to explain the sorts of 
displaced but nonetheless embodied learnings that are valued by the 
community. These are represented by three-digit multiplication. In working to 
explain abstract, displaced knowledge, the emerging alternative relies on the 
previously developed approach to category formation and suggests that 
abstract cognitive tools are built in the same way that more concrete categories 
are built. Thus the practices associated with addition (leftward displacement, 
vertical addition) are redeployed in multiplication to construct new, more 
abstract, and arguably more powerful, cognitive tools.
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Chapters 2,3 and 4 work to fill the first two goals in my "triadic" strategy 
for developing an alternative, more educationally useful approach to learning 
and cognition. They focus on building a learning theory in a broad historical 
context which is plausible given the constraints of neurology, situated 
cognition, and computational theory. Having laid out a skeletal framework for 
an alternate approach to learning and knowledge, I must demonstrate how this 
difference can make a difference. Chapters 5 and 6 begin to work in this 
direction.
Chapter 5 takes up the issues of research design and analysis in the context 
of the design of instructional materials. Using constructs suggested by the 
developing situated/learning perspective, a significantly different approach to 
teaching the distinction between eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells in the 
discipline of microbiology is constructed. Extracted from a larger experimental 
framework, the connectionist/practice approach suggests differences from 
traditional text genres which are statistically analyzed. By and large, the 
analysis indicates that the new material works as well and often better than the 
more familiar traditional material in enabling students to make a correct 
distinction between eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells.
While the results from chapter 5 are encouraging, the experimental study 
examined there was constrained by the experimental context and the nature of 
paper-based materials to slight two crucial and particularly distinctive aspects 
of the emerging perspective on learning: the importance of situated activity and 
particularly the hermeneutic, temporally embedded aspect of that activity. 
Chapter 6 takes on the task of making the implications of these aspects clearer 
in the context of developing a computer-based learning module which takes 
advantage of the underutilized plasticity of the medium to make a more 
dynamic presentation of the eukaryotic/prokaryotic distinction possible. This
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program serves as a model for teaching the bifurcating, absolute distinctions 
which are typical of taxonomies and classical categorization in general. Sample 
screens are discussed, as is the progressive construction of categories through 
the manipulative activity of the user. The program itself is included as an 
appendix and the reader is encouraged to work the sequence in order to better 
understand the dynamically oriented position taken in the analysis.
Chapter 7 summarizes the work, characterizes the position taken on 
learning, and suggests that this position fits into a more general intellectual 
style of analysis emerging across a number of intellectual fields. It points to 
gaps remaining to be filled in the current position on learning taken by this 
dissertation and lays out associated areas for further exploration using this style 
of analysis. Development and the construction of the self in activity are two 
areas in which the author hopes to integrate the positions taken herein with 
progressive stances taken in those literatures.
The perspective offered in this work is largely a matter of reinterpreting our 
understanding of the world and ourselves in terms of realistic constraints on 
our theory and practice—our praxis. The attempt is not so much to provide a 
basis for radically changing what we do in schools (though in places that seems 
appropriate) as it is to give us new tools through which to view the ongoing 
successes and failures of our engagement with students, and thereby revitalize 
our work. If it is successful, it will allow us to view the child who learns to 
recognize her mother's face successfully and act competently as a part of that 
recognition as continuous with the students in our classroom—and as 
deserving of our wonder and appreciation as any newborn. It attempts, in 




The Horizon Against Which It Appears
W hen a m an reasons, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total from
addition of parcels, for REASON . . .  is nothing but reckoning . . . .
—Hobbes, 
The Leviathan, 1958, p. 45
This chapter concentrates on providing a background against which 
connectionist theorizing can appear as a response to historically specific ways 
of knowing. It will argue that the received understanding of mental functions 
and their composition is not, as that understanding represents itself, "natural," 
but is a historically contingent approach to self-understanding. This work will 
not represent connectionism as other than historically contingent. 
Connectionism is understandable only as a historically specific way of viewing 
ourselves formed in direct response to problems created by the contradictions 
of the traditional understanding, and is arrived at by using tools developed 
within this tradition.
In pursuing the goal of placing connectionism against a cultural and 
historical background which makes it sensible, this section will trace its history 
on two widely divergent time scales. First, a broad historical overview will be 
offered. This will review the rise of the current way of understanding ourselves 
and the world, w ith a focus on tracking the broad shape of a coalescing 
understanding of mental activity that is the received or traditional 
interpretation. Second, against this background, the specific interdisciplinary
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field of cognitive science from which connectionism emerges will be described. 
Battles w ithin this field recapitulate positions—and outcomes—familiar from 
the larger historical context.
The Current Context
The pursuit of a goal such as situating connectionism does not appear 
simply as the disinterested intellectual "play" of a postmodern analytic. Rather, 
the need for such an exploration reveals itself in the dramatic clashes taking 
place w ithin the disciplines concerned with understanding the realm of the 
human. One could, and many have, noted the turmoil in the scientific 
disciplines. The verities of our culture have lost their quality as truths. 
Newtonian physics gives way to quantum  uncertainty. The center of scientific 
theorization shifts to the unstable ground of biology and evolutionary theory.18 
Chemistry lays claim to fundamental principles of the organization of matter in 
the rise of nonlinear dynamics. There is a thriving academic industry in 
pointing out the collapse of traditional patterns of explanation in specific 
disciplines and the blurring of disciplinary boundaries themselves.19
Certainly these shifts are important, but they are shifts in our communities' 
explanation of the world; they treat the nature of hum an understanding as a 
background factor. This particular discussion will focus more narrowly on the 
way this conflict manifests itself in the realm of cognitive science and academic 
psychology. The educator finds this realm of special importance because it is 
the well from which the practice of education is drawn—or at least the way in
18 M. Grene, The Knowerand the Known (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).
19 Clifford Geertz, "Blurred Genres," chap. in Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 19-35.
which teachers justify their practice. Our culture invests these disciplines with 
the authority to understand ourselves and, in some ways more pointedly, to 
understand the way we understand our world. At risk in the disorder within 
academic psychology and the newly ascendant cognitive sciences is our very 
understanding of ourselves. The terms of the disagreement could scarcely be 
more starkly dramatic. On the one hand, formalists such as Fodor20, Papert21, 
and Minsky22 accuse the insurgent connectionists of various forms of 
romanticism, behaviorism, gestaltism, and of being merely fashionable. Most 
tellingly, the repeated assertion is that the connectionists partake of the "holistic 
heresy."23 The thrust of their attack is that in one way or another—or in many 
ways—the connectionist resurgence is unscientifically motivated and 
methodologically suspect. For their part, connectionists and their allies accuse 
formalists of being deliberately blind to the interconnectedness of the material 
world24 and of being even more blind to the implications of hum anity's own 
way of being situated in the world.25 They believe that the insistence that the 
formalists make on inviolable levels of analysis amounts to little more than
20 Jerry Fodor, "The Mind-Body Problem,” Scientific American 244 (Jan., 1981): 124-133.
24 Seymour Papert, "One A1 or Many?" Daedalus (Winter, 1988): 1-14.
22 Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert, Perceptrons: An Introduction to Computational 
Geometry; Expanded Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 19-20.
23 Ibid.
24 Paul M. Churchland, "Chapter Five: The Methodological Problem," chap. in Matter and 
Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, revised ed. (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1988), 83-98.
25 See: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus Modeling the Brain: 
Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint," Daedalus 117 (Winter, 1988): 15-43, and Terry 
Winograd and Fernando Flores, Understanding Computers and Cognition (Reading, MA: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing, 1986).
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scientific dogmatism—a dogmatism that flies in the face of the history of 
science.26
Invective aside, the grounds for disagreement are substantial. The formalists 
take the traditional position that hum an thought is essentially logical. They 
hold the "physical symbol hypothesis;" Newell and Simon, the formulators of 
this phrase, define it succinctly and canonically as:
The Physical Symbol Hypothesis. A physical symbol system has the 
necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action.
By necessary we mean that any system which exhibits general 
intelligence will prove upon analysis to be a physical symbol system. By 
"sufficient" we mean that any physical symbol system of sufficient size 
can be organized further to exhibit general intelligence 27
The terms in which this definition is cast are revealing because they refer to
the traditional, logical way in which cause is established. A thing or event is
said to be caused by another thing or event if it can be established that it is
necessary (empirically, always co-occurring) and sufficient (no other thing or
event is necessary). Not so subtly, the claim is being made that one need look
no further for the "cause" of intelligence than a complex physical symbol
system, and that intelligence is an expression of such a system. This, coupled by
theorists w ith Turing's famous demonstration of the universality of his abstract
computational device, has been taken to mean that there is no need to consider
particular instances—that there is no need to understand hum an intelligence in
its particular, embodied form.
In its purest form this constitutes the essential position of the formalists. In
one set of concessions, the formalist camp has come to the conclusion that a
system must not only have the form of a physical symbol system referred to
26 Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of Mind-Brain 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 239-399.
27 Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus Modeling the Brain" 10.
above but m ust also possess at least some degree of context-specific information 
to manifest intelligent behavior.28 Much of the development of the field has 
surrounded the development of data structures which purport to model 
memory such as frames, schemata, and scripts.29 In a nutshell then, the 
formalists believe what I have labeled above the "theory theory." They believe 
that productive thought is a matter of logical operations over factual objects.
The model, ultimately, is one of geometric proof.30 According to their account 
intelligence is an abstract quality divorced from the material substrate in which 
it happens to be found.
The task they set themselves is to model the logic w h i c h  causes intelligent 
behavior in their scheme. They want to know how knowledge is organized to 
be useful.
Connectionists, on the other hand, stand opposed to such a formulation. 
They believe logical cause has little to do with the process which subserves 
intelligent behavior. Instead, they rely on the particular material matrix in 
which we find the phenomena which they believe does subserve intelligent 
behavior: the brain. For them, thought is not logical at its root; it is associative. 
Metaphorically, not geometry but poetry is the basis for human reason in their
28 The most extreme extant example is "CYC," a project headed by Douglas Lenat, which is 
literally attempting to encode all the semantic relationships necessary to reproduce 
"understanding." See the review of this work in: Jim Barnett, Kevin Kight, Inderjeet Mani, and 
Elaine Rich, "Knowledge and Natural Language Processing," Communications of the ACM 33 
(August, 1990): 30-49.
29 Respectively: Marvin Minsky, "A Framework for Representing Knowledge," in The 
Psychology of Computer Vision, ed. P. H. Winston (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), and David E. 
Rumelhart, "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition," in Theoretical Issues in Reading and 
Comprehension, ed. Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce, and William F. Brewer (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1980), 1-33; and R. C. Schank and R. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and 
Understanding (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977).
30 For a discussion of this genealogy from a point of view sympathetic to the Descartian 
roots of the project of traditional artificial intelligence, see: John Haugeland, Artificial 
Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 28-36.
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formulation. Intelligent behavior is intimately associated w ith the relationship 
between the actual neuronal architecture of the brain. While logic may be 
conceded to be sufficient in the sense that anything may be described by simple 
logical processes,31 connectionists aver that classical, formal logic is 
demonstrably not necessary; the hum an brain is an existence proof that other 
architectures can support intelligence. If Turing's assumption of unlimited 
space and time is discarded, it is not sufficient—the hum an brain has neither 
enough time nor enough address space to work as ponderously as the logical 
story would suggest.32
The task connectionists set for themselves is to model the material 
organization of the brain. They want to know how humans can learn from their 
experience in the world.
It is tempting to say that this opposition was inevitable; in the intellectual 
history of the West, the shifting configurations of opposition between faith and 
empiricism as the ground for understanding, between the material and the 
ideal as cause, between logic and poetry as making meaning, were bound to 
shake out this way at least once. But this is not a simple matter of a distorted 
opposition between Snow's two cultures.33 It takes place entirely within the 
privileged realm of scientific discourse, and the participants agree on 
fundamental matters essential to that discursive community. They agree that
31 This is a major point of the famous "Turing Machine" paper; it is accessibly reprinted in: 
A. M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," in The Mind's I; Fantasies and Reflections 
on Self and Sold, ed. Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett (New York: Bantam, 1981), 53-67.
32 This point is discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of the present work. See also: John A. St. 
Julien, "New Understandings of Cognition," Paper presented at the Tenth Conference on 
Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Dayton, OH, 26-29 October 1988.
33 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1959).
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their task is one of material explanation, that hum an thought is in no way 
ineffable. They agree that the scientific method—what Dewey understood as 
disciplined common sense—should be the way in which such an answer is 
sought. Neither an external, unique cause in a concept of god nor an internal, 
unique reference to the hum an spirit is allowed. They even agree on the basis of 
their disagreement, with each accusing the other of being some specie of 
idealist; they simply disagree about what justifies the charge. This disagreement 
does not represent a polar division within the larger scientific community. The 
participants dissent together from some canonical positions that shape science. 
Most notably, they agree on the value of modeling as both a theoretical and 
empirical enterprise. That is, they are both willing, contra the scientific 
mainstream, to take a felicitously designed model as theory in that it can be a 
representation of the real which implies surprising, testable events. A model 
may also be taken as empirical data about a system in that the behavior of a 
well-tested one is taken as a legitimate reason to take action in the world.
This, then, is a sharply focused disagreement among participants loyal to a 
single strand of scientific discourse. It can be seen as a battle for the cultural 
high ground of science over the issue of what constitutes productive hum an 
thought.
W hat I w ant to ask, is how did it come to be this way? W hat makes their 
opposition possible, sensible, and contentious?
A Discursive History
This is a historical question. It asks how people, cognitive scientists among 
them, came to understand themselves and their fellows in such a way that this 
particular disagreement is both possible and compelling. To answer such a
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question, we need to examine histories that focus on the way we understand 
our own cognition. This is a markedly different focus from that which informs 
more familiar histories which chart the transition to our times. We are more 
familiar with histories which focus on the products of science (Galileo's theories 
as the start of modernity) or on political structures (the American and French 
Revolutions as the decisive break with medieval social organization) or on 
economic factors (the rise of the mercantile state or the appearance of the urban 
proletariat as the decisive moment shaping modern history). Our focus here 
needs to be on the transition to our current self-understanding, a self- 
understanding that connectionism problematizes.
A number of scholars of intellectual history have come to the conclusion that 
the view a people hold of their own intellectual capabilities is the hallmark of 
an intellectual age. In their differing ways, such authors as Reiss, Toulmin, and 
MacIntyre focus on different aspects of how the westerners came to hold their 
present self-understanding. Reiss focuses on the move from a previous 
discourse of patterning to our current analytico-referentiai discourse.34 
MacIntyre traces four European cultural traditions in which the meaning of 
rationality varies significantly.35 Toulmin studies what he sees as the shift from 
reason to rationality in the sixteenth century.36
These commentators are particularly congenial for this study because they 
adopt a common material approach to history. By this I mean they avert only to 
structures of explanation which are firmly rooted in hum an history itself,
34 Timothy J. Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982).
35 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose justice? Whose Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 1-11.
36 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 
1990).
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chiefly to practices and more specifically to discursive practices. They do not 
refer to some internal, lower level "hum an nature" or to some external, higher 
level deity or teleology in explaining their findings. This attitude marries well 
w ith the explanatory processes at work in cognitive science, which also refuses 
patterns of explanation that cordon off difficult questions by assigning them to 
a trivial "black box" or by defining certain issues as so much beyond our grasp 
as to be ineffable. This allegiance to material of cause in the realm of the mental 
constitutes cognitive science's most consistent break w ith prior patterns of 
explanation—and its greatest legacy.37
These writers can be read as producing complementary works, with Reiss 
examining major discursive shifts, and with Toulmin and MacIntyre 
respectively emphasizing discontinuity and continuity of change within our 
current discursive regime. Taking such a stance allows the reader to begin to 
make judgments about the importance of the discussion within cognitive 
science by offering a framework against which to understand the particular 
claims of each side.
The narrative that I will lay out here is one of a developing series of 
conceptions of hum an self-understanding, each of which takes shape against 
the backdrop of emergent difficulties in the previous mode of understanding. 
The general pattern is that each successive solution is accepted because it 
allows the participants to escape the dilemmas in which they find themselves 
enmeshed. But each solution creates its own difficulties and it is against the
37Although the influence of Chomsky' is clear in cognitive science his "black box" approach 
little influenced cognitive scientists. What they received from Chomsky was his reassertion of 
the unity of grammar (syntax) and logic. The generativity of grammar was a result of its logical 
properties. Cognitive scientists broke with Chomsky precisely in taking up the challenge 
(which Chomsky declined) of delineating which logical processes were within the black box.
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background of those difficulties that subsequent solutions arise. MacIntyre has 
phrased it well:
The best theory so far is that which transcends the limitations of the 
previous best theory by providing the best explanation of that previous 
theory's failures and incoherences (as judged by the standards o f that 
previous theory) and shows how to escape them.38
I have emphasized the parenthetical phrase "as judged by the standards of 
that previous theory" to point to the historical necessity to explain an event in 
the light of its own circumstances rather than by reference to what it has 
produced. There is nothing inevitable about the conflict within cognitive 
science that this chapter attempts to make sensible. If connectionism can be 
used to restructure the current problematic more usefully, this does not make 
connectionism a final solution, only a contingent resolution. Indeed, insofar as 
it acts to reconfigure the border between knowledge and learning, connectionist 
perspectives reveal the need for a more adequate understanding of knowledge 
in a dramatic way. Situated cognition as a way of understanding the social 
constitution of knowledge will be addressed in chapter 4 below.
Reiss's Narration of the Rise of the Analytico-Referential Discourse
I have argued above that cognitive researchers are faced w ith a cultural 
preunderstanding of their task which shapes their research and offers them 
problems that are important in this canonical scheme. Classic research in 
cognitive science has treated this given framework as "natural." Reiss's work 
argues convincingly that this framework is not natural, and charts the transition 
to our current view of ourselves.
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments and Social Contexts: A Response to Rorty," in 
Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1985), 222- 
223.
Reiss explains that new discursive structures arise out of contradictions 
inherent in the old pattern of understanding. As a discourse works out its own 
implications in the practices of those that participate in it, contradictions that 
were previously only implicit are made explicit, and the failure of the discourse 
to adequately handle all the issues that are created within its discursive frame 
becomes apparent. Slowly, bu t according to Reiss irresistibly, those in the 
community who encounter the contradictions become aware of the inadequacy 
of the formulation with which the then-current discourse frames the problem. 
Awareness of the very discursive structures through which sense is made 
allows the objectification of the current patterns of understanding and 
interpretation.39 Only then can an alternate pattern of explanation arise which 
provides a better "explanation of that previous theory's failures and 
incoherences . . .  and shows how to escape them."40
In the particular case of the discursive formation previous to our own, Reiss, 
following Levi-Strauss, points to a form of reference which does not privilege 
the separation of the interior and the exterior of the enunciator; discourse is a 
part of the world and not separate from it. Such a discourse cannot distinguish 
between sign and object; all objects are signs and all signs, objects. The world is 
ordered by a resemblance in which the name of the object and the object itself 
are not distinguished. Knowledge consists of "a discursive exchange within the 
world" and is essentially interpretive.41 This discourse does not take into 
account the arbitrary nature of the sign. This pattern of thinking and reference 
has been discussed as "magical thinking" and "bricolage "by Levi-Strauss and
39 Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism, 31.
40 MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments," 222-223.
41 Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism, 31.
others.42 For those steeped in such a pattern of thought, lying is an 
epistemological problem, not simply a moral one. Similarly, manipulating 
language should be as effective as manipulating objects—hence magical 
"incantations." From our current vantage point, we can anticipate how these 
assumptions brought w ith them real problems in practice.
In such a system, much that we find commonplace or interpret very 
differently m ust be occluded, hidden. Lying, for instance, was a violation of the 
proper order of things. It interrupts the unity of the world and suggests that a 
lie may become the truth, overturning that order. This ties closely to the 
question of "magic." Magic, within the discourse of resemblance, was not, as 
we tend to think of it, a matter of using language to affect the world though 
some mystical tie between the incantive use of the word and the world. Rather, 
under the discourse of resemblance, the sign and the object were not habitually 
regarded as separate and the resources of the culture did not make the 
difference available. But lying is possible and magic is not.
As it becomes increasingly obvious that the word and the object referred to 
are not inseparable, a space is opened up between the sign and the object that 
allows the sign and the language system as a whole to be detached from the 
world. There is a crisis of reference. Suddenly one is not sure what words refer 
to or upon what principles that reference is ordered.
The contradictions of the discourse of resemblance generated a crisis of 
representation in which a new discursive structure is possible. But in order for 
any new structure to gain legitimacy and displace the old, it must offer a 
resolution to the crisis. It m ust respond with a referential system which 
explains the relationship of words to the world and offer a set of principles
42 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 1-33.
which orders that relationship. Our current "analytico-referential" is such a 
response. Reiss labors to demonstrate that in the intellectual life of the 1500s the 
issue of reference was a source of great anxiety, and he locates the rise of our 
current forms of both science and literature in the attempt to save the system of 
reference.
Reiss claims (and I will not repeat his complex analysis here) that the 
sixteenth century resolution to this crisis is to grant a separate status to the sign 
apart from the world. This allows a conception of the relationship between 
these two new entities in which they are yoked together as parts of the same 
unity. Lying is possible and is no longer an epistemological problem but only a 
moral one. One may speak incorrectly about the world without threatening the 
order of it, making the relationship between description and the world opaque 
and giving rise to the possibility of what today we call science. The crucial 
remaining task was to make the relationship between language and the world 
reliable once again. This is the crux of the crisis of reference. The sixteenth 
century repaired the w ound which was opened up by separating language and 
the world by making the relationship strictly parallel by equating the syntax of 
language with the causality in the world. The tool that bridges this gap is logic, 
understood as equally descriptive of grammar and of the workings of the 
world.
The new analytico-referential discourse, then, rests on an identity between 
the syntax of language and the workings of the world based on the structure of 
logic. Crucially, this is not held to be an analogy. It is identity. The formal 
relations that hold between elements of language (grammar), logic (in the 
Euclidean, deductive sense), and the world (science) are held to be the same. 
Language and the world are no longer conceived of as being the same thing, 
but are now understood as properly corresponding in a set, logical way. hi
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attempting to repair the deficits of the previous discourse of resemblance, the 
new analytico-referential discourse emphasizes that the way language 
references the world is that language and the world share a pattern exemplified 
by formal, Euclidean logic. "It allows the world of phenomena and of concepts 
to be serialized into a grammar."43 Once serialized, it can be logically analyzed, 
and any resulting deductions can be taken to be true of the world. The speaker 
stands outside this process and enunciates the sentence. This argues that logic, 
the world, and language are but different expressions of the same underlying 
order. Thus, one knows a thing when one can describe it. One expects that the 
world is adequately describable in words. One expects that operations 
performed logically on objects identified in language will prove true of the 
world. And one knows that causal entailment in the world is simply logical.
One knows that there is but a single order and a single truth. If this seems 
natural, it is because, in Reiss's account, this stance underpins the present 
dominant discourse, the analytico-referential. It m ust feel comfortable to us. But 
like any discourse, it contains its own contradictions.
W hat the discourse of analysis and reference ignores is that while the sign is 
arbitrary, the map is not the territory m apped.44 The relations that govern 
language are not the relations that govern the world. Language is not identical 
to logic nor is logic a full formalization of the relations that govern the world. 
That we can recognize these statements as true, and at the same time feel that 
the framework they contradict is natural, is evidence that we occupy a historical 
moment in which reference is again in crisis.
43 Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism, 32.
44 This is a reference to Alfred Korzbyski's famous dictum: "The map is not the territory and 
the name is not the thing named." Alfred Korzbyski, Science and Sanity (New York: Science 
Press, 1941), 58.
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At some level, concrete practices in the world m ust take these contradictions 
into account and mitigate their effects. And if the analytico-referential discourse 
is to dominate, these sustaining practices must be occluded. Reiss's discussion 
suggests that just as the analytico-referential discourse grew out of the elements 
that were occluded in sustaining the discourse of resemblance, so also are the 
elements that are occluded in the present discourse likely to hold the key to 
understanding the fracture points of the present discourse. Reiss's analysis 
suggests that one would expect to see a challenge to the unity of sign, logic and 
the world. Such a challenge would be expected to emerge from an elaboration 
of the present system. There is no "outside" from which it can originate. Just as 
the elaboration of the resemblance mode of knowing led to the revelation of the 
occupations upon which the mode depended and so opened the way to the rise 
of the analytico-referential discourse, so would we expect the present discourse 
to be elaborated in such a way as to reveal its own occulted practices.
Toulm in's Narration of the Development of M odernity
But Reiss's analysis does not, itself, bring us to a point from which we can 
understand the background against which connectionism appears. 
Connectionism appears as a significant issue in the elaboration of the analytico- 
referential discourse. Reiss's discussion gives us the building blocks and their 
broad relations but does not tell us what will be the final shape of a discourse 
described by these limits. Such a shape remains to be delineated by the specific 
history of actors attempting to work out the contradictions as they encounter 
them.
My analysis here will follow the same general pattern as my analysis of the 
emergence of the discourse as a whole. That is, I will describe the initial state of
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the system before its elaboration, describe points of conflict, and discuss the 
ways the discourse was elaborated in response to the resultant problems. These 
elaborations, themselves intended to heal the gaps introduced by practice, will 
eventually lay bare the contradictions that were only implicit in the problems 
investigated. The tool used to make such a gap explicit may become the basis 
for the elaboration of a new discursive regime, h i this way the rise of grammar 
in the sixteenth century was an attempt to heal the*gap between the sign and 
the world but eventually functioned to make plain the gap and finally served as 
the basis for the shift to a different discursive framework.
I will use Toulmin's work to chart a more specific history of the elaboration 
of the discursive structures that Reiss discusses. Some caution is in order here, 
as the intellectual frameworks that underpin Reiss's Foucaultian project and 
Toulmin's philosophical history of science differ, as do the pragmatic ends 
which shape their texts. But these same differences should give us some 
confidence about the area in which their analysis is parallel. Their analyses 
share an interest in the rise of the modern intellectual order and locate the 
beginnings of that rise in the fifteenth century. Both accounts find literary and 
scientific accounts of this era pointing toward a fundamental change in the way 
the world and thereby the self is understood. Their differences may be viewed, 
in part, as resulting from their differing interests—interests which in the context 
of the present work are complementary. Reiss is interested almost solely in the 
transition between discursive orders. Toulmin, on the other hand, is deeply 
concerned with what he sees as the mistaken elaboration of that order. While 
we may not join Toulmin in characterizing the elaboration of modernity as an 
error, preferring instead to treat it as a fact of our history, his analysis advances 
our project of understanding the trajectory of the current order. Both writers 
describe a discursive structure increasingly dominated by mathesis, the attempt
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to model all aspects of the world on the basis of formal logic, and a preference 
for generalizability and objectivity.
In summary, Reiss leaves us with a discursive order which is based on an 
identity between the structure of language, Euclidean logic, and causality in the 
material world. Because these identities will not hold up, and indeed have not 
held up, contradictions are said to exist in the current discourse. The tensions 
that arise through these inaccurate mappings need to be accommodated in 
some way if the discourse is to continue to operate. The most obvious solution 
is to make one element of the discursive structure dominant (even while 
occluding this dominance because to "see" it would be to admit the failure of 
the discourse to solve the problem of reference). This sort of either/or choice is 
built into the discourse by the adoption of a logical form based on Aristotle's 
exclusion of the middle. If language, logic, and the world seem not to be 
identical, then we m ust choose which one to privilege in ambiguous cases. The 
patterns of language or of logic or of material cause m ust rule the triad. We are 
shaped by the discourse w ithin which we are embedded to choose between the 
good offices of literature, mathesis, and science to explain our experiences.
Toulmin's history of the first two centuries of modernity points tow ard a 
conflict between literature on one side and mathesis and science on the other. It 
is a conflict which the humanists such as Montaigne lost and which Leibniz and 
Newton w on by successfully uniting logic and the material world. The hard 
certainties of the ratio and rationality came to be preferred over the humanistic 
judgm ent that was the basis of Reason.
Toulmin's account, following Dewey, focuses on Rene Descartes' ideas as 
exemplifying a mistake which has led Western understanding down an 
unproductive road. Toulmin, however, criticizes Dewey for failing to ask,
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"Why did this transition take place just when it did?"45 Toulmin's explanation 
centers on the thirty years of war and hardship that followed the assassination 
of Henry of Navarre. This difficult period is said to have led to a pervasive 
thirst for certainty. But history has been a record of just such periods of unrest 
and misery: in European history the black death of the mid-fourteenth century 
which coincided with the beginning of the H undred Years War comes to mind. 
The fourteenth century was not, however, a period in which the entire 
intellectual community of Europe embraced a search for certainty. Toulmin 
himself fails to ask a further crucial question: "Just hozv was this transition 
possible; what are its conditions of possibility?"
Without an intellectual substrate which could support certainty—the 
absolute certainty of logical proof, not, for instance, the certainty of faith—as a 
solution to disorder, Descartes could not have emerged as a watershed 
intellectual figure. Reiss's account makes it clear that the fourteenth century did 
not yet have the intellectual apparatus of the analytico-referential discourse 
which linked causality, logic, and grammar; that was developed in the sixteenth 
century. W ithout such apparatus, "certainty" in the modern sense was not 
available. Only the analytico-referential discourse makes sensible the equation 
of logic and causality which allows us to be "certain" of the deduction that 
follows from physical laws.46 But the development of this logical apparatus in 
the sixteenth century makes it available to the seventeenth—and Descartes 
becomes possible.
45 Toulrnin, Cosmopolis, 44.
46 A certainty which is undermined by our further study of the material world. We now 
regard Newtonian laws, by and large, as artifacts of basically stochastic relationships.
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Toulmin charts the intricate conflict between the humanist attitudes of early 
modernity where particular cases, timeliness, and complexity were accorded as 
legitimate a status as the global, timeless, and linearly ordered solutions 
associated with geometry and syllogistic logic.47 Descartes was, and thought of 
himself as, a geometer. "He claimed he was in the habit of turning all problems 
into problems of geometry."48 The tool of geometry seems to fill the role in 
elaborating the discourse that Reiss claims grammar filled in its development. 
Grammar had pointed to seriality, syntax, and regular transformative rules.
This attempt to rescue reference led to an equation of Euclidean logic, material 
cause, and grammar on the basis of their similarity along this formal axis. As 
this uneasy equivalence almost immediately started to unravel, the pattern had 
to be maintained by occluding the problems with it. What occurred was that 
mathesis was accorded the dominant status but that this dominant status had to 
be obscured. The other two elements which formed the basis of the discourse 
had to be either subsumed or discredited—always without acknowledging that 
this was what was happening.
W hat emerged was a system in which what we now understand as the 
literary was pushed to the periphery, and its role in the support of mathesis and 
science was, as Derrida and others have recently pointed out, unacknowledged 
and even denied. On the other hand, mathesis and science were conflated.
Logic and the experimental (scientific) method were understood as the same 
process. The differences between logic and science have recently been 
highlighted by historians and philosophers of science such as Kuhn, Holton,
47 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, 30-44.
48 Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, Descartes' Dream: The World According to Mathematics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 5.
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and Ernst Mayr.49 The results of further investigations into the relations that 
actually govern the material world—beginning w ith Einstein and continuing 
with Prigogine's work in chemistry—demonstrate that these relations are not, 
strictly speaking, logical.50
Toulmin's contrast between the reasonableness of the early m odern era and 
the rationality of its development in the seventeenth century prepares us to 
understand the situation in which m odern cognitive science, and the 
intellectual background which shaped it, arose. Formal logic, w ith its 
universality, timelessness, and axiomatic basis, replaced practical judgm ent's 
emphasis on particularity, timeliness, and concrete diversity.
In such a context, every area of hum an endeavor was judged by its 
congruence with this rationalist model. Following this account, then, it is not 
simply "scientism" to adhere to rationalist standards. Indeed, this pattern 
underlies the dominant form of late modernism51 and as such informs all areas 
of life. Folk psychology, for instance, participates fully in the results of 
Descartes' solution to the problem of knowledge.52 We have no trouble
49 See, as examples: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second edition, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/1970); Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific 
Thought: Kepler to Einstein, second edition, enlarged (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988), and Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1983), 158-166.
50 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's Neiv Dialogue With Nature 
(New York: Bantam, 1984).
51 See MacIntyre for a healthy example of the conflictual and incomplete way that discursive 
elements within a broad tradition may differ. No tradition, including the tradition of Western 
rationalism, is unitary—Western rationalism is notable in that it needs to claim that its tradition 
is unitary to substantiate its universalist claims. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
52 See the illuminating work by Stich which traces this relation and draws out the 
implications for current work in cognitive psychology: Stephen P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to 
Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).
understanding rationality as something which is objective: that which is formal 
and universal. Error is associated with the body in opposition to the mind.
Thus, we explain emotionality as one of the chief causes of faulty reasoning. We 
commonly insist that another source of error is the failure to get our facts right, 
that is, to adequately secure the axiomatic basis which underpins our reasoning. 
Science and the science of m ind with which we will be concerned, do not arise 
in opposition to folk or common understanding. Science is, as Dewey clearly 
understood, only a rigorous extension of our common sense.
At this juncture we begin to close in on the object of our quest: to understand 
the background against which connectionism appears and thereby to 
understand the depth of the implications that it holds for our culture's 
conception of thought and learning. Mathesis, the attempt to formalize all 
relationships on a model of formal logic, as has been argued above, has been a 
basic move in formation of the current discursive structure. As this discourse 
has evolved, Descartes' division of phenomena into mental and material realms 
has been a crucial and discourse-shaping move. It is another expression of the 
discursive underpinning that identifies the same pattern of relation at the 
bottom of all phenomena and postulates parallel but directly analogous logics 
which underlie the various realms. Descartes' move to separate mind from 
body and to identify mind with pure logic, and his failure to see a problem of 
coordination between body and mind, are understandable within the discursive 
history sketched above. It is simply a recapitulation, in a different but 
complementary form, of the idea that language, the world, and logic are 
parallel and noninteracting systems which nonetheless stay in synch because of 
their identical underlying form and processes. Descartes, of course, believed the 
world to be as logical, fundamentally, as the mind; it is this congruence which 
made science, and particularly his geometrically-based mathesis in the form of
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the calculus, a sensible enterprise. Descartes' move, and his identification of the 
logical w ith the mind, was perhaps the crucial move in the development of the 
late m odern discursive structure. Without it, and his companion translation of 
geometric logic into the calculus, the rise of modern science as a central activity 
of modernity is not understandable. The mind, being logical, can know the 
world which is organized logically, and can express itself in language, logically. 
Descartes' introjection of logic as the order of mind and his uncoupling of 
geometry from the form of the syllogism (and thereby the entanglements of 
language) made formal logic an "objective" tool. Without this formalized, 
unified basis for "proving" a thesis about the world with the certainty of 
geometry, "certainty" as we know it in late modernity—the certainty that 
Dewey and Toulmin protest—is not available.
Thus, assumptions about the nature of the m ind have been crucial to the 
development of the m odern discourse. It is not by accident that Descartes 
postulated an immaterial m ind with only the rhetorical use of the tiny pineal 
gland as the passageway between mind and world. The original formulation of 
modernity declared language, formal logic, and the world to be governed by 
the same set of principles. These were bridges over the chasm of 
meaninglessness opened up  by the collapse of the discourse of patterning. But 
they were only bridges, airy and insubstantial supports over a great gulf. 
Descartes helped secure modernity by obscuring that terrifying chasm. He 
made logic the basis for the operation of hum an mind, making possible a more 
secure obscuration of the pit. No longer was humanity attempting to coordinate 
three external systems—however alike—that were foreign to human 
understanding. Instead, "man" was essentially logical, a being whose very 
essence was to reach out and know the logically ordered world through the 
offices of his most godlike facility: logic. Finally, the logical nature of language
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w ould assure that he w ould to be able to reliably represent that knowledge. The 
terrifying gap that hum anity had to bridge coordinating three independent 
systems was closed to the minuscule one represented by the pineal gland.
There, hidden deep within the brain, the transaction between a logical if 
insubstantial m ind and the equally logical substance of the world could be 
assumed to be natural. It is this relationship which makes "rational" the long­
time assumption that in some sense we can know the world directly. If the 
mind is assumed to be as logical as the world, language, or logic itself, there is 
no real problem of coordination—only problems of confusion when the m ind is 
distracted by material events. In a very real sense the mind can be said to 
already "know" the logical relations that constitute the world. Descartian 
introspection, then, suggests only that we let the mind do its task 
unencumbered by an actual engagement with a confusing world. It is in this 
way, Descartes hopes, that meaning will be most securely grasped.
M ind, Thought, and Logic: The Development of an Identity
The identity introduced between thought and logic in the Descartian scheme 
makes more sensible the sometimes puzzling association of computing and 
neurology in Western self-understanding. In the present account, formal logic, 
like Reiss's grammar and geometry in Descartes' analyses, is a tool that takes 
shape in the attempt to deal with problems produced by the then-current 
discursive contradictions. But like these earlier tools, the elaboration of the area 
of contradiction does not, finally, serve to close the gap, but only to reopen the 
wound. The elaboration of this tool has served to demonstrate how limited a 
tool it actually is, and how little suited it is to the role of unifying the current 
discourse in which it has been cast.
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The exaltation of formal logic has been a dominant thread in the intellectual 
history of the West w ith Descartes' body/m ind dualism and Leibniz's monads 
representing extreme and influential outgrowths of the belief in a "soul," a 
hum an essence, which was strictly logical. A further, influential development of 
this line of reasoning was Boole's famous book The Laios of Thought,53 which set 
forth the now famous "Boolean logic." This development is crucial in the 
development of the ideas this chapter traces. Following Boole's lead, Russell 
and Whitehead formulated their Principia Mathematica, which was intended to 
provide a rigorous, complete, bi-valued basis in logic for mathematics and all 
knowledge. Their project failed to meet the challenge of Godel's incompleteness 
theorem and was abandoned by its authors before completion. Godel's theorem 
constituted a fundamental challenge to the Cartesian project shared by virtually 
all the mathematicians and logicians of the day. It proved that any 
systemization strong enough to account for arithmetic m ust be incomplete.
The choice which faced logicians was galling: they had to choose between 
strength and completeness. The Cartesian project of logical totalization fails. 
Godel's theorem strikes directly at the discursive basis for totalization via 
mathesis—formal logic—for if logic is a limited system, it will always remain 
inadequate to model the seemingly limitless world or to be the sole defining 
feature of the mind. It was particularly galling to discover that formal logic was 
not only not adequate to the task set it by the discursive assumptions, but it was 
not even adequate to model everyday arithmetic. The one-to-one 
correspondence between formal logic and the world that both m odern forms of 
scientific mathesis and the discourse itself assumed is simply not available.
53The title of this book stands as a succinct exposition of the conviction of the rationalist 
school that logic and thought were one and the same. George Boole, The Laws of Thought 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1854/1940).
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Bringing us to the focus of the present day, machine computation and 
computers, Turing reacted to Godel's dashing of Russell's hopes by embarking 
on his own project to cordon off "undecidable" propositions. He hoped that by 
isolating undecidable propositions, he could rescue the Cartesian. He failed.
His failure, though, produced the famous Turing machine thought experiment. 
This paper is usually remembered for its proof that such a machine was 
universal and could solve any formally statable problem. The "universal Turing 
machine" idea—that such a machine could solve any well-formed problem— 
has functioned to legitimate computer science in general and computational 
cognitive science in particular. But the idea of such a generally powerful 
computational device actually appears in Turing's arguments as a means to 
show that even such an ideal machine would fall prey to the limits Godel had 
intimated. The universal Turing machine, the acknowledged conceptual 
forerunner of computers,54 actually seals off the possibility that all knowledge 
could be quantified. The m odern serial digital computer is directly modeled on 
Turing's conception. The irony, an irony which points to our culture's lack of 
awareness of its own intellectual history, is that while the Turing machine is a 
direct outgrow th of the failure of the Cartesian project to totalize all 
understanding under the banner of logic and mathematics, computers based on 
its principles have been used largely in pursuit of that very goal. The history of 
recent research in artificial intelligence is a history of the ignorance of this basic 
philosophical contradiction.
A final element in the social history of m odern computing was provided by 
von Neum an and the idea of program,55 which simply allowed the machine's
54 Howard Gardner, The Mind's Neiv Science (Basic Books: New York, 1985), 17.
55 See Gardner, The Mind's New Science, 18. This idea is often and correctly attributed to 
Babbage and his sponsor, Lovelace. The point made here however is not a question of primacy,
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instructions to be stored within the machine. With this step and Putnam 's 
pointing out that such programs could be considered mind and would be 
implementable on any Turing machine (body),56 a full-blown model of mind 
based solely in the dictates of formal logic emerged. This, often seen as a pivotal 
insight,57 simply replays Descartes' division of mind from the material plane of 
the body and the accompanying substitution of logic for material relations that 
Descartes placed at the center of our discursive structures. The essential, crucial 
difference is that this form of philosophic rationalism could be put to the 
empirical test.58 Steeped in the discourse in a way that its originators could 
never be, the modern cognitive scientist, unconsciously certain that logic was 
the way the world worked, was unable to see the need to maintain the 
immateriality of logic that Descartes insisted on. This discursive "conflation" 
and the resultant confidence in the metaphor of the mind as a program and the 
computer as a brain was to lead directly to the possibility of artificial 
intelligence. This, as we have begun to see, was a new tool that was fated not to 
explicate and solidify our dominant discursive practices but to erode them.
but of social history. In the context of modern computing it is Von Neuman's insight and the 
way that he contextualized it that determined the subsequent course of its use.
56 Hillary Putnam, "Minds and Machines," in Dimensions of Mind, ed. S. Hook (New York: 
New York University Press, 1960), 148-179.
57 Gardner, The Mind's New Science, 31.
58 It is striking to see the two historically contentious philosophies of rationalism and 
empiricism confront each other again. It does not bode well for rationalism that the current 
situation requires that the battle be fought on empiricism's home ground. The historical irony is 
extended if we notice that again, the specific grounds for contention lie in whether knowledge 
is gained by reason or experience. Hobbes vs. Descartes rednxl (It is indicative of the strength of 
the rationalistic tradition that while these worthies disagreed on what they felt were 
fundamental grounds, they both assumed that formal logic was the foundation of thought, a 
point currently under debate.)
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The predominant model of mind in cognitive psychology is currently based 
in a computational model labeled "the serial digital computer." Such 
explanations have proceeded from the powerful early explorations of such as 
Turing and von Neuman, whose work helped open the possibility of creating 
logic in the material world by imagining a machine that could compute—a 
"computer." In a world that finds such an idea commonplace, it cannot be 
emphasized enough what a radical insight this was. Prior to the development of 
logical machines, the classic method of distinguishing m en from the rest of 
creation was reason, and in this view mathematics was often seen as the 
pinnacle of human achievement. The "von Neum an architecture" which used 
on/off logic gates, logical programs, and local, site-addressable memory, was a 
combination of then-current cutting-edge logic and the best ideas of how the 
brain functioned. At the time, there was assumed to be no contradiction. The 
research trajectory which demonstrated the invalidity of this assumption is one 
way to understand the story of the rise of cognitive science.
The Rise of Cognitive Science
The history of the rise of cognitive science and the connectionist reaction 
parallels the story that Toulmin tells about modernity as a whole. The field 
arose in a moment of agreement; a wide range of methods and a general 
agreement about the task were initially evident. But as the field matured, one 
side of the discourse, the one that focused on the particular nature of learning 
and that drew on biological and statistical metaphors, was displaced by a 
logicist model that insisted on the purities of axiomatic, propositional logic and
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assailed the holistic heresy that it claimed59—accurately—its sibling 
represented.
Clearly, the rise of computers raised questions as to the nature of mind. This 
was accentuated by the fact that the machine said to be the first digital 
computer was modeled on the classic McCulloch-Pitts neuron.60 There is humor 
in this since a machine modeled, in part, upon the then-prevailing models of 
hum an brain function came to be the predominant model of mind. As our 
understanding of the brain has progressed further, this model of m ind has 
come under attack as being falsely modeled on a machine!
A critical juncture in the history of computing arose at this point when the 
analog computer, a computer which directly modeled the problem rather than 
solving equations which described it, lost out in the competition to become the 
tool of choice in computing. A key factor was the development of reliable 
transistors to provide a stable basis for the bi-valued computation that Russell 
had developed and for which Turing had suggested a physical implementation. 
It is worth noting that as soon as it became practical, the more culturally 
acceptable, logical formulation of thought which embodied the m ind/body 
dualism was chosen. Analog computers were perfectly possible to construct 
with the new technology bu t were not seen as desirable if one could have "the 
real thing." Analog computers and the associated processes of modeling the 
problem rather than "solving" it via formalisms were to undergo a long eclipse.
Operating within the world view that formal logic was at the basis of 
thought, computer programs running on serial digital machines became tools
59 Minsky and Papert, Perceptions, 19-20.
60 J. A. Anderson and G. E. Hinton, "Models of Information Processing in the Brain," in 
Parallel Models of Associative Memory, ed. G. E. Hinton and J. A. Anderson (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981), 12-13.
for implementing the theories of researchers in cognitive psychology and 
related fields. The tool proved very powerful and was quite successful at 
exhibiting intelligent (in the sense of logical problem solving) behavior. Almost 
all the effort in implementing these theories went into writing the software, or 
deciding what representations and processes could be used to produce the 
desired results. This was reasonable; hardware considerations were practically 
nil (and this is only slowly beginning to change). Quite naturally, the program 
became a metaphor for the mind, the computer a metaphor for the brain. The 
metaphors were developed as models, models which were seen as successful 
because they were able to handle what was then felt to be the pinnacle of 
hum an achievement: logic.
These powerful and successful models carry with them an implicit set of 
assumptions based on the nature of the serial digital computer and its 
characteristic programs. The serial model presupposes a machine based on a 
central processing unit which sequentially addresses a passive, discrete, site- 
locatable memory store by means of a program. This program consists of a 
series of commands which manipulate abstract symbols according to rules; 
these rules are, in turn, only symbols themselves. Thus the mind, and by 
extension people, come to be seen as symbol-processing machines.61 Further, 
the sequential nature of the commands necessitates the use of a hierarchical 
logic structure.
In this way, an internally consistent image of mind and brain and their 
relationship arose which was in alignment with many of the deepest 
presuppositions of our culture regarding this relationship—an image we now 
take as reality.
61 The classic statement of this idea is: Allen Newell, "Physical Symbol Systems," Cognitive 
Science 4 (April-June, 1980): 135-183.
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Emergent Problems in Cognitive Science
As w ith any paradigm  successful enough to attract widespread acceptance 
and large amounts of research based on its insights, problems have arisen. 
Those problems w ith a particular educational importance will be discussed 
below. Among these are those arising directly from the neurology of the human 
brain: time problems and space constraints. Neither does the dominant, logicist 
paradigm  deal adequately with a criticism which many psychological theories 
have proved vulnerable: that by failing to specify a mechanism by which 
thought could occur in the brain, any such theory has a hidden assumption of a 
"little man" to categorize and judge—the homunculus.
All the problems mentioned here relate in a greater or lesser degree to the 
particularizing move of situating thought in the hum an brain. There is a strong 
functionalist argument which states that the neurological problem is a 
phantasm and that the particular implementation does not matter. Fodor is 
probably the chief proponent of the view. In his article on the mind-body 
problem (1981) he points out that any software can theoretically be 
implemented on any Turing machine. This is certainly the overwhelming 
conclusion of computational theory and is the point for which Turing is usually 
remembered. Any well-formed62 problem can be solved on any Turing
62 A well-structured problem is one that can be stated in terms which can be examined via 
logic. Generally this means that we know what would define a good solution and we know the 
constraints upon finding that solution. As such, "well-structured" problems exclude paradox 
and vague, incomplete, and poorly parsed problems. In practice, well-structured problems 
appear suspiciously predigested, with factors such as attention, perception, and motivation 
entered as pre-given. Considered in this light it is suggestive that most school problems are just 
such predigested, "well-structured" problems—and most other problems are not. As Dewey 
and others have recognized, imposing an appropriate structure on the diffuse problem area is 
the first and, as artificial intelligence workers have discovered, often the most difficult part of 
handling difficulties.
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machine. To go further and conclude, as Fodor does, that quarrels about how 
mind is implemented are therefore irrelevant, does not necessarily follow.
The conclusion seems to fail on two points. First, it assumes that the 
phenomena of interest, "the mind," is completely capturable by the logic of a 
Turing machine. This assumption, as we have seen, is entirely in line w ith our 
current discursive formation. Second, while the argument does show that any 
Turing machine can exhibit the phenomena of mind (given the above 
assumption), it does not follow that any mind can be reasonably implemented on 
any such device.63 As Toulmin's analysis would suggest, particularity matters. 
Two key characteristics of Turing's universal machine are that it has an infinite 
memory capacity and an infinite time in which to process. Turing's proof of 
universality depends on these conditions. The hum an brain has neither. 
Cognitive psychologists—and educators—are interested in the phenomena of 
the hum an mind. The hum an mind is based in the hum an brain and it is this 
particular implementation which imposes limits on the models which may be 
reasonably postulated. The claim that will be made here is that the digital serial 
model is not a reasonable one in the particular context of the brain. Fodor's 
claim that such particularization is trivial is backed by the weight of a 
traditional understanding which favors the search for universal, certain 
knowledge over the particularity of the problem. One response is to claim, with 
Toulmin and others, that it is not reasonable to dismiss particular cases, or to 
make basically timeless and placeless analyses of situations that depend 
crucially on both time and space. Another response, and one which such a 
tradition legitimates w ithin its own understanding of knowing, is to show that
63 For an excellent review of some of the reasons to disbelieve the logical story of mind by a 
senior artificial intelligence researcher, see: Douglas R. Hofstadter, "Waking Up From the 
Boolean Dream," chap. in Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern 
(Bantam: New York, 1985), 631-665.
this, as particular instance, does not conform.64 Time and space constraints, 
discussed below, will seek to substantiate these points.
Given that brain does matter, the question m ust be: in w hat way does our 
knowledge of the brain constrain our theorizing?
First, and perhaps foremost, the brain operates in parallel. Neurological 
evidence supporting this view is discussed in detail in Anderson and Hinton.65 
Such evidence shows that there is no central processing unit to send out calls 
one after the other along a hierarchically organized tree of inquiry; rather, the 
evidence shows a complex network of interconnection without a central 
processing unit, a parallel architecture which makes many calls at once. Such 
parallelism has become a well-accepted basis of neurology.
Strictly speaking, this alone defines only the architecture as parallel. The 
program s that run on it could conceivably be serially ordered. Architecture is 
not destiny, and however inelegant the idea seems, the mind is not logically 
required to take advantage of the possibilities of parallel processing.
There are considerations, however, that seem to eliminate the serial model 
from being considered a realistic representation of how the hum an mind 
operates. These are time and space constraints.
The question of time rises from the observed speed of the processing units 
(neurons) in the brain. Neurons work on a millisecond basis, while typical 
computer gates work on a nanosecond basis. This means that computers' gates 
operate a million times faster than neurons. In its fundamental operations the
641 am unwilling to go on and conclude, as those within this Zeitgeist would presumably be 
willing to do, that this is the instance which disproves the general rule Fodor attempts to 
establish concerning the triviality of particularity—but such an approach is fascinating and I do 
not see how the logical formalist can avoid it; there is certainly no less trivial example than the 
way thought itself is constructed.
65 Anderson and Hinton, "Models of Information Processing in the Brain," 9-48.
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hum an brain is a million times slower than a computer. Therefore it is not 
surprising that computers take moments to return a computation that would 
take a person years to do, if the hum an could do it accurately at all. Yet there 
are many jobs which hum ans can do much faster; those involving pattern 
recognition, for instance, can be done in milliseconds in the hum an brain but 
take hours—where the recognition is possible—to be done by a computer.66 
Something is clearly wrong with an explanatory model that takes orders of 
magnitude longer to complete an operation using machinery that is orders of 
magnitude faster. The hum an brain works far too slowly to be organized as the 
metaphor of the program suggests, for if a computer takes hours to do 
recognition tasks, the hum an should take centuries to accomplish the same task, 
given the disparity between the rates at which they work. The combined 
disparity between the known speeds of the basic "machine" and the observed 
differences between the two in pattern recognition tasks is approximately four 
orders of magnitude! No fiddling with a more efficient program will bridge a 
gap of such magnitude. The inherent possibilities of parallel processing m ust be 
utilized.
The problem of space similarly arises from consideration of the particular 
hum an brain. Lashly, as far back as 1950, in his oft referenced paper "In Search 
of the Engram," toted up a truly impressive amount of research—including 
thirty years of his life's work—that led him to conclude that memory traces 
located at any particular site were impossible in light of what was known of 
hum an brain physiology. His disproof proceeded from two bases. First, 
extensive destructive testing had failed to locate any single spot for any single
66 David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, "Introduction," in Parallel Models of 
Associative Memory, ed. J. A. Anderson and Geoffery E. Hinton (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1981).
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memory or skill. Even if truly massive portions of the cortex were destroyed, 
the skill was retained. Often this process could proceed to the edge of reducing 
the animal to a completely non-functional vegetable state before the "trace" was 
lost. Lashly's second line of reasoning was more radical. He stated that in his 
judgment, there w eren't enough neurons or even synapses to encode all of the 
recall humans have access to at the available number of discrete sites. He 
observed that the large ratio of sensory to cortical neurons, coupled with the 
observed fact that virtually all of the brain could be observed as active during 
sensory input, foreclosed the possibility that there were any neurons left over to 
be dedicated to serving as memory sites. Lashly's almost despairing 
observations were to remain unchallenged, and largely unreconciled with 
prevailing theory, for almost twenty-five years. Thus physiological 
considerations make serial, site address models of mind untenable.
A persistent and even more long-lived dispute involves the concept of the 
homunculus. Psychological theories have traditionally been attacked, especially 
by those outside of the field, as implicitly calling for a "little man" to choose 
and to categorize. The critics felt that this was an intellectually suspect position 
since it only "hid" the problem of how decisions were made. The dominant 
school of artificial intelligence has claimed that its model eliminates the 
homunculus and that this is one of the strongest points of the perspective.67 In 
such a view, the program makes the decisions and there is nothing mysterious
67 See, for instance: Fodor, "The Mind-Body Problem," 124-133. More recent work, such as: 
John H. Holland, Keith J. Holyoak, Richard E. Nisbett, and Paul R. Thagard, Induction: Processes 
of Inference, Learning and Discovery (Boston: MIT Press, 1986), make it clear that even traditional 
artificial intelligence researchers feel the need to address the problem of learning. They do not, 
however, necessarily agree as to how learning should be pursued. Thagard and Holyoak have 
been working within the connectionist paradigm: Keith J. Holyoak and Paul Thagard, 
"Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction," Cognitive Science 13 (July-Sept., 1989), 295-355, 
Holland, on the other hand, has pursued a more rule-based approach with genetic algorithms. 
See the account in: Russell Ruthen, "Adapting to Complexity," Scientific American 268 (January, 
1993), 130-140.
about it; the operations of this program, which this research program sees as 
mind, are quite mechanistic and very transparent. It is not, however, clear that 
what earlier psychologists were accused of having hidden in space—in the 
brain—the computationalists who rely on the serial model have not hidden in 
time—via the program. Who programs the program? In the serial computer the 
answer is clear: at some point in time the programmer, who stands outside the 
computer, imposes order via the program. In a human no such programmer is 
apparent.
The appealing argument has been made that evolution provides the 
programmer. Certainly no computational model would be possible w ithout the 
assumption of a basic "drive to organize." Similarly, the case for certain 
behaviors' being "programmed" or at least as existing before experience—fight 
or flight reactions and falling reactions, for instance—is unassailable. The case 
for even more complex behavioral patterns such as schizophrenia and 
personality structures appears to be building. Still, learning is difficult to see as 
programmed in this sense; a genetically-based understanding of Euclidean 
geometry seems unlikely. The great mass of what has interested people about 
their own cognition is clearly the class of things which is unknown but can be 
learned. What accounts for the flexible, autonomous, self-guided learning that 
we all experience and. observe? What seems to be missing is a concrete 
mechanism for self organization. If we are to remain materialists and reject 
Descartian dualism, we will agree that such a mechanism must exist; almost as 
clearly, it m ust be based in hum an biology and its evolutionary history and its 
focal site must be the brain. The trouble here is that the serial model provides 
no such mechanism and in not addressing the problem leaves itself open to the 
accusation that the homunculus has not been vanquished, but has merely 
receded in time.
This is not to say that such a defect is characteristic of all computational 
models; one of the advantages of the interactive distributed memory discussed 
below is that it provides a self-organizing principle which clearly emerges from 
its assumptions about the hum an brain structure. Hopfield, among others, 
indicates that stable patterning in a relaxation response to input is an emergent 
characteristic of complex networks.68 Such distributed patternings spread 
across the whole field and serve as the analog of memory sites in the serial 
model.
Thus, given its failure to correlate with the known neurological 
characteristics of the brain, its failure to answer questions concerning the 
possibility of a program so organized actually running in the brain given the 
known time and space constraints, and its failure to adequately dismiss the 
homunculus, the serial model cannot be considered a valid model of brain 
functioning.
Emergent Answers to Problems in Cognition
Granted the serial model will not work, what will? W hat we are looking for 
here is a single unified solution to the problems of time, space, and the 
homunculus discussed above. A suitable solution w ould be fast, very fast, 
w ould have tremendously more memory than the site address model implies, 
and w ould exhibit a clear self-organizing principle which allows for learning 
w ithout recourse to an externally originating program.
68 J. J. Hopfield, "Neural Networks and Physical Systems with Emergent Collective 
Computational Abilities," in Proceedings of the National Academy of the U. S.-Biological Sciences, 
vol. 8, ed. National Academy of Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 
1979), 2554-2558.
Research and thought on the problems with the serial model have tended to 
focus on one problem at a time. This paper will follow that pattern and will 
follow the development of these problems in an order which seems logical 
given the synthesis which seems to be emerging. It is worth noting that the 
apparent "logic" so imposed is not historically accurate. That is, some pieces— 
specifically distributed representations—developed long before the necessary 
theory of brain structure (parallel processing) to implement it arose.
The first problem is the neurological one: the brain does not function 
according to the patterns of a serial computer; rather it is a parallel processor. 
Bringing an idea of brain function in line with this fact immediately takes care 
of the problem of time. Parallel processors ate fast. Perhaps more cogently, 
serial processors are of a necessity slow. Each command m ust be sent out to a 
specific site and the encoded response m ust be returned. Then and only then 
may further demands be made. Everyone m ust get in line and wait a turn. The 
larger the data base searched and the more commands sent, the worse the 
problem becomes. Parallel processors can, theoretically, be as fast as their 
gates—all demands are made simultaneously and all the requisite data is 
returned in one pass.
The obvious objection is that such a return m ust still be organized—how can 
a parallel processor be governed? Clearly, one solution is to place a serial 
processor over it to give it "order." Such a mixed system is conceptually 
possible,69 and some experimental data such as that reported in Anderson70
69 Paul Smolensky, "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism," Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 11 (March, 1988), 1-74. In this influential article Smolensky argues for a mixed model of 
human cognition but acknowledges tire limits to the "depth" of processing which it is feasible 
to assume. Mixed models built on connectionist principles leave very little room for the sorts of 
programs which traditional artificial intelligence presumes.
70 John R. Anderson, Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications, second edition (New York: W. 
H. Freeman, 1985), 77-80.
concerning extended response time for increasingly complex computation 
problems can be interpreted as pointing to this. However, given the time 
constraints, it is clear that to explain adequately the problem of the rapidity of 
hum an recognition (children's recognition of familiar faces occurs in 
milliseconds), the "program" which retrieves the recognized object may contain 
no more than 100 "calls"—a daunting limit for any extensive serial 
governance.71 Very little in the way of symbolic logic can be done in such an 
extremely short program. Thus the role of serial governance in any mixed 
model m ust be very small in organizing hum an thought. If the old solution 
w on 't work, w hat will? An answer is suggested by the solution to the second 
problem with the traditional AI approach: memory.
The third pressing problem of the serial model is that of memory space. This 
problem is associated with site address and the parallel processing model does 
not address this problem directly. In fact, modern parallel processing "super 
computers," such as the Cray supercomputer, use site address (and a serial 
executive), and models based on such a computer would retain the memory 
problem. Lashly, in addition to being the first to succinctly state the problem, 
was also able to formulate w hat seems still to be the only answer: distributed 
representation. Such a model of memory depends upon abandoning the 
concept of site and substituting patterns of relationships as the "location" of 
representations. Distributed representation solves the space problem by 
increasing exponentially the amount of potential memory. Consider a simple 
situation in which there are four memory sites, four locations which are either 
"on" or "off." If these are treated separately, only four bits of information are 
encodable. If, however, these four are understood as constituting a unity, we
71 Hofstadter, "Waking Up From the Boolean Dream," 631-665.
are able to consider the pattern of relations between the parts that constitute the 
whole. There are sixteen such distinct patterns and sixteen bits of information 
may be stored. Increase this to a twenty-location unity and there 1,048,576 
separate patterns of relations versus only twenty for its independent site 
address cousin. When one realizes that each neuron in the cortex is said to 
average 2,000 synaptic connections to other cells72 and that the Purkinjie cells— 
implicated in information processing—have as many as 100,000,73 the impact of 
this exponential progression in the expansion of memory space is quite 
staggering. It is little wonder then that the idea appealed to Lashly, for it neatly 
solves his problem of memory space; he need not be limited to the simple one- 
to-one correspondence that site address entails.
Some mention should be made of the engineering objection to distributed 
representation. This criticism says that such randomly connected elements 
could never function reliably, since they would oscillate wildly. Even 
disregarding the real world disproof that the brain appears to do a fine job of 
utilizing such architecture, networking theory in every field militates against 
this objection. From ecology to classic systems theory, networked relationships 
are considered much more stable than their more nearly linear cousins. 
Hopfield's mathematical treatise74 is quoted as giving the definitive lie to the 
idea that such systems are not stable.
Taken separately, parallel processing and distributed representation seem to 
solve the time and memory problems of serial processing that are based in
72 E. Larson, "Neural Chips," Scientific American 9 (Feb., 1986), 112-116,169.
73 T. Kohonen, Associative Memory: A System-Theoretical Approach (Berlin: Springer, 1977).
74 J. J. Hopfield, "Neural Networks and Physical Systems with Emergent Collective 
Computational Abilities," 2554-2558.
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neurological fact. It is a central thesis of this work that w hat appears to be 
occurring is the tentative emergence of a new psychological paradigm  of brain 
functioning based on a synthesis of these ideas.
Such a synthesis would appear to be well-conceived, since each concept 
provides solutions for problems that its "brother" generates. Parallel 
processing, for instance, gives distributed representations somewhere to live. 
Though Lashly's "In Search of the Engram" article75 arrived at distributed 
representations as a logical necessity, there was no way, under the then-current 
paradigm based on site address, to access such a representation. Parallel 
processing, inherently involving the simultaneous address of many sites, gave 
such an idea an intellectually viable substrate.
Additionally, distributed representations gives parallel processing, by 
raising the possibility of associative recall on the basis of similarity and of 
content addressable memory, possible primitives that would allow its 
coordination without extensive recourse to a serial executive. This allows the 
designer to make minimal use of a serial executive, the extensive use of which 
w ould work to negate parallel processing's speed advantages over serial 
processing.
It is these new primitives of distributed representations that account for 
some of the most attractive characteristics of the new models. A particular 
memory site has no meaningful relationship to what it represents in the serial 
model; the meaning of a one or a zero in any particular location is completely 
arbitrary and any meaning that it can have is imparted by the program. A 
distributed representation is, on the other hand, inherently meaningful in the 
sense that the internal structure of the pattern formed in response to the
75 K. Lashley, "In Search of the Engram," in Symposia of the Society of Experimental Biology, No. 
4, Physiological Mechanisms in Animal Behavior, (New York: Academic Press, 1950).
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perceived object is not arbitrary, but bears a consistent relationship to the object 
that is perceived over time. Further, this internal structure of connectionist 
distributed representation, in  which many differing representations may share 
large parts of their constitutive pattern, leads representations to interact.76 
Similar symbols have similar patterns and therefore similar interactions. Any 
modification of the strength of the hardware connections comprising one 
symbol will tend to alter similar representations in the same way. It is this 
interactive aspect that yields such powerful implications as associatively 
organized memory, content-addressable memory, and the resultant self­
organizing possibilities.
These new primitives radically reduce the demand for a program and the 
serially based executive in which it is based. The rules that such a program is 
based on are largely replaced by the structure given by the patterns of 
interactions between distributed representations, while its memory retrieval 
and relating mechanisms are replaced by content-addressable associative 
memory. Thus the last problem this paper originally proposed—the implication 
that a homunculus removed in time lurked in the concept of the program—has 
been diminished in scope by the substitution of the regularities imposed by 
emergent structure in interaction with its environment for the rules imposed by 
the program.
In this way the constellation of parallelism, distributed representation, and 
the new primitives which are implied by the first two factors' interaction, 
suggest a unified and interdependent whole which avoids the pitfalls that make 
the traditional artificial intelligence model untenable as a way of understanding
76 Anderson and Hinton, 1981.
the functioning of the particularly hum an brain with which psychologists and 
educators are concerned.
Distributed representation, an emergent property of the network 
architectures we have discussed here, form a fundamental challenge to the 
discursive structures of modernity. It posits an alternative basis for cognition to 
the logic-centered story our tradition gives us and which has proven untenable. 
We buy the explanatory power of network architectures at a cost, though. We 
m ust give up the foundational discursive assumption that mind works 
according to the patterns of logic. The Cartesian center of a logical m ind does 
not hold.
Conclusions
This chapter has traced the development of the discursive background 
against which connectionism has appeared as a dissenting field in the area of 
cognitive science. A chief thesis has been that connectionism, by dissenting 
from the canonical assumptions of the AI branch of cognitive science, is staking 
out a position which threatens the stability of the current discursive formation, 
artificial intelligence took up the materialist challenge to close Descartes' gap 
located at the pineal gland by making logic material and locating it in the 
organization of matter. The concept of the serial computer as a brain and the 
program as the mind is dualism without Descartes' gap. This attempt to 
instanciate the mind as logic has failed and has the effect of undoing Descartes' 
identification of m ind with logic. Bereft of the crucial assumption that the mind 
is logical, the further assurance of congruence between the underlying 
structures of language and the world are undone. Not coincidentally, both 
language and the world are no longer assumed to follow the pattern of formal
logic. M odern science, developed in response to the late modern assumption 
that the logical mind could know the logical world and express that 
understanding clearly within the logical structures of language, has eaten its 
own discursive base. The crisis of representation, noted in parts of the academy, 
is, on this account, real.
Education's response to such a situation is properly a practical one: that is, 
given such a situation, how do we discharge our obligation to educate 
students? W ithout a viable theory of thought, we are left uncertain as to what 
learning and knowledge are. How do our students learn? What is it that they 
know? The recent disputes within education, the extensive search for alternate 
methods, and finally the search for alternate theoretical bases are a testament to 
the urgency of this problem for educational practice. In the current account 
connectionism, itself a crucial factor in undermining the current understanding 
of how learning takes place, will be presented as an alternative to canonical 
understandings of "how they learn," and situated cognition will be taken as 
pointing toward a more adequate conception of "what it is that they know."
CHAPTER 3
Connectionism :
C om putation  and  the Brain
[N]othing seems more possible to me than that people some day will 
come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in the . . .  nervous 
system which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea or 
memory.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1,1982, para. 504 (66e)
Connectionism has been discussed in terms of learning theory and as a point 
in the trajectory of Western understanding of thought. In this chapter I will 
discuss the field itself. I will describe connectionism, work through an example 
of a connectionist network, and detail cognitive, neurological, and 
computational evidence regarding the plausibility of connectionism.
Connectionism Bounded
Connectionism in its recent form grows from treating two constraints 
seriously. First, connectionist theory focuses on the modeling of learning in a 
cognitively realistic fashion—it aspires to model hum an cognitive abilities fully, 
both its successes and its errors. Second, it is constrained to models which are 
plausible given the actual material substrate of thought: the hum an brain.
These commitments constrain the models that connectionists will consider 
reasonable to ones that learn realistically and to ones that could possibly be 
based in the hum an brain. These constraints are congenial to educators who 
are, by definition, concerned that people learn. Educators are not directly
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concerned with what might be true of knowledge structures in the abstract or in 
the possible efficiencies of systems of calculation in computer science.
The split between those committed to modeling the process of learning and 
those committed to modeling logic and knowledge structures is one of the 
defining issues in the history of cognitive science.77 The commitment to actually 
modeling learning is a commitment to building a system which mimics what 
we know from observation are characteristics of hum an learning. It leaves open 
the question of the mechanism which produces these effects. This is in distinct 
contrast to the opposing camp's assumption that logic is the mechanism that 
produces valuable thought. The logicist asserts that anything which is not 
logical is outside thought as such. Thus emotion and context, for instance, are 
primarily understood as sources of error.
Crucially, we know that people context dependent reasoners78 and that a 
large portion of this context dependence lies in the use of contextually variant 
categories.79 Researchers focused on learning treat this as datum  to be 
accounted for in a productive way. That is, they wonder what role context 
dependence plays in productive thought. Those committed to a logicist position 
can—within the tradition of objectivity—treat such particularities only as
77 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus Modeling the Brain: 
Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint," Daedalus 117 (Winter, 1988): 15-43.
78 This has been a large part of tine discourse of cognitive science, a field broader than the 
relatively narrow artificial intelligence community on which this dissertation focuses. A 
textbook overview of much of tine work is available in: John R. Anderson, Cognitive Psychology 
and Its Implications, 2nd edition (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1985), 60-72.
79 The nature of categories and the constraints on category formation are some of the most 
exciting areas in cognitive research. For very interesting, different approaches to this subject, 
see: Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangeivus 
Things; What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
and Eleanor Roscln, "Principles of Categorization," in Cognition and Categorization, ed. Eleanor 
Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978), 27-48.
sources of error and w ould attempt to continually refine their models to 
eliminate this as a source of error.
People are neither serial computers nor Turing machines. As has been noted 
in chapter 2, calling attention to this fact points to the particularity, to the 
finitude, and to the time-bound nature, of the hum an cognitive machinery. The 
model of serial computation, the logic machine, cannot be instanciated usefully 
in the "hardware" of the hum an brain. Some fundamentally different model 
m ust be in operation. That connectionists have found a credible model in light 
of what we know about the brain allows us to see how incredible the traditional 
explanation has been—the traditional model is plausible only in the absence of 
any realistic alternative.80
Connectionist Analogies
Connectionist explanations, precisely because they are not organized on the 
traditional logical model of declared axioms and deductive conclusions are 
difficult to grasp using our usual patterns of understanding. It shares this 
problem with ecological and evolutionary models of explanation. In all these 
cases small differences in the particular history of any situation can result in 
very different final outcomes.
One naturally-occurring example of a situation in which small initial 
differences can make a large difference in the final outcome is erosion on a 
slope. Water falls randomly on the upper reaches of the slope and rolls 
downhill picking up minute pieces of soil and creating a small—very small— 
tendency for succeeding droplets to follow the same path but they mostly
80 And, as the history of romanticism amply demonstrates, not always credible even in the 
absence of a credible alternative.
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cancel each other out and the surface wears down smoothly; there is no 
systematic change. Eventually, through sheer chance, several drops may 
succeed one another in the same path, carving out a deep enough groove to 
capture an increasingly large area, and hence capture more raindrops. Soon a 
small groove has formed that future patterns of random droplets cannot 
change. In short order it is a ravine that has become a permanent part of the 
landscape.
Similarly, a connectionist network, before it has learned anything, starts out 
w ith no real differences—it is like a smooth plane. As a network receives 
"drops" of input from the outside small changes in connection strengths 
propagate across the network which make it slightly more likely that future 
"drops" will follow the same path. As long as those drops are random, the 
patterns formed on the plane of the network will also be random—and largely 
self-canceling. But any patterns in environment, in the input, will predispose 
the net to form grooves. These grooves are the basis for the connectionist analog 
to memory—and thought. It is im portant to realize, however, that this pattern is 
not itself "a memory." It only "works" when it is activated, when, as the 
analogy would have it, activation "flows" through the system. Before it is 
stimulated by environmental input the pattern is only potential. As a 
connectionist network learns more and more patterns, the network is 
increasingly crisscrossed with worn-in "ravines." Initially each array of 
different inputs results in a different output array. However, as more and more 
ravines are worn into the network, we reach a practical limit on the number of 
independent patterns that may be maintained. In short order new patterns of 
sensation begin to fall into already established ravines. If the input is 
sufficiently different it will groove a new ravine. But at some point similar 
patterns of input will begin to fall into almost identical patterns of activation.
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And eventually these small differences in the initial patterns of activation will 
not be enough to activate different output patterns—the new, slightly different 
pattern will be captured by an already established "ravine." Lead astray by our 
traditional epistemology we will be tempted to say that the network has made a 
mistake. But almost the opposite has happened: the network has learned to 
categorize. When differing input patterns are assimilated to the same output 
pattern a new organizing principle has surreptitiously emerged. The network 
has evidenced that most crucial of all learning activities: it has learned to 
classify difference as the same.
This ability to respond to different inputs as if they were the same leads to 
such crucial abilities as pattern completion, error tolerance, categorization by 
family resemblance, and automatic inference. We may consider pattern 
completion the most basic, and most valuable, of all these qualities.
Classical theories of knowledge, and the theories of categorization on which 
they are based, are weak and brittle in our messy, work-a-day world because 
they require perfect knowledge to complete an act of categorization. We must 
know whether a particular instance evidences the "necessary and sufficient" 
features that make up the category. The real world seldom obliges us by 
presenting neat, unconfused and complete information. To handle such a world 
the agent acting in it must create categories on the fly. The classical story gives 
us no idea of how categories are created; in order to recognize a member of a 
category, one must already know the necessary and sufficient features. But 
until the necessary and sufficient features are themselves recognized there is no 
way to see the items that are to be categorized as the same. There is no logical 
way into the classical story of categorization other than the one advocated by 
innatists from Plato to Chomsky: we, somehow, already know and can 
remember the ideal forms.
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The pattern completion abilities of networks, on the other hand, give us a 
way to get started in this process without innate knowledge—overloading the 
network space results in categorizing small differences as the same in a 
straightforward, material way. Neither mystical nor innatist ideas are 
necessary. The messy, incomplete, slightly wrong information that we get from 
our world is easily enough assimilated to the same output pattern. Learning 
occurs and it is this pattern of relations that underlies our cognitive abilities.
Connectionism Described
Connectionism, then, is a model of the relations that underlie cognition. But
what is it that we w ant to explain? The story that we want to be able to tell,
w ith wonder but w ithout turning our attention away from its implications for
our practice, is the primal story of the child's recognition of her mother's face.
I sit in a room and watch a young child in a crib beneath an open 
window. She is beautiful, or I think she is. I sit immobilized, fascinated.
A cool gust of wind moves the curtains, annoying the child. Her mother, 
harried, returns and bends over the crib. The baby perceives motion, 
turns her head and recognizes her mother. She gurgles, smiles, reaches 
out and is softly gathered in ....
The child's recognition of her mother is a wondrous thing. We have only the 
exciting beginning scraps of how it might be possible. Recognition is precisely 
the point at which artificial intelligence, grounded in the modernist story of 
mind, has failed. Connectionist models offer a radically different story of how 
this can be accomplished.
The problem that the tradition has found insoluble is just that of recognition. 
In chapter 2 ,1 discussed a disproof of the possibility in logical terms. In practice 
the problem appeared less forcefully and more intractably.
Consider the real problem that faces the young child. She must recognize her 
m other's face. It is only when we try to specify more fully what this task entails,
a task that AI workers have attempted, that we realize the enormity of the 
problem. The child never sees the same face twice. She must identify as the same 
her mother in varying intensities of light, under radically different shadowing 
conditions, from different distances, from different angles, with and without 
earrings and glasses. The range of experiences and the degree of overlap with 
similar experiences that m ust be disentangled to experience her mother's face 
as the same is truly staggering. How does she know that her tanned aunt, also 
brunette and well practiced at bending over babies, is not her mother in a 
slightly darker light? How is the mask of harsh shadows that occurs in the late 
afternoon's setting sun disembedded from the diffusely lit face of the morning's 
dusk. Why isn 't that creature with dangling, glistening earrings seen as an 
unknown and threatening creature? AI programs fail, and fail miserably, at 
similar tasks. Logic cannot account for it. How does the child succeed?
No artificial neural net has nearly the complexity required to react as the 
youngest child does to the repeated appearance of her mother's face. But neural 
net architectures do generate intriguing analogs to the child's competence. The 
child learns to experience difference as the same. She solves the classical 
problem of categorization effortlessly, faultlessly, and fluidly.
An Example of a Connectionist Memory Model
An example of a very simple neural net's behavior may give the reader a 
sense of the striking power of the architecture associated with connectionism. 
The example developed below focuses on categorization as an emergent 
property of distributed representatioii. It is a redevelopment and simplification 
of the Jets and Sharks exemplar which McClelland & Rumelhart use to
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demonstrate the Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) model of 
memory81.
Abstractly, an interactive activation and competition network consists of a 
collection of processing units organized into different pools. There are 
excitatory connections among units in different pools and inhibitory 
connections between units in the same pool. Units in the network are given 
initial values that change as the program runs through multiple iterations.
These values are understood as the activation level of each unit. The change in 
each iteration is governed by a function which computes the input to each unit 
by taking into account both the current activation of the unit and any input 
from other units in the system or from the outside. The function then uses that 
input figure to change the activation level of the unit by factoring in values that 
define the maximum and minimum activation levels and a decay factor. All of 
these values can be changed to explore the effects of changing various 
parameters on the history and development of the system.
The effect of arranging the relationships in this way can be read from the 
name of the model: Interactive Activation and Competition. It is interactive 
because it sets up a relationship between the processing units which makes 
them into a linked network in which a change in the activation value of one 
effect the value and the linkage strength between all the others. It is competitive
81 This program was published by Rumelhart and McClelland in their handbook: James L. 
McClelland and David E. Rumelhart, Explorations in Parallel Disti'ibuted Processing (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1989). This book comes with a disk which contains the IAC program. The 
program runs on various personal computers and allows tire user to go into tire defining matrix 
and alter the parameters, the number of nodes, and how those nodes are connected. The 
implementation discussed here differs from the original in that tire "Jets" gang has been 
eliminated from the matrix, the number of nodes reduced, and the decay parameters 
eliminated. Rebuilding tire example in this way makes the points I make about associative 
memory easier to explain. For further explanations of this program and examples of varying 
use, see: Rumelhart and McClelland, Explorations, 11-48, and James L. McClelland, David E. 
Rumelhart, and Geoffrey E. Hinton, "The Appeal of Parallel Distributed Processing," in Parallel 
Distributed Processing, Volume 1: Foundations, ed. David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and 
the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 3-44.
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because the relationship between processing units within a pool is negative. A 
negative connection will mean that the unit within a pool, which in early 
iterations of the net's history has the highest activation, will suppress the 
activation value of all others in the same pool. Configuring a network in this 
way results in one element of each pool coming to dominance. The positive 
relationships between units in different pools means that the overall level of 
activation will remain high.
As a model of memory, the properties of an IAC are very suggestive. Like 
the child, it can categorize—that is, produce "the same" output for different 
cases. It can recognize an example as a member of a category even under 
conditions that are adverse, and it automatically fills in missing details which in 
the experience of the network have co-occurred with other members of this 
category. All of these features of network relations are difficult to explain 
formally w ithout elaborate logical structures which, like the Ptolemaic system 
in astronomy, become only more complicated with each new case. This network 
model exhibits these characteristics as emergent properties of the system.82
Attaching our relatively technical explanation to a story, a concrete example, 
may help make these claims more understandable. For the sake of discussion, 
let us imagine that we are participating in the tryouts for a play based on the 
situation found in West Side Story. There are two gangs, the Sharks and the Jets; 
each group has its separate members and they have their separate
82 An emergent property of a system is a property which is born of the interaction of the 
parts which cannot be extrapolated from the characteristics of the parts taken as individuals. A 
relatively familiar example would be carrying capacity in ecology. The number of rabbits that a 
particular ecology will support is not a property of rabbits, or of foxes, but an emergent 
property of the relations that comprise the system. It can be most usefully conceived as a limit 
parameter that emerges from the relationships of the system as a whole. For a useful and 
rigorous discussion of emergence, see: William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson, " 'Emergent' 
Phenomena in Interconnected Networks," chap. in Discovering Complexity (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 202-229.
characteristics. The situation that you, as the casting director (acting the part of 
the confused inquirer) have set up is to test the person auditioning for the 
character's role by putting them in a situation where they have to realistically 
act and identify a gang member, "Ken," in response to your questions during a 
cold improvisation. The actors have come prepared by reading the script and 
have, supposedly, attended to the instruction to "get to know" the characters. 
The part that is being auditioned for is that of a young neighborhood man who 
is in neither gang but knows the people in the Sharks relatively well. You tell 
the players that the inquirer is trying to get the name of one of the Sharks. How 
do they handle the scene? The following dialog emerges:
The inquirer asks: "You know that guy, uh, the dark haired guy, always
got something to hock, hangs out down at Joe's."
The character responds: "Come on, everybody hangs at Joe's."
To which the inquirer says: "You know, 30s, different girl every
w eekend.. .you know."
The character reacts: "  Dunno, Rick, maybe."
Inquirer: "No, I know Rick, he lives on Myrtle."
Character: "Maybe Ken, but he's younger."
Inquirer: "Yeah, Ken, that's it—he's younger?"
Character: "Yeah."
Inquirer: "Yeah."
As a casting director you are probably pleased; for a cold ad lib, this sounds 
pretty good. But why are you pleased? What sounds real? Our concern with a 
realistic modeling of cognitive abilities causes us to focus on the authentic feel 
of this portrayal of the process of recall. It sounds like normal, everyday 
associative recall—not like a wooden query about a checklist of traits.
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To examine the example a bit, The Jets, like the Sharks, are all Puerto Ricans. 
They are mostly in their thirties and they all hang at Joe's. There is little in this 
first attempt that helps the character find a difference on which to base a 
judgm ent—a fact which the character calls attention to in his first line. The 
inquirer expands, exasperated, to more specific information. The trouble is, he 
has gotten Ken's age wrong; Ken is in his twenties. This is an understandable 
mistake, since most of the Sharks are in their thirties but it confuses character 
up for a while.83 Finally he comes up w ith Ken, who fits the bill except for his 
age—he's a burglar and he's divorced, with a major reputation as a ladies' man. 
The inquirer affirms the choice by recognizing the name and filling in more 
details. Finally they engage in a small ritual of agreement.
How would a connectionist approach model this process? What follows is an 
connectionist model which helps to explain associative memory.
An Examination of a Connectionist Simulation
A  few caveats are in order as we begin an examination of this model. As 
models necessarily are, this is air abstraction. In this instance it will be 
worthwhile to note that the present example is an abstraction on two levels. 
First, "horizontally" it is an abstraction from its broader context. As McClelland 
originally developed this example, it was about two gangs and had sixty-eight 
rather than thirty-seven nodes. This added complexity made it difficult to 
follow but did enable "bias" effects from this broader context. Second, 
"vertically" this example implicitly assumes that there are something like 
"_Phil" units distinct from name units "Phil," which in their turn are distinct
83 Actually, the "mistake" that assumes that all Sharks are in their thirties is just the sort of 
"mistake" that neural nets make. It is intriguing to consider the possibility of modeling two nets 
feeding their outputs into each other until they produce the same "recognition" but not on the 
basis of the same pattern. This would be one way to model intersubjectivity.
from "Shark" units. This is unlikely to be the case. To the contrary, the chief 
rhetorical purpose of this program  is to demonstrate how intertwined and 
inseparable such concepts are in actual memory and recall.
This model can be understood as a series of concrete examples with their 
relationships specified which exhibits a surprising ability to both "generalize" 
and "specify."
The set of relations from which this particular model starts is:
Instance Name Gang Age Hair Status Job
Phil Phil Sharks 30' s Brunet Married Pusher
Ike Ike Sharks 30' s Blond Single Bookie
Nick Nick Sharks 30' s Black Sinqle Pusher
Don Don Sharks 20' s Brunet Married Burglar
Ned Ned Sharks 30' s Brunet Married Bookie
Karl Karl Sharks 40' s Black Married Bookie
Ken Ken Sharks 20' s Black Single Burglar
Earl Earl Sharks 40' s Black Married Burglar
Rick Rick Sharks 30 ' s Black Divorced Burglar
01 01 Sharks 30 ' s Brunet Married Pusher
Neal Neal Sharks 30' s Black Single Bookie
Dave Dave Sharks 30' s Black Divorced Pusher
Figure 3-1: List of Sharl<s
Figure 3-2 represents the basic sets of pools and their resting state as the 
simulation begins. The external input is listed to the left of each unit. The 
activation level is listed to the right of each unit. It represents the sum of all 
inputs, external and internal, for the current iteration. The iteration level, which 
tracks the history of the developing system, is to the far right labeled "cycle." 
The initial activity level of each begins at the "resting level," which is set at
-10.84 Activation is passed from the feature units (including the name unit) to 
instance units. From there it propagates back out to the feature units.
As we model the effects of the story on the characters' associations, we will 
set a few ground rules which will simplify this model. All input activations will 
be either a positive or a negative 100 and there will be no decay in the input 
values on successive cycles.85 We will be watching the instance units for their 
pattern of activation as successive external inputs are entered. Each changed 
input will be denoted by italics. We will assume that no unit is available to 
"consciousness" until its activation level goes above 50. When a unit reaches 
this level, it will be depicted in boldface. At that point the character guesses that 
the individual represented by that unit is the one that the inquirer is seeking.
External input Name units Instance Units
0 Sharks -10 0 Phil -10 0 _Phil-10 cycle 0
0 Ike -10 0 _Ike -10
0 in20s -10 0 Nick -10 0 _Nick -10
0 in3 0s -10 0 Don -10 0 _Don -10
0 in40s -10 0 Ned -10 0 _Ned -10
0 Karl -10 0 _Karl -10
0 Blond -10 0 Ken -10 0 _Ken -10
0 Black -10 0 Earl -10 0 _Earl -10
0 Brunet-!10 0 Rick -10 0 Rick -10
0 01 -10 0 _01 -10
0 Single -10 0 Neal -10 0 _Neal -10





Figure 3-2: Sharis Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) network in resting state
84This is a truncated explanation of the processes modeled in the McClelland and Rumelhart 
program. For a discussion of resting levels, decay rates, gamma levels, and other interesting but 
here secondary phenomena, see: Rumelhart and McClelland, Explorations, 11-48.
85 Thus earlier "clues" are no less salient than earlier ones—a psychologically unrealistic 
assumption.
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As our improvisation starts, the players already know that the topic of 
conversation is a Shark. Thus they are acting the part of someone who is 
already biased toward recalling that which is typical for Sharks. In figure 3-2 
we see the result of setting the external input of the Sharks unit to 100, or full 
activation. As activation propagates through the network for 10 cycles, 
interesting effects begin to emerge. Before hearing anything about the particular 
Shark that the inquirer was interested in, the network is predisposed to find 
Nick, Dave, Neal, Rick or Dave the likely choices. The net would find it easier 
to "believe in" a thirty-year-old, black-haired, married man. These are the initial 
biases of the system, biases born of the architecture's interaction w ith these 
specific instances.
External input Name units Instance Units___________
10 0  S h a r k s 80 0 Phil -7 0 _Ph.il 6
0 Ike -7 0 _Ike 6
0 in20s -5 0 Nick -7 0 _Nick 7
0 in30s 11 0 Don -7 0 _Don 5
0 in40s -5 0 Ned -7 0 _Ned 6
0 Karl -7 0 _Karl 6
0 Blond -8 0 Ken -7 0 _Ken 5
0 Black 8 0 Earl -7 0 _Earl 6
0 Brunet 0 0 Rick -7 0 Rick 7
0 01 -7 0 _01 6
0 Single 0 0 Neal -7 0 _Neal 7





Figure 3-3: Sharks IAC network at '10 iterations
The initial query asks for a man among the Sharks who is dark-haired and a 
burglar by trade. We simulate this by setting the value of the external input to 
the appropriate units to 100. This new configuration, added to the activation of 
the Sharks unit which remains active, propagates through the network. Among
the Sharks, only Ike, the lone blond, is definitively eliminated, and his 
activation value drops to a negative number (though not quite to the resting 
state of -10). The identification of the sought-after Shark as a burglar increases 
the activation level of all the burglars: Don, Ken, Earl, and Rick—but not, yet, to 
the threshold rate of 50. (See figure 3-3)
External input Name units Instance Units___________
100 Sharks 84 0 Phil -3 0 _Phil 16
0 Ike -8 0 _Ike -9
0 in20s 2 0 Nick -4 0 _Nick 7
0 in30s 42 0 Don 4 0 _Don 37
0 in40s -6 0 Ned -3 0 _Ned 16
0 Karl -6 0 _Karl 0
0 Blond -■15 0 Ken 2 0 _Ken 32100 Black 80 0 Earl 5 0 _Earl 40
100 Brunet 77 0 Rick 7 0 Rick 43
0 01 -3 0 _01 16
0 Single 7 0 Neal -4 0 _Neal 7
0 Married 39 0 Dave -4 0 Dave 3
0 Divorce -2
0 Pusher -7 
100 Burglar 82 
0 Bookie -9
Figure 3-3: Sharl<s IAC network at 20 iterations
In the next exchange the inquirer says that the Shark he is seeking is, like 
most Sharks, in his thirties and that he is an active ladies' man. This guidance is 
modeled here as turning on the inputs to the in30s, Single, and Divorced units. 
Another 10 cycles of iteration yields the following pattern:
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External input Name units Instance Units
100 Sharks 85 0 Phil -8 0 _Phil 8
0 Ike -11 0 _Ike -110 in20s - 5 0 Nick -8 0 _Nick 29100 in3 0s 83 0 Don 2 0 _Don 250 in40s -11 0 Ned -8 0 _Ned 8
0 Karl -10 0 _.Karl -120 Blond -16 0 Ken 2 0 _Ken 41100 Black 82 0 Earl 5 0 _Earl 28100 Brunet 77 0 Rick 19 0 _Rick 63
0 01 -8 0 _ 0 1 8100 Single 77 0 Neal -8 0 _Neal 29




Figure 3-4: Sharics IAC network at 30 iterations
At this point Rick has gone over the threshold activation level of 50 and is 
therefore reported as a guess. Rick, of all the Sharks, is the only one who 
matches all the criteria. He is a thirty-year-old, black-haired, divorced burglar. 
This is a good example of content-addressable memory.
The trouble is that this guess is wrong. The inquirer has mistakenly said that 
the person that he is seeking is thirty. But the inquirer is certain that it is not 
Rick; after all, he knows Rick. That means that no one really matches the search 
criteria. In contrast to the current IAC model systems based on simple 
deduction break down at this point. They cannot handle "bad" input. The 
computer maxim, "Garbage in, garbage out" applies, but w ith the added 
caution that it takes only one "byte" of garbage to turn all the output into trash. 
Humans don't just quit in this way, though they may be confused.
With the IAC network modeled here, we simply continue to do what we 
have been doing: we input the datum  that Rick is not the name of the instance
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sought. We set that unit to a negative 100 and again cycle the networks relations 
another 10 times.
External input Name units Instance Units___________
100 Sharks 85 0 Phil -10 0 _Phil -50 Ike -11 0 _Ike -110 in20s -10 0 Nick 5 0 _Nick 46100 in30s 84 0 Don -5 0 _Don 10 in40s -■13 0 Ned -10 0 _Ned -50 Karl -11 0 _Karl -14
0 Blond -■16 0 Ken 16 0 _Ken 51100 Black 83 0 Earl -1 0 _Earl 8100 Brunet 73 -100 Rick -17 0 Rick 65
0 01 -10 0 _ 0 1 -5100 Single 80 0 Neal 4 0 _Neal 460 Married-13 0 Dave 3 0 _Dave 45
100 Divorce 79
0 Pusher -8 
100 Burglar 82 
0 Bookie -12
Figure 3-5: Sharks IAC network at 40 iterations
This pushes the Ken instance barely above 50 and allows our character to 
offer Ken as a possible candidate. This choice is confirmed by the character and 
we finally have identified our Shark. But before we go on, note that even when 
receiving negative input to his name unit, Rick has actually picked up 2 points, 
to 65. W hat is going on here? This, like the ability to retrieve a particular 
instance by its content, is an artifact of the interaction of the architecture and the 
particular instance we have explored. Recall that every member of a "pool" is 
connected to every other member by inhibitory connections. The instance _Rick 
has gained enough dominance locally that it continues to suppress others in its 
pool independently. H ad this same pattern of inputs into the net been input 
initially, if the inquirer had made a simple list of all that he knew, this effect 
w ould not have appeared and Ken would have been the dominant unit—and 
the clear answer. But in this sort of network, history does count. The net is in
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very real danger of "blocking on" Rick. McClelland and Rumelhart call this 
phenomena "hysteresis:" " . . .  prior states of the network tend to pu t them into 
states that can delay or even block the effects of new inputs."86
Luckily for the sake of this exercise, Ken emerges from the background 
enough to become an active possibility. The character offers this as an 
alternative w ith the caveat that Ken is too young. When the inquirer agrees that 
Ken is the one and that he is younger, we activate the in20s unit and deactivate 
the in30s unit and cycle the program once again.
External input Name units Instance Units___________
100 Sharks 85 0 Phil -12 0 _Phil -11
0 Ike -12 0 _Ike -12
1 00 i n 2 0 s 78 0 Nick 5 0 _Nick 42
0 i n 3  0 s 53 0 Don -10 0 _Don 21
0 in40s -15 0 Ned -12 0 _Ned -11
0 Karl -12 0 _Karl -15
0 Blond -16 0 Ken 22 0 _Ken 64
100 Black 83 0 Earl -9 0 _Earl -5
100 Brunet 74 -100 Rick -17 0 _Rick 60
0 01 -12 0 _01 -11
100 Single 80 0 Neal 5 0 _Neal 42





Figure 3-6: Sharks IAC network at 50 iterations
With the confusion about the age cleared up, Ken becomes the dominant 
node in the instance pool and the clear choice.
W hat is exciting about this style of explanation is that it is a robust model of 
memory that produces the sort of associative recall that seems intuitively 
plausible and that it does so w ithout recourse to elaborate, implausible rules.
86 McClelland and Rumelhart, Explorations, 16.
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While, like all computer programs, this one is built from rules, it is im portant to 
note just what is modeled in this medium. Unlike conventional logicist models 
it models a pattern of relationship—and a pattern of relationship that is 
particular to the actual content. The "structure" is dependent on the content.87 
In a traditional account, the structure is independent of the particular content. 
The forms are eternal while the content is ephemeral.88 While connectionist 
models blur this distinction, they introduce a new distinction: architecture. This 
term, adopted from computer science, denotes a set of constraining parameters 
within which particular instances are constructed. Architectures limit but do 
not determine the structure/content interrelationship that is at the heart of 
connectionist models.
The point is not that this particular example could not be solved through 
logic (fuzzy logic is the most obvious logical strategy89), but that to produce the 
same output, a logical model would have to be extremely complex. This is due 
to its inability to handle dynamics. Change occurs over time and models built 
on the model of deductive logics are timeless. To produce the same effects, a 
logicist model built of " i f . . .  t hen . . statements would have to chart out every 
possible path that the input could take and specify a set of relationships that 
would hold under each condition. Essentially, it would have to know all the 
branch paths in advance and specify a relationship in each case. In a strictly
87 And, of course, but less germane to the point made here, the content would not be 
available as content without the patterned relationship that I have here called structure.
88 The classical proponent of form is, of course, Plato. See: Plato, The Republic, Everyman's 
Library, trans. A. D. Lindsay (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 197.
89 Though this is the topic for a different dissertation, fuzzy logics also constitute a 
fundamental departure from classical reasoning in that they, like connectionist models, proceed 
from a point that assumes that objects are not unitary. In common use, this is yet another 
instance where statistics are used to dodge the effects of history on the systems that logicists 
want to study so that the relationships could be idealized as time-free.
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logical system, all possible outcomes are calculable and prepositional models in 
artificial intelligence build on this possibility—they calculate the intervening 
steps on the fly. But even for so simple a situation as the Sharks simulation 
given above, such a strategy is extremely unwieldy. Classical assumptions have 
resulted in an increasingly complex model of nested, conditional rules for any 
situation which it models. This resembles nothing so much as the Ptolemaic 
system of astronomy in which the assumption of perfect circles, made on the 
grounds of a particular culture's belief that circles were the perfect forms 
behind the real, elaborated epicycles upon epicycles to explain each new 
observation.90 In the current instance we are faced w ith a situation where the 
classical assumption, based on our particular culture's assumption that 
deductive logic is the pattern that underlies both the world and the mental, is 
producing an increasingly complex system of self-similar rules which shows no 
sign of coming to any natural end. We are ripe for a Copernican revolution in 
the way that we think about thought.91 Current models of cognition are less 
and less plausible as we are forced to elaborate them in the face of empirical 
findings in cognitive science and psychology.
The Plausibility of Connectionist Models
Connectionist modeling is a powerful tool that is coming into use in a 
surprisingly large number of areas.92 The differing interests of various
90 This example is one made popular by Kuhn in a different context but brought most 
forcefully into this discussion by Smolensky. See: Jeremy Campbell, The Improbable Machine 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 191.
91 We are also ripe, not incidentally, for a new Copernican revolution in how we see the 
world. See, for instance, Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New 
Dialogue With Nature (New York: Bantam, 1984).
92 This aspect is accessibly covered by Waldrop (see particularly Farmer's remarks) in: M. 
Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York:
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investigators leads them to emphasize differing values in the tool. Some are 
interested in it largely because of its ability to convincingly model 
psychological and cognitive phenomena that had remained puzzling under the 
dominant models of investigation.93 Others are chiefly interested in the neural 
plausibility of such models and their ability to connect disconcerting 
discoveries about neural architecture to basic perceptual and motor abilities 
shared by all animals.94 Still others are fascinated with the computational 
properties of network models. Central processor, serial, local address 
computers—the sort of computation most supercomputers and your desktop 
PC share—have run up against distressing performance bottlenecks which 
networked architectures do not share.95 While one of the exciting things about 
this field is that the cross-fertilization between disciplinary areas is very 
evident, most of the motivation for pursuing network models falls into one of 
these areas.
Our interests in pursuing this field are both narrower and broader. They are 
narrower in the sense that this work focuses chiefly on learning and the process 
by which learning occurs. While tins is an important focus of some researchers
Simon and Schuster, 1992). More technically, see: J. Doyne Farmer, "A Rosetta Stone for 
Connectionism," in Emergent Computation: Self-Organizing, Collective and Cooperative Phenomena 
in Natural and Artificial Computing Netivorks, ed. Stephanie Forrest (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 
135-187.
93 This, for example, is the main interest of the PDP group. See: McClelland, Rumelhart, and 
Flinton, "The Appeal of Parallel Distributed Processing," 3-44.
94 Examples include Grossberg's neurological modeling, for example: Gail A. Carpenter and 
Stephen Grossberg, Pattern Recognition by Self-Organizing Neural Networks (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1991) and Brooks' work on robot insects, for example: Rodney A. Brooks, "A Robot that 
Walks: Emergent Behavior from a Carefully Evolved Network," Neural Computation 1 (Fall, 
1989): 253-262. For a review of Brooks' work, see: Philip Chapnick, "Flerbert, Murphy and 
Periplaneta comutarix [Book Store]," AI Expert 5 (December, 1990): 23-25.
95 Danny Hillis has built both an academic career and a business out of this approach. See:
W. Daniel Hillis, "The Connection Machine," Scientific American, Trends in Computing 1 (Special 
Issue, 1988): 24-31.
in the field, it is not generally central to their rationale for pursuing work in the 
area. For an educator, a focus on learning and the development of a credible 
theory of the material change that constitutes learning are the central 
motivations. Education's interest is broader because education is directly 
engaged in a practical project in the social world, a project which is peripheral 
to the interests cited above; education seeks to enhance our students" practical 
competence.96 As we will see below (and will cover in more detail in chapter 4) 
this latter interest will push us to understand that connectionism and the 
insight it provides into learning is not fully adequate to fulfill our distinctly 
educational interests.
In this section we will examine the plausibility of connectionist models as 
cognitive, neural and computational models of cognition with special attention 
to w hat they have to say about learning.
The Cognitive Plausibility of Connectionist Models
One of the most appealing aspects of connectionist models is their 
psychological plausibility. Connectionists models generally produce a pattern 
of success and, perhaps more crucially, of failure that is analogous to the 
pattern of success and failure that we find in hum an cognition.
Education and the Classical Cognitivist Account
Educational interests, as outlined above, help us narrow our focus to the 
problems in psychological approaches that are most important for education.
96 This is to be sharply distinguished from so-called "competency-based" education which 
is not about practical competence at all, but is about a schoolish testing regime which is 
antithetical to the worldly competence which is education's legitimate aim. For an excellent 
exposition of this distinction, see: William B. Stanley and James A. Whitson, "Citizenship as 
Practical Competence: A Response to the New Reform Movement in Social Education," The 
International Journal of Social Education 7 (Fall, 1993): 57-66.
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One range of problems in psychology that is suggestive for the practice of 
education is that of competence. This range of issues has to do with 
understanding how agents can act competently in the world. As we ignore the 
successful learning of the baby's coming to perceive her mother's face, a real 
engagement w ith the positive issue of competence is often ignored for a focus 
on various types of failures of competence. But generally people, like babies, do 
act competently given a reasonable history in the appropriate context. This 
competence is therefore held to be "unremarkable." But again, like the baby's 
ability to recognize her mother's face, it is a remarkable and wondrous thing.
Consider for a moment what the standard story about human competence 
has to say about the conditions for competent action. As we have seen above (in 
chapter 2), there is a very straightforward way of understanding our abilities 
which says, essentially, that we know the world through knowing the objects of 
the world and the relations which connect them. Objects are understood as 
either pregiven simples or categories in the classical sense. Classical categories 
are known by their necessary and sufficient features and are sharply 
distinguished from members of other categories. This sort of category is 
necessary in any system which relies on formal logical relations to connect the 
objects of understanding since, as Aristotle observed, objects which are allowed 
to overlap cannot be handled through the offices of logic.
Given this presum ption one would expect that any study of human 
competence made from within this tradition would look first to cataloging the 
objects of the world and the relations between them. Indeed, this has been just 
the way that Western philosophy has preceded. As Liebniz observed:
[T]he most im portant observations and turns of skill in all sorts of trades
and professions are as yet unwritten. Of course, we can also write up
this practice, since it is, at bottom, just another theory more complex and 
particular.97
But, "of course," Liebniz's task is too large: how can we list all the things 
that a person m ust be able to distinguish, know the use of, and their relations to 
objects both absent and present, just to make it through the everyday task of 
shopping at a m odern grocery store? As the task of listing objects and their 
relations becomes more and more obviously a practical impossibility, those 
attempting this path are led to wonder how it is that people, who in the 
analytico-referential account m ust possess just such an annotated list, 
accomplish so difficult a task. They finally either conclude that people come to 
the world already filled with the appropriate knowledge98 or they postulate 
that there exist structures in the hum an perceptual apparatus and knowledge 
storage structures that "naturally" pick out the objects of the world.99
Such synthetic a priori are, ironically, justified as logical necessities. How 
else can the burden be borne? Logically, say their advocates, these are the only 
solutions. But the force behind the confident deferral to logic is derived directly 
from the presumptive unity and naturalness of the analytico-referential 
discourse. This discourse is founded on the presupposition of an identity 
between language, the world, and logic. Further, the assumption that this must 
be the way that the mind works is due to our common acceptance of the
97 Leibniz, Selections (New York: Scribner, 1951), 48. quoted in Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
"Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain."
98 This tack is used most commonly in restricted domains; for example, Chomsky's certainty 
about the black box of language is derived from the apparent complexity of grammar and the 
poverty of stimulus from which to learn such complexity. Plato, however, in his doctrine of the 
eternal forms (that we remember imperfectly), made it a general strategy.
99 Frege's Sinn, Husserl's noema, and Kant's schemata all share elements of this; see 
Dreyfus's historically oriented discussion in: Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus 
Modeling the Brain," 15-43.
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Cartesian introjeclion of logic into the workings of the mind. W ithout our 
particular intellectual history, this approach w ould be neither obvious nor 
natural.
Given this history, however, it has been taken as both. Most recently we see 
the development of formal memory structures, which act as the sort of prescient 
filters that Frege, Husserl, and Kant postulated, in cognitive science. These have 
taken the form of Minsky's frames,100 Shank's scripts101 and Rumelhart's 
schemata.102 Each of these has been put forward as a way to deal with context— 
a context which had stymied earlier more purely logical attempts to build 
models of intelligent agents in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.103 
These earlier attempts were based on the simple understanding of thought as 
taking the form of logic. While enjoying success in limited realms—such as 
solving logical theorems104—they functioned poorly in the complexity of open
100 See: Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). For an 
exposition of the educational implications of Minsky's position, see: Howard Gardner and 
Thomas Hatch, "Multiple Intelligences Go to School: Educational Implications of the Theory of 
Multiple Intelligences," Educational Researcher 18 (November, 1989): 4-10.
101 See: R. C. Schank and R. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaurn, 1977).
102 See: David E. Rumelhart, "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition," in Theoretical 
Issues in Reading and Comprehension, ed. Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce, and William F. Brewer 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaurn, 1980), 33.
103 See Gardner's historical overview of the field: Howard Gardner, The Mind's Neiv Science 
(Basic Books: New York, 1985).
1041 am thinking here of the area of expert systems and, especially, Newell and Simon's 
early program "Logic Theorist." Interestingly, considering the intellectual history presented in 
chapter 2, this program was developed for and had its first use in proving theorems from 
Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. See Gardner's discussion of this period under 
the heading "The programs of the Dartmouth Tetrad" in Gardner, The Mind's Nexu Science, 145- 
155.
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situations. Workers in this programme,105 echoing their historical antecedents, 
decided that the problem was a matter of inadequate or inaccessible 
background knowledge of the world. So background knowledge, understood as 
facts and propositions, were added to their models in ways that were 
structured to increase their availability and to capture context. Importantly, but 
not surprisingly given the history of the term, these schemata were conceived 
as hierarchically structured sets of propositions concerning things in the 
world—as structures of logic connecting fact. John Anderson, in his influential 
text,106 gives the example of a schema for a house which contains "slots" for 
categories such as "superset," "function," and "location." A given instance may 
fill all of the slots in terms of its "default" designation and hence be a "central" 
instance, with less ideal instances being "peripheral." What made this revival 
possible in the late seventies was, as Rumelhart et al. (1986)107 remarked, the 
development of the computer as a research tool. This made possible a 
specificity which allowed schema theorists to state their theories with a rigor 
whose lack had led to the dismissal of previous models.
These models, lent power by their material presence—they actually "ran"— 
became the basic building blocks of an understanding of knowledge by the new 
cognitive school of psychology. They did not, however, fulfill all their theorists' 
dreams. In their formal instanciation, they were unable to answer some of the 
questions that researchers had been asking; they were "a pale representation of
105 The spelling "programme" is intended to reference Lakatos's understanding of research 
communities. Lakatos emphasized competing research programmes, an analytical framework 
which seems particularly apt in the context of this discussion. See: Imre Lakatos, The 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
106 Anderson, Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications, 124-125.
107 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought 
Processes in PDP Models," 17-18.
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the underlying intuitions."108 Among others, they were fixed by their original 
structure, in that empty slots were filled but the structure itself could not be 
elaborated; and there was no way to place variable constraints on the filling of 
default functions, which would have made possible a situation where the filling 
of one slot would have changed the default on the filling of another.
In the vocabulary of education, this failure meant that these formalized 
schemas could "learn" only in the most mechanical of ways: it could fill slots 
w ith the nearest match to an expected value. A more profound alteration of 
structure in response to a history of changing input or a more dynamic 
contextual refrigeration was impossible. They were essentially memory and 
retrieval structures and they answered researchers' questions coitcerning 
anomalies in this area, such as the relative ease with which associated ideas are 
memorized and certain kinds of contextual blockage and enablement of recall. 
The difficulties with regard to learning were not breached and researcher 
dissatisfaction continued.
But the computer power that enabled the return of schema theoretic 
perspectives to psychology also made possible a return of the associative 
models which had suffered a similar eclipse in the absence of a convincing way 
to instanciate their complex networked ideas.109
The Sharks simulation is an example of how plausible models of cognitive 
functions can be built using connectionist architectures. The Sharks simulation
108 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought 
Processes in PDP Models," 19.
109 In fact, the intuition which informs connectionist theories goes all the way back to 
William James who, like other pragmatists, struggled to make his theoretical position a material 
one. The image in his Briefer Course of the connections that make up associations and the 
accompanying discussion of how they change during experience is eerily prescient of more 
recent work. See: William James, "Chapter 7: Association," chap. in Psychology: The Briefer 
Course (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1892/1961), 120-146.
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is designed to deal w ith the problems of static structures that had characterized 
frames, scripts, and schemata.
Generally, the problems with static logical structures such as those discussed 
above are subsumed under the rubric of "brittleness." Brittle programs work 
adequately in the restricted domain in which they are developed but do not 
scale well when exposed to a large and more complex universe. They deal 
poorly w ith several sets of conditions: 1) situations in which the complexity of 
the problem space makes it impossible to anticipate (and program for) every 
particular possible state of relations between interacting units; 2) situations in 
which the input contains errors; 3) situations in which history or order makes a 
difference; and 4) situations in which the problem itself is poorly defined.110
The Sharks simulation deals with the first three of these problems in ways 
that indicate the value of connectionist models of memory. Problem four, the 
problem of "poorly defined problems," is deeper and requires a broader 
solution, to be discussed below, than the Sharks example can support.
The Basis for Emergent Cognitive Properties in Network Architectures
The Sharks simulation exemplifies a primitive operation of connectionist 
architectures: pattern completion. Pattern completion is an emergent property 
of connectionist networks which is based on the tendency of a network to settle 
into similar patterns when given similar inputs. Put so baldly, such a comment 
seems almost trivial, but this is not a characteristic of competing models of 
cognition where only identical inputs, or inputs which can be transformed to be 
identical, reproduce the same outputs. This relative stability vis-a-vis 
incomplete or distorted input is crucial to understanding learning. The child
110 Several of the phrases used in this sentence are technical uses of common terms. While 
the common meaning indicates adequately for the present purposes the intended meaning, the 
reader should be aware that "problem space," "unique decision," and "poorly defined 
problem" have computationally precise meanings.
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who learns to recognize her m other's face has never seen the same face twice. 
Logicist systems theoretically require a massive amount of prescient discarding 
of sensory experience to achieve identical input such that recognition can occur. 
Under such a logicist interpretation, the child would somehow know, before 
she knew the category being learned, just what she m ust eliminate as a non- 
essential feature of that category. Connectionist models do not have this 
problem. Pattern completion's simplicity turns out to be deceptive. It is actually 
a robust primitive under conditions where we have limited resources of either 
time or storage space.
Distributed representation is the architectural feature of connectionist 
networks that supports pattern completion.111 In a connectionist model there is 
no single location that serves as the site of any particular memory. Instead, 
memory is distributed across many nodes. As we have seen in the figures above 
(1-6) these networks are designed to implement incremental changes to 
connection strengths between nodes based on the history of external input. 
Because of this there is no single node or location within the network that 
uniquely encodes the characteristics of, say, Ken. Similarly, though it was never 
explicitly entered, the network does contain an "idea" of the ideal Shark. Figure 
3-2 above shows the initial configuration where a bias toward Neal, Dave, Rick 
and Nick and against Ken and Don are established after only 10 iterations. This 
is in sharp contrast to localist models of memory developed in analogy to von 
Neuman computer architectures, where each atom of information is stored in a 
defined location.
111 See: James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart, "A Distributed Model of Human 
Learning and Memory," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological 
Models, ed. David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 170-215.
Complexity and the Plausibility of Connectionist Architectures 
Distributed representation enables a network to evade the first problem 
cited above, of situations too complex to anticipate all possible relationships, by 
its ability to respond "reasonably." In figure 3-3 above, the simulation is asked 
to suggest a dark-haired burglar who is otherwise a typical Shark. It returns 
Rick, who is a dark-haired burglar, but suggests him over other dark-haired 
burglars because his pattern of activation is closer to the "typical" dark-haired 
Shark. Rick's other characteristics are that he is in his thirties and is divorced. 
His closest competitor, Earl, is in his forties and is married. A typical Shark is in 
his thirties and is married. Earl is one of two Sharks aged forty and Rick is one 
of two Sharks who is divorced. So how does the program "know" which one to 
choose? In this case the simplest explanation is that the age thirties is more 
typical of Sharks than is the status married and that a reasonable answer to the 
query would return the m ost "Sharklike" qualifying member: Rick. It is 
instructive to trace this out in some detail. There are eight Sharks in their 
thirties and only two each in  their twenties and forties. But there are only six 
married Sharks, four who are single, and two who are divorced. The negative 
relationship that characterizes within-pool connections means that as the 
iterations proceed, the eight thirties in the age pool will come to dominate their 
pool more quickly and thoroughly than the six married instances will dominate 
the marital pool. The age pool's activation strength will propagate to the "Rick" 
unit earlier and with greater strength than the marital status pool's activation 
will spread to the "Earl" unit. Once this early dominance is established, Rick 
will suppress Earl w ithin their common pool more than Earl will suppresses 
Rick. The architecture is thus sensitive to and magnifies small initial
differences.112 Ultimately you get the most "reasonable" answer to a question 
which no designer of the simulation ever expected would be asked.
Nowhere in this program is there a rule which relates to this instance nor is 
there an ideal, prototypical model to which the actual cases are compared. This 
is w orth noting because descriptions of psychological reality often insist on one 
or both of these conditions. The system demonstrated above can be described as 
having a rule which says something on the order of, "Take all the instances 
which satisfy this list of characteristics; if this list is larger than one, then take a 
look at all the other characteristics that all the members of the new group share 
which are not already listed; if there are any differences, count the number of 
times each different element appears in the larger population; if this number is 
the same, take the categories in which the difference appears and determine if it 
appears more often than any other subcategory; If it does, count the absolute 
number of times it appears as a member of its category . . .  then award the nod 
to the instance w ith the largest number of times to appear." This is a 
complicated and unreadable sentence even with the many alternate branches 
not explicitly stated and elaborated. It is a bare-bones rendition of the logical, 
propositional approach to this problem. No such rule appears in the Sharks 
program, and no large number of other rules which could be used to describe 
other possible outcomes of this same configuration actually exists.113
112 The phrase "small initial differences" references a key concept in what has come to be 
known as chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics. For a good popular treatment, see: James 
Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking, 1987). For a more philosophically 
oriented approach, see: Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos:.
113 The rule-based approach has been the dominant methodology in artificial intelligence 
and remains extremely influential. The descendants of Liebniz and Husserl remain active in 
their attempt to exhaustively describe the world in a way that would allow answers to 
questions to be calculated. See: Jim Barnett, Kevin Kight, Inderjeet Mani, and Elaine Rich, 
"Knowledge and Natural Language Processing," Communications of the ACM 33 (August, 1990): 
30-49.
Very similarly, no prototype exists; that is, no "perfect dark-haired, burglar 
Shark" image exists which is somehow a smooth interpolation of all the Sharks 
with these characteristics plus an average of all known values in the larger 
category of Sharks for each unknown value.114 Though the program may be 
described as "acting" as if this is true, there is nothing of this sort to locate.
Error and the Plausibility of Connectionist Architectures
While both logical and prototypical approaches can be used to describe the 
functioning of this program, neither of these alternate approaches can 
adequately account for error. This is the gist of the second problem cited above: 
situations where the input is "noisy." Noisy information is the bane of logicist 
models of intelligent action. By "noisy," cognitive scientists usually mean 
information which is, in the most extreme case, simply wrong, is in excess, or is 
internally inconsistent. Logic has always had trouble with wrong information. 
You m ust be certain of your premises if your deductions are to be trusted. 
Excess information, information which is more than is necessary and sufficient 
to derive the correct conclusion, introduces biases into logical systems which 
can only produce deviation from the perfect answer. What is wanted is all the 
information and only such information. Internally inconsistent information is 
also deadly to such systems. To the logicist this means that somewhere there is 
some tiling wrong—if the w orld is held to be fundamentally logical, as I have 
argued above, then true inconsistency is not really possible. But the world is 
such that often cognitive researchers may know that there is an inconsistency in 
the data set, but are unable to locate the particular "error" that causes it.
Humans have much less of a problem with such data. People can usually 
pick out easily any anomalous data in an area with which they are familiar—it
114 For a good discussion of the current status of prototype theory, see: Lakoff, Women, Fire, 
and Dangerous Things, 39-57.
100
doesn't fit the pattern with which they are familiar. In practice we simply 
discard such data; more often than not this turns out to be a good idea. 
Similarly, people often consider data which is in excess of what is logically 
required to come to the correct conclusion.115 While hum an behavior which 
shows these characteristics is often criticized as "illogical," any cognitive theory 
which purports to be psychologically realistic must produce such effects as 
effortlessly as people seem to do.
In the original Sharks example, we observed the way in which the Shark 
network was used to model a discussion in which one character asked another 
to identify a person unknown to the inquirer but known to the first character. 
Some of the drama of the example was due to tension as to whether the 
program would be able to recover from incorrect information. In some ways the 
example given was a particularly powerful one because the target Shark, Ken, 
was not a typical Shark. Ken was one of only two Sharks who were in their 
twenties and also one of only two divorced Sharks. Because of this the network 
was biased against finding Ken a suitable Shark of any kind. The network 
displayed some of the flexibility and potential power of such architectures in 
being able to overcome error in such an unfavorable context. A more common, 
though less dramatically interesting situation (the casting director would find it 
"uninteresting") would have been for the interlocutor's admitted ignorance of 
the Sharks and his familiarity with other gangs to lead him to assume that the 
Sharks must all be younger than they were. He would be fitting them into his 
previous "biases." This would lead to his saying that he wanted a twenty-year- 
old Shark when he was actually referring to thirty-year-old Rick. In this 
instance the same network would return three candidates at above the
115 David Kahnenan and Amos Tversky, "Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness," Cognitive Psychology 3 (July, 1972): 430-454.
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threshold of 50 units of activation: Don, Ken, and Rick. In returning the 
instances Don and Rick, the simulation would have effectively been throwing 
away anomalous information which could lead to poor conclusions. It may not 
be strictly logical, but it does work. The nuanced nature of this discarding 
should be noted, however; Ken, who fits all of the given parameters, is the first 
choice but he, the odd Shark, is not the only choice.
History and the Plausibility of Connectionist Architectures
History effects are included as a type of error discussed above in the 
tradition of cognitive science. Connectionist models, however, give us a reason 
to focus on history as an element not directly associated with error. In a 
connectionist account history is not simply a source of deviation from the 
timeless, general, logical account. The passage of time can, instead, be seen as a 
source of much of the power of connectionist explanations.
A connectionist architecture blurs the distinction between content and 
structure. The effects of this architecture in making possible a reasonable 
instanciation of associative memory through the concept of distributed 
representation have been noted immediately above. Such models reproduce a 
much fuller range of hum an psychological phenomena. Pointedly, such models 
also produce, as byproducts, an account of hum an "error" that is integrated 
with the account of hum an ability.
Considered over time the coupling of content and structure modeled by a 
connectionist network opens a dynamism that simple structural models cannot 
model. Put simply, in a connectionist network both the order of events taken as 
data and duration matter. A network will settle into very different patterns 
depending upon the order in which it gains information and upon the length of 
time it processes that information.
Again, we can use the Sharks to examine a concrete example of what this 
might mean. Recall the original story that we told:
The inquirer asks: "You know that guy, uh, the dark haired guy, always 
got something to hock, hangs out down at Joe's."
The character responds: "Come on, everybody hangs at Joe's."
To which the inquirer says: "You know, 30s, different girl every 
weekend . . .  you know."
The character reacts: " . . .  Dunno, Rick, maybe."
Inquirer: "No, I know Rick, he lives on Myrtle."
Character: "Maybe Ken, but he's younger."
Consider this slightly different story. Here, the order of the information
presented in the first two inquiries is exchanged.
The inquirer asks: "You know that guy, uh, thirties, different girl every 
weekend, hangs out dow n at Joe's."
The character responds: "Come on, everybody hangs at Joe's."
To which the inquirer says: "You know, the dark haired guy, always got 
something to hock . . .  you know."
The character reacts: " . . .  Dunno, Rick, maybe."
Inquirer: "No, I know Rick, he lives on Myrtle."
The Sharks network I have devised is sensitive to this difference in a way 
that turns out to be catastrophic for the inquirer's finding the person he is 
seeking. In the original example the network had developed to the point that 
both Rick and Ken were activated at above-threshold levels and with the 
knowledge that the person sought was not Rick, the second choice, Ken, could 
be confirmed (figure 3-7).
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External input Name units Instance Units
100 Sharks 85 0 Phil -10 0 _Phil -5
0 Ike -11 0 _Ike -110 in20s -10 0 Nick 5 0 _Nick 46100 in30s 84 0 Don -5 0 _Don 10 in40s -13 0 Ned -10 0 _Ned -5
0 Karl -11 0 _Karl -14
0 Blond -16 0 Ken 16 0 _Ken 51
100 Black 83 0 Earl -1 0 _Earl 8
100 Brunet 73 - 1 0 0 R i c k - 1 7 0 _Rick 65
0 01 -10 0 _oi -5100 Single 80 0 Neal 4 0 _Neal 46





Figure 3-7: Sharks IAC network at 40 iterations under the conditions of the first story
Modeling the second story, however, makes for a radically different 
situation after we have gone through 40 cycles. Rick, as in the first simulation, 
was the first instance to make to the threshold mark of 50 immediately after 30 
cycles. But at 40 cycles, after the inquirer claims that the person he is seeking is 
not Rick, the following, quite different, pattern emerges. Instead of Ken 
emerging as the second choice, Nick, Neal, and Dave emerge. Given the same 
information but in  a different order, this simulation has failed to find the 
sought-after name: Ken. Further cycling of this simulation in this condition— 
thinking "longer" about it—without any new information in terms of different 
input strengths will only deepen the bias toward Rick as his stronger activation 
level w ithin the instances pool leads to the suppression of all other instances. 
U nder these new conditions Ken will never emerge as an alternative.
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E x t e r n a l  i n p u t  Nam e u n i t s  I n s t a n c e  U n i t s
1 0 0 S h a r k s 85 0 P h i l - 1 2 0 _ P h i l -9
0 I k e - 1 1 0 _ I k e - 3
0 i n 2 0 s - 1 3 0 N i c k 15 0 _Nick 56
1 0 0 i n 3 0 s 8 4 0 D on - 1 2 0 _ D o n - 1 2
0 i n 4 0 s - 1 4 0 N e d - 1 2 0 _ N e d - 1 1
0 K a r l - 1 2 0 _ K a r l - 1 4
0 B lo n d - 1 6 0 K en -9 0 _ K en 43
1 0 0 B l a c k 8 4 0 E a r l - 1 2 0 _ E a r l - 1 1
1 0 0 B r u n e t 73 - 1 0 0 R i c k - 1 7 0 _Rick 64
0 0 1 - 1 2 0 _ 0 1 -9
1 0 0 S i n g l e 80 0 N e a l 1 1 0 JNeal 51
0 M a r r ie d - 1 6 0 D a v e 14 0 _Dave 55
1 0 0 D i v o r c e 79
0 P u s h e r 1 6 s
1 0 0 B u r g l a r 8 1
0 B o o k i e - 1 0
Figure 3-8: Sharl<s I AC network at 40 iterations under the conditions of the second story
This model fails to return the "correct" answer in this instance. And this 
failure is not a fluke—it is a result of the basic architecture of the simulation, 
and to one degree or another it is a problem w ith all connectionist architectures 
where each node is active in  more than one representation.116 McClelland and 
Rumelhart call this phenomena "hysteresis"117 and it is one way to explain the 
common phenomena of blocking, where an incorrect recall seems to block the 
correct recall. One might not be able to recall a friend's daughter's name as 
Sally after recalling, incorrectly, "Sarah." Such historically, contextually
116 It is possible to design neural net architectures in which each pattern which corresponds 
to a representation of a pattern of input is fully independent of other patterns learned. This is 
chiefly a matter of the relative complexity of the learning tasks versus the complexity of the 
network. This is seldom a useful strategy because it forfeits the interactivity of 
representations—distributed representation's chief advantage over its more traditional 
alternatives.
117 McClelland and Rumelhart, Explorations, 16-17. In McClelland and Rumelhart's usage, 
"hysteresis" is a broader term than might be concluded from this example. Hysteresis means 
"delay," and their use of the term includes the sort of delayed coming to the correct answer that 
my original example displayed after it received incorrect information as to the sought-after 
person's age.
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contingent recall is a feature of hum an cognition which is common and difficult 
to explain.
In this example we have shown how the order of the input can make a 
psychologically real difference in the result that the network settles (or does not 
settle) on. As mentioned above, in such networks duration also matters. 
Generally, given a steady diet of a single pattern of input, a network will settle 
into a pattern which is stable. Beyond a certain number of iterations it does not 
change. It has reached a stable state. This, too, can make a difference in the 
eventual pattern that the network settles into.
The network that we have been using as an example settles into a stable state 
by the time it has cycled 100 times with a particular set of input. If we allow the 
network to stabilize between inputs, the original story that we have been telling 
comes to a more rapid conclusion. After only the first set of information is fed 
through, the network settles on two cases with an activation level above our 
threshold of 50: Rick with an activation of 61 and Ken with an activation of 51. 
This would allow us to skip forward to the final part of our original story and 
refuse Rick as someone we already know and then accept Ken as the person we 
seek, effectively bypassing the age error which misled us in the first instance.
The preceding remarks on the cognitive plausibility of connectionist 
architectures have focused on  areas which are particularly important in 
modeling the way hum an agents acting in the world might show their 
particular pattern of competence and failure. That connectionist architectures 
show an analogous pattern of success and failure in understanding such 
instances has been taken as evidence of the cognitive plausibility of such 
architectures for educational purposes.
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Learning: Ill-Formed Problems and Connectionism
The Sharks example and the discussion above focus most directly on issues 
of contextual recall. While such examples gives a sense of the power and the 
flavor of connectionist models, of more fundamental interest to education is the 
way such models illuminate issues of learning. To date, learning theory has 
consisted almost exclusively of descriptions of the conditions under which 
learning occurs. In part this has been because there was no credible theory of 
how the differences that underpin learning take place. We could not answer a 
question which asked what material process supported learning. In part, 
though, the failure to pursue the actual mechanisms of learning was founded in 
the presumption that the material instanciation was relatively trivial. We 
already knew that thought took the form of logic. The tradition from Plato 
through Boole and Kant and on to such educationally im portant derivations as 
Bruner's and Piaget's have all assumed that real, valuable thought was 
logical.118
Cognitive science has been seen as an extension of this tradition, with the 
crucial difference that these researchers took the presumption that logic is the 
basis for thought and combined it w ith the materiality of logic that the digital 
serial computer represents. Faced with the problem of brittle programs— 
programs which could not transfer their expertise out of the very narrow range 
for which they were designed—it became apparent that logic alone was 
insufficient. Researchers concluded that there had to be a much larger amount
118 Writers as different as Piaget and Bruner agree that classification is done through 
features or attributes, leaving completely unexplained how such features are recognized. While 
both authors change many positions in later work, their early, influential writing serves as a 
good example of the way in which logical conceptions of thought have been dominant. See: 
Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, Classification and Seriation 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George 
A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (Huntington, NY: R. E. Krieger, 1977).
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of contextually appropriate, domain-specific knowledge.119 There were at least 
three ways of attacking this problem: one could claim the knowledge was wired 
in by evolution, one could claim that the problem space could be made 
manageable by rules of thumb (heuristics) and thereby establish a tractable 
space within which logic could operate, or one could lean on learning.120 The 
prewired solution works only for restricted domains—it is not considered 
reasonable to suggest that we have evolved to go grocery shopping. The second 
solution is the route that most cognitive scientists and workers in artificial 
intelligence have taken. This has led to projects to describe the world,121 to the 
elaboration of domain-specific agents which use local heuristics to evade the 
problem of complexity,122 and, building on this latter idea, to concepts of 
people built of many such domain-specific agents.123 The ideas of domain 
specificity, though adequate for certain engineering objectives, does not meet 
the needs of those who want an understanding of how an agent can act 
competently in the world. Domain specificity and the complexity of domain- 
specific programs make it very difficult to credit the possibility that all these 
agents come prewired by evolution. Finally the hope that material processes 
which undergird competence can be known rests on finding a credible 
explanation for the phenomena of learning.
119 Howard Gardner, "Artificial Intelligence: The Expert Tool," chap. in The Mind's New 
Science (Basic Books: New York, 1985), 138-181.
120 These three positions are exemplified by Chomsky, Simon, and Rumelhart et al. 
respectively.
121 Barnett, Kight, Mani, and Rich, "Knowledge and Natural Language Processing," 30-49.
122 William J. Clancey, Knoioledge-Based Tutoring: The GUIDON Program (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1987).
123 Minsky, The Society of Mind.
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The trajectory that cognitive science has followed, from a belief in logic and 
the forms of logic, to a dawning realization of a more pervasive need for 
domain-specific knowledge to avoid the brittleness problem, to a focus on 
learning and encouraging learning, is very suggestive of the pattern in 
education—a path that educators trod long before cognitive science arose. Built 
on the same presumptions as the current research program in cognitive science, 
American education has passed from an emphasis on learning as properly 
training the forms of the m ind (and the accompanying emphasis on math, the 
grammar of Latin, and natural law) to an emphasis on the many specific facts 
that one m ust know to operate successfully, to an emphasis on the process of 
learning. This describes, I suspect, the development of any competence-oriented 
project which originates w ithin the framework of the analytico-referential 
discourse.
Educators, having reached the conclusion that they should concentrate on 
the process of learning, have been at a loss to say w hat is, exactly, learning. 
W ithout a theoretical grasp on the material process that supports learning, 
there is very little choice but to go with descriptive theories of the conditions 
under which learning occurs. At its least sophisticated this has been a simple 
take-up of behaviorist stimulus-response psychology; at its most sophisticated 
it has posited a complex individual competent within an environment filled 
w ith cognitive resources. Both are finally theories of knowledge acquisition and 
not theories which actually suggest how the change we call learning happens.
Learning and Distributed Representation
Connectionist networks offer a model which suggests that learning need not 
be regarded as entirely mysterious. It suggests ways of understanding the 
process of learning which go beyond description to suggest why some things 
are difficult to learn and others easy. It suggests ways to understand context
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and history as useful and necessary parts of the learning process and not 
merely as sources of error. A nonmysterious process of learning is at the heart 
of any hopes for a truly effective pedagogy.
The Sharks example allows us to make a distinction between some 
phenomena that we often refer to as learning and the sorts of learning done in 
connectionist networks. The Sharks network can be interpreted as being 
capable of inference. If we look at inference as a specie of the "best fit" problem 
where an adequate response is made to a query on the basis of incomplete 
information, the Sharks network infers quite well. It can tell you who is the 
most Shark-like Shark or who is the closest to a dark-haired, burglar in his 
thirties who is unm arried—even if there is no such individual. When someone 
comes to a conclusion of this sort, we often say that the person has learned 
something about the group. Indeed, that person has done something, 
something we sometimes label induction, which has been very difficult to 
explain.
Similarly, we can claim that the Sharks simulation generalizes. It is able to 
conclude from a list of associated characteristics, "Sharks are in their thirties." 
As inaccurate as this is, strictly speaking, it is invaluable in our everyday lives. 
Too, this is not a simple m atter of counting up numbers of Sharks and 
comparing that number to a total number of Sharks and concluding according 
to a plurality rule that Sharks are most likely to be in their thirties. It is entirely 
possible to get nuanced generalizations and suggestive failures to generalize. 
W ith three elements in the age pool (twenties, thirties, and forties), it would be 
possible to come up w ith a distribution of instances in which there was a 
plurality of thirty-year-olds but in which, otherwise, the forty-year-olds were 
more typical (more likely to have the "ideal" profession and martial status, for 
instance) which w ould so bias the overall network dynamics as to result in a
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network which settled on forty as typical, since it is most typical of the most 
typical instances. If the balance were closer to being even, it might be unable to 
settle on any of the three ages reliably; the return would depend upon the 
particular inputs activated and the historical pattern of that activation. This sort 
of contextually sensitive recall, a recall which changes as the saliency of various 
elements of the situation changes, often looks like a nuanced and carefully 
reasoned judgment. Indeed, on the account given here it is carefully reasoned. 
But it is not deduced.
Learning in Simple Multi-Laver Connectionist Networks
As suggestive as is the phenomena allowed by the distributed representation 
in the Sharks net, there is a much richer tale to tell. While we may be able to see 
how the "family resemblance" between different instances of the concrete 
mother can lead to a network returning the same label "mother," (close is good 
enough for neural nets) we still have very little idea how the baby can learn the 
category in the first place.
The Sharks net was a "hand-crafted" example of one model of recall, a 
model rich enough to yield interesting phenomena and simple and explicit 
enough to be observable. But the categories and the patterns of connection 
between the instances were directly coded. Beneath the differing patterns of 
activation these patterns remained stable. As the coder, I would need to specify 
the relations that any new member of the Sharks would have to all the old 
members. Until we are able to account for the creation of such patterns, we will 
be short of the theoretical framework that we need in order to account for 
learning.
In general, three factors are needed to move from the distributed network 
that we have described so far to one which is capable of generating its own 
patterns from patterns of input. First, and perhaps most important, there needs
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to be some way of altering the connection strengths that does not depend 
(directly) on a programmer. Second, there will need to be more than two layers 
in the network, and, third, the activation function will need to be nonlinear. 
Such a network would, in theory, be a complete Turing device, able to compute 
any statable computation.124
The simplest case of a network that learns is a two-layer associative net. In a 
two layer network the patterns of change are relatively easy to comprehend.
The design of such a network connects every node in the input layer to every 
node in the output layer. A pattern of activation is presented to the input layer 
and is propagated to the output layer. This is one way to regard the basic 
design of the Sharks network if we consider all the feature units to be input 
units and all the instance units to be the output.125 A two-layer associative net is 
set the task of associating a given input pattern, which is taken as an "event," 
w ith an arbitrary output array, which can be taken as the "name" of the event. 
This type of net does not take the strength and sign of the relation between the 
input and the output layers as fixed. Instead, the strength of the connection 
between units of the two layers is altered slightly in each iteration in the 
direction that would produce the correct outcome. It is fairly easy to see in such 
a situation that the network would eventually "learn" to produce the correct 
"name" for the input. Even with such a simple network some interesting effects 
are possible. A single network can learn to associate several different inputs 
w ith their respective names. It can also be trained on distorted versions of each 
of their input patterns and will correctly "generalize" by categorizing each
124 Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski, The Computational Brain (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 125-130.
125 This is not an entirely accurate analogy, chiefly because in simple two-layer networks 
there is no pattern of connection between units in the input array.
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slightly distorted version by its correct name. As in the Sharks example 
discussed above, the typical associative network exhibits interaction effects tied 
to its distributed representations that are very similar to those exhibited by 
hum an memory.
Two layer networks have known computational limits.126 The most 
significant basic advances in network architectures have centered around the 
development of "hidden" layers of units and nonlinear activation functions.
The computational limits of two-layer nets have to do with what they can learn 
and so are of particular interest here. Two-layer networks cannot learn the 
solution of the classic XOR (exclusive or) connective in bi-valued Boolean logic. 
In problems of this sort, two conditionals of one type, say "+" and yield one 
value when the conditionals are the same and another value when they are 
different. The sign that results from multiplying negative and positive numbers 
shows this pattern: two dissimilar signs yield a negative and two similar signs 
yield a positive. This is a simple case of a function which is not linearly 
disassociatable. That is, there is no single, defining element for which knowing 
the value is to know the answer to a question posed. Instead, the answer is 
relational. One m ust know and compare the values of both elements of the 
conditional to draw a conclusion. This is a large class of problems and not 
simply an exotic computational nicety. It goes to the heart of being able to draw 
relational conclusions.
126 The computational limits, particularly the inability to find a solution to the XOR problem, 
was the major theme of Minsky and Papert's Perceptions. Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert, 
Perceptions: An Introduction to Computational Geometry; Expanded Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1988).
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The solution to this problem lies in expanding the network architecture 
beyond two layers. Three-layer networks can solve for the XOR relation.127 The 
middle layer, usually called a hidden layer, can be designed to fire when both 
the conditionals are, say, negative, and thereby send enough activation to the 
output layer to cause it to yield the correct answer. This simplest case 
establishes, in principle, that relational conclusions can be draw n from network 
architectures. It stops short, however, of demonstrating what we are most 
interesting in seeing demonstrated: it does not show that such a net can "learn" 
in the incremental fashion discussed above in two-layer associative nets. We 
need to know that an algorithm exists that will converge on the pattern of 
weights which will yield the correct answer without explicit external coding.
This problem is difficult just because it is relationally conditional. In a two 
layer network, the difference between the desired output and the actual output 
can be computed for each output unit, and that error can be used to adjust the 
connection weight to each input unit proportionally to the input unit's effect on 
the net error. Metaphorically you just divvy up the error among those elements 
that caused it according to whether their activation strength contributed to the 
error. A too-weak connection gets incremented slightly and a too-strong 
connection is decremented. But in a three-layer (or more complex) architecture, 
it is not clear how to assign credit.128
127 Rumelhart, et al.'s 1986 chapter is devoted to demonstrating this point in detail. David E. 
Rumelhart, Geoffrey E. Hinton, and R. J. Williams, "Learning Internal Representations by Error 
Propagation," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 1: Foundations, ed. David E. Rumelhart, 
James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 318-362.
128 This is a specie of the more general credit-assignment problem in computational theory. 
See: William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1991), 86-87.
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The solution turns out to allow a small change in the input to the hidden 
unit to make a large change in its output. This is done by making the output 
function of the hidden unit sigmoid (see Figure 3-8).129
Figure 3-9 Linear and Sigmoid functions
A common function is graphed as a line draw n at an angle on a plane but a 
sigmoid function, is shaped roughly like an "S." The function drawn as a 
straight line describes a situation in which a change in the amount represented 
by the Y axis always corresponds to a set amount of change in the amount 
represented by the X axis.
But in a sigmoid function large differences in the flat lower and upper ends 
of the range produce virtually no difference in output while small differences in 
the middle of the range produces large differences in output, Given the larger 
global context this behavior effectively shifts the sensitivity of the unit over its 
output range "seeking" the area in which its activation strength makes the 
greatest difference. This magnification of difference allows, after multiple
129 Churchland and Sejnowski, The Computational Brain, 107-112.
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feedback iterations, the 3-layer or more complex network to settle into a pattern 
of relations which minimizes output error.130
This ability to learn the canonical set of logical functions is, in one sense, a 
task set for network theorists by the presumptions of the analytico-referential 
discourse discussed in chapter 2. We may express some doubt as to the 
importance of the task outside of an unquestioned acceptance of the primacy of 
logic. Nonetheless, to again refer to MacIntyre, a theoretical framework can be 
considered superior to its predecessor if and only if it can solve the problems 
generated by its predecessor.131 We may be in the waning days of a discourse, 
but we too m ust respond to the problems that discourse has created. More 
concretely, much of what students are expected to learn in education is couched 
in just such a set of logical functions. The ability of networks to model 
successful problem-solving of this sort is crucial to their plausibility in a 
specifically educational context. A recurrent critique of networks is that while 
they may be fine for certain low-level sorts of learning like perception and 
categorization, they are not capable of handling higher level functions—by 
which is meant logic relations and. deductive conclusions over the symbols of 
language taken as discrete objects.132 It is true, and possibly an element of a 
connectionist critique of schooling, that school tasks are quite often
130 Technically, the point is a good bit more complex than this, with some algorithms finding 
the absolute minimum at considerable computational cost (Boltzman class automata, for 
instance. See: Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, chapter 3), but with a larger 
class of algorithms and their associated virtual machines finding local minima at a much lower 
computational cost. Whether these cheaper and more biologically realistic solutions learn 
quickly enough and well enough to suit human purposes will be an empirical matter in each 
particular instance.
131 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments and Social Contexts: A Response to Rorty," in 
Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1985), 222- 
223.
132 por example, see: Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, "Connectionism and 
cognitive architecture: A critical analysis," Cognition 28 (March, 1988): 3-71.
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characterizable in this way. The results set out above demonstrate that this need 
not be a reason to reject network architectures as an important element in a 
revised theory of learning. The exclusive or (XOR) relation in networks cited 
above can be inverted to solve for the case of not exclusive or (NXOR). Such a 
relationship is the formal equivalent of the more familiar "if and only if" 
relationship. Networks are capable, in other words, of learning to reach a 
correct answer even in those cases where a single datum  among arbitrarily 
many determines the outcome.
Explanations of learning based on logical relations, which posit the ability to 
solve such relations as primitives, model relations of this nature more cleanly 
than networks. But the question for educators is whether the additional 
explanatory powers of distributed representations and the additional 
constraints on theorization are reason enough to abandon the traditional logical 
model of the transformation that underlies learning and adopt a theory based 
on networked relations. Chapters 5 and 6 below will seek to expand on the 
practical implications of this possibility.
Learning, the Teacher, and Environmental Regularities
As we have discussed the basis for learning in network architectures, we 
have progressed from talking of the learning-like qualities of distributed 
representations possessed by network architectures in general to learning in 
two-layer associative networks to learning in multi-layer networks. It has been 
shown that network architectures have patterns of success and failure in 
contextually sensitive situations that are suggestive of the patterns of success 
and failure of human reasoning. Multi-layer networks can also correctly solve 
formal logical problems.
To this point the most complex networks described have been multi-layer 
networks incorporating an algorithm which incrementally adjusts the
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connection weights so that the gradual, internal reorganization of the network 
finally returns the desired output. These multilayer networks are usually called 
"feedforward" networks in reference to the direction of the propagation of 
activation. Activation feeds from the input layers forward to the hidden layers 
and then to the output layer. There are two broad critiques of such networks 
which are tied closely to the feeling that such networks are not "really" 
learning. One is that the learning that is shown is not real learning because the 
back propagation of error messages constitutes an omnipresent teacher.133 The 
other is that such networks are actually time-bound in significant ways and that 
they cannot adequately represent crucial psychological effects that depend 
upon, in effect postponing, the meaning of a current input until its appropriate 
context is revealed. Syntax in language, and particularly subject/verb 
agreement and embedded clauses, are often proposed as areas in which 
network architectures are inadequate.134
From the standpoint of an educational theory of learning, the complaint that 
real learning is the sort of thing which happens without a teacher is largely 
without force. It seems unremarkable that learning would require a teacher— 
the assumption that real learning takes place spontaneously has been suggested 
in education, but not in a context in which spontaneous excluded teacher- 
arranged regularities which appear in "learning environment."135 In an
133 Robert Cummins, "The Role of Representation in Connectionist Explanations of 
Cognitive Capacities," in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, ed. William Ramsey, Stephen P. 
Stidi, and David E. Rumelhart (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), 91-114.
134 Steven Pinker, "Rules of Language," Science 253 (August 2,1991): 530-535.
1351 am thinking of Montessori doctrine in particular, which holds that learning is a 
spontaneous accompaniment of play but which rigorously organizes the environment in which 
such play occurs to contain the regularities which are to be learned. Piagetian theory, of course, 
had very similar assumptions.
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educational context the sharp distinction between "environment" and "the 
teacher" seems naive. It is true, nonetheless, that neural net architectures such 
as the ones that we have discussed depend upon repeated interaction with an 
environment that is stable (in the sense that it presents the sort of slightly 
varying regularities that networks excelling in extracting pattern from during 
its history of interaction.) It is further the case that networks are very slow at 
extracting such pattern unless the network has been designed with the 
particular task in mind or has been trained on a set of regularities that were 
specially singled out for their pedagogical value. Again, this does not, in the 
current viewpoint, appear as a reasonable indictment of using network 
architectures to model of learning. Accepting the use of specially designed 
neural nets only amounts to the admission that there is some organization of 
the brain above the very micro level of the neuron or cell assembly that most 
networks model. Connectionist researchers have no quarrel with such an 
assumption and, in fact, much work in the area is directly inspired by modeling 
particular hum an perceptual architectures.136 Depending on environmental 
regularities only amounts to saying that the learning environment m ust show 
systematic regularities and that a part of the teacher's task is to arrange for the 
appropriate regularities to be significant for the student. While these sort of 
objection is not very salient considering our current purposes, they do highlight 
the need for a broader framework than that which connectionist theorists 
usually adopt. Connectionists do show a certain naivete in assuming that such 
regularities are readily apparent in the hurly-burly of the world. Education's 
more practical project pushes educators toward making explicit what cognitive 
scientists may reasonably treat as peripheral to their concerns of explicating
l 3  ̂Mead's work stays particularly close to the perceptual substrate. For example, see: Misha 
A. Mahowald and Carver Mead, "The Silicon Retina," Scientific American 264 (May, 1991): 76-82.
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cognition. The implications of this point will be expanded upon in chapter 4, 
where we will examine the specific utility of situated cognition in providing a 
basis for understanding the environmental regularities upon which network 
architectures rely.
Learning Temporal Patterns in Recurrent Networks
While the interests which motivate this work may sharply differentiate the 
educational and cognitivist concerns regarding the teacher, such is not the case 
in the second objection recently cited: that such time-sensitive effects as have 
been shown are insufficient to explain large areas of hum an capacities and the 
associated abilities to learn these capacities, which are necessary if we are to 
take network architectures as a reasonable starting point for an educational 
theory of learning. Indeed, if it were true that networks could not learn 
recursive and temporal patterning as has been charged, and if a serial 
architecture coupled w ith stable, site-addressable memory were necessary for 
this class of learning, as has been charged, it would be a strong indictment of 
the connectionist position. A large class of humanly learnable patterns would 
be covered under such rubric and, unlike the agnostic position that this work 
adopts toward the demands that learning model formal logic, such a deficit 
would affect the ability to explain many practical, in-the-world abilities that 
people conspicuously share. Beyond the syntactic and linguistic problems 
already mentioned, temporal coordination is required for such commonplace 
faculties as the capacity to appreciate music, the ability to dance and even such 
simple activities as grasping a pencil.
In large part, such critiques are in reaction to feedforward networks which 
learn by the backpropagation of error—the sorts of multi-layer networks
discussed above.137 While these are powerful learning architectures which 
effectively model perception and associative recall, such networks do have at 
least some of the limits that critics have asserted.138 W hat such networks lack 
are internal feedback. Internal feedback has been generally avoided, in part 
because the interpretation of network activity in the presence of such feedback, 
especially in the boundary case where the feedback crosses layers, is 
conceptually very difficult. In fact such boundary-crossing feedback can lead to 
conditions which are formally chaotic under the definitions used in the study of 
nonlinear dynamical systems—a point which will be discussed below. Internal 
feedback can take such limited forms as the inclusion of nodes whose activation 
strength is predicated in part on its activation level in the previous cycle. It can 
extend to include general within-layer interconnections and, most radically, to 
propagation of activation strength from higher to lower levels of the 
network.139 Networks which include such recursive feedback are known as 
recurrent nets—nets in which activation is passed in such a way that parts of it 
recur. This allows such networks to store previous states of the network and
137 Steven Pinker and A. Prince, "On Language and Connectionism: Analysis of a Parallel 
Distributed Processing Model of Language Acquisition," Cognition 28 (March, 1988): 135-183.
138 Network architectures, in general, are flexible enough that separating architectures by 
type and attributing capacities to these types as I have done here is a heuristic, rather strictly 
accurate, characterization. For instance, speech recognition networks typically make use of 
"time delay" neural networks. In such nets the initial activation pattern is passed to only some 
of the input nodes, and their activation is preserved by being propagated sideways in the input 
layer as well as forward through a standard feedforward, multilayer network. Generally, this 
lateral propagation does not involve a transformation and the connections to the hidden units 
symmetrical to those receiving current input. Viewed from the standpoint of the hidden units, 
each input "moment" consists of several serial moments of "real time." Is this a recurrent or a 
feedforward architecture? The answer largely depends on the use to which it is put.
139 "Backpropogation of activation" should be sharply distinguished from the 
backpropogation of weight adjustment in a standard feedforward network. It has serious 
computational consequences but is a biologically more plausible learning method. For the 
initial theorization of such "tangled hierarchies," see Douglas R. Hofstadter: "Waking Up From 
the Boolean Dream," chap. in Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern 
(Bantam: New York, 1985), 631-665.
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implicitly "compare" past states to current conditions. Doing so allows one to 
arbitrarily extend the time frame that can be considered far beyond the 
relatively short time that it takes a pattern of input to propagate forward to the 
output layers.140 Recurrence allows networks to compare temporal patterns 
and, interestingly, to resolve figure-ground ambiguities and segmentation 
ambiguities by allowing multiple, discrete "interpretations" to be compared.141
Complex Networks. Self-Organization, and Extended Learning
Recurrent networks open up vast realms of possibility in connectionist 
inspired modeling and theorization. So far, we have avoided the use of meta- 
theoretical frameworks such as chaos theory, nonlinear dynamics, automaton 
theory, or complexity. In part this has been a response to the awareness that a 
theoretical structure such as complexity theory is too strong. It can be used to 
model almost any phenomena, including those to which it adds very little in 
the way of explanatory power. Arguably, feedforward networks trained by 
backpropagation are cases of complex nonlinear systems. But they can be 
understood fairly easily w ithout reference to the more general arsenal of 
theoretical constructs offered by such frameworks. With recurrent networks, 
however, we enter a realm of complexity so great as to make recourse to these 
tools a useful measure.142
140 Not all network theorists consider this a central problem. Particularly those working in 
perception make the point, "Let time be its own representation." See the remarks of Carver 
Mead reported in Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, 120.
141 Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, 117.
142 For an extremely useful characterization of the circumstances under which separate 
research programs in neurology, biochemistry, and genetics have led to a rejection of 
localization of function and an endorsement of emergent phenomena in scientific explanation, 
see: William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson, Discovering Complexity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993).
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At the heart of the additional complexity that recurrence introduces is the 
possibility that some elements of a network can be relatively isolated from 
change vis-a-vis other elements of a network. These relatively stable but still 
plastic regions of the network constitute semiautonomous entities within the 
network. Such semiautonomy is the potential basis for explaining a wide array 
of phenomena. Among these is the emergence of hierarchy and the possibility 
of large scale "resonance."143 More grandly, imagination in the form of 
projective possibility, the concurrent ability to plan, and the existence of 
progressively more complex forms of abstraction which can feed backward to 
affect perception are enabled.
Such a prize is well worth seeking. But to do so more fully we will need to 
take a short side trip into the terminology of complex systems.144 Much of this 
will seem familiar to the attentive reader for the simple reason that the 
connectionist work on learning that we have been reviewing is a major source 
of such theory. In fact Doyne Farmer, in a seminal article, suggests that 
connectionist networks can be seen as the prototypical general case for the 
sciences of complexity and introduces a terminology based on its usages.145 The 
phenomena that is of the most interest in discussing the influences of the 
complex systems theory on a theory of learning is emergence. Emergence is
143 This concept has a long and interesting history. McCulloch published a suggestive 
mathematical paper suggesting both the later concept of cell assemblies and a very nonlinear 
conception of hierarchy, "heterarchy," in 1945. Warren S. McCulloch, "A Heterarchy of Values 
Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets," chap. in Embodiments of Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1988), 40-45. The latest embodiment of this trend is: Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, 
Brilliant Fire; On the Matter of the Mind (New York: Harper, 1992).
144 Tracking the emergence of dynamical classes of explanation is a project as yet undone. It 
appears to be a case of multiple emergences, with ecological and ultimately Darwinian 
conceptions claiming precedence.
145 Farmer, Emergent Computation, 135-187.
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said to occur in complex systems when the system exhibits characteristics 
which are not properties of the smaller units. Holism of this sort is not 
mysterious—it is explained on a relational basis. Generally the units or nodes 
are simple objects whose relationship is governed by simple rules. This has 
been the case in the networks discussed above. Dynamical systems are treated 
as open systems, meaning that such systems are open to outside perturbation or 
disturbance which can change the patterns of relation of the nodes. However, it 
is crucial that such systems be bounded. If there is no limit, however porous, 
the systemic relations simply dissolve. Such systems are said to be self­
organizing in that the regular patterns of relations that connect nodes lead, in 
response to external perturbation, to the creation of new internal structures.
This arises, in the abstract, when out of the flux of the initial disorder 
occasioned by the perturbation, particular patterns of relationships between the 
simple units arise which are more stable than alternate patterns of relationship. 
These patterns, by virtue of their relative stability, become the dominant ones 
within the system. There may be one such pattern indefinitely repeated or there 
may be several competing patterns.
In either case, under a stable pattern of external perturbation a stable pattern 
of relations will emerge. These structures are understood as self-organized 
states of the complex system. Typically there are multiple stable states the 
system can take under different levels of perturbation. In cases which are 
especially interesting in view of our present purposes, such states lead to 
internal conditions which are not only relatively stable in regard to the level of 
perturbation but which also interact with the environment is a way that 
stabilizes the level of external perturbation. Such systems can be understood as
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adaptive.146 Insofar as these states enable adaptive changes, the system can be 
said to have m apped its environment. The stable states that are possible under 
such systems are not time-reversible; that is, history matters. The evolution of 
the system closes off possibilities as interactions with the environment continue.
Connectionist systems map closely onto such systems. Simple units are 
connected by simple rules. Input to a net can be considered perturbation. 
Feedback, whether in the guise of connection strengths or activation strengths, 
alters the internal structure of the network. On a purely local, broadly parallel 
basis, each unit or its relationship to other units is altered in response to 
relationships that are internal to the network.147 Over time, or multiple 
iterations of input, the network settles into a state in which the difference 
between desired output and produced output is minimized. It has m apped its 
environment as well as the original structure and its history allow. Artificial 
networks of this kind can be viewed as networks which have been designed to 
seek stability.
Recurrence is the key to seeing network models as adaptive complex 
systems of more than the simplest kinds. W ithout recurrence—internal
146 While "adaptive" is a term particularly associated with Holland's rather technical use in 
classifier networks, the instinct to ally it with Darwinian evolution is not misplaced. 
Philosophically, the Darwinian vision of many simple animals interacting in competition and 
small differences between them being selected for is a clear example of a dynamical system. The 
revolutionary nature of Darwin's suggestions is widely acknowledged and Prigogine, a central 
figure in the philosophy of complexity, has made explicit his debt in this regard. See Prigogine 
and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 215.
147 Maturana, and Varela in a series of works, make this internal relationship central, 
emphasizing the "structure determined" nature of biological organisms interacting with their 
environment. The current work, because of its emphasis on human learning, on change, 
emphasizes how the structures that determine change—in part through interaction with "the 
world." Where we start a hermeneutic analysis of the relationship between organism and 
environment (or even starting from this opposition) is largely a matter of pragmatic purposes in 
view. See: Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knoivledge, The Biological 
Roots of Human Understanding (Boston: Shambala, 1987). and Francisco J. Varela, Evan, 
Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
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feedback—networks can m ap only one "thing" at a time: the total field. While a 
simple network can map multiple items—the Sharks net examined above 
demonstrates this—it can only actively map one item at time. With recurrence 
multiple areas of stability which map multiple contingent items in the field are 
possible. It would be possible, for instance, to simultaneously hold both the 
child's mother and the child's aunt as possible "faces" and resolve this 
ambiguity on the basis of subsequent input.
The issue of multiple, semiautonomous mappings is new enough to be little 
discussed theoretically.148 Our interests lead us to solutions to these problems 
which focus on networks that learn to partition their solution space. One class of 
solutions, applicable chiefly to perceptual learning, is to incorporate activation 
functions for the hidden units which make each hidden unit sensitive to a 
limited range of input units and sets up a competition, similar to that within 
Sharks pools discussed above, for adjacent hidden units. In this way the 
network is driven to have semiautonomous internal structures, each of which 
"represent" only a limited range of input. This strategy greatly reduces the 
am ount of retraining and representational degradation which occurs when a 
network needs to be retrained on subtly but significantly different input 
patterns. In effect only the changed portions need to relearn to associate the 
new input w ith appropriate output. Another, related strategy is to set up 
competing networks rather than competing nodes in the hidden layers. In such 
networks all inputs are fed to all the available hidden units in the initial layer. 
There is no interaction between mini-nets on the same level. A referee network 
receives input and compares it to the desired output, determines which
148 The literature that I here interpret to reflect on this issue is dispersed and is often the 
product of narrowly drawn problems and equally narrowly drawn solutions. One useful if 
technical summary is Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, 125-130.
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semiautonomous mini-net is closest to the correct output, and sends 
backpropagation error messages only to that network. The referee network is 
trained concurrently with the other mini-nets and its performance improves 
over time. This managed competition results in a partition of the instances 
between differing mini-nets on the basis of global similarity with each subnet 
specializing in a particular subset of instances. The Jacobs et al. paper (1991) 
from which this description is draw n is a speech recognition system which 
learns to recognize vowels uttered by multiple speakers. Its networks, 
depending on the particular history of cases which they are presented, learn to 
specialize in voice types such as children's or men's voices.149
While the institution of such semiautonomy as is illustrated above 
demonstrates the possibility and the power of semiautonomous networks, very 
little is yet known about just how, computationally, semiautonomous regions 
appear. One response might be to claim that leaning on preexistent structure, as 
the above example implicitly does, is not neurological unreasonable.150 Another 
would be to lean to some degree on activity in the world. Neural nets as 
currently implemented are, necessarily, completely passive. That is, they are 
unable to slightly change the angle at which they view an item to bring it into 
closer alignment with a previously seen example Both solutions seem likely, but
149 While technical, such networks may be commercially invaluable, as they are the basis for 
much of the connectionist-based work that is being done in the area of speech recognition. See 
R. A. Jacobs, M. I. Jordon, S. J. Nowlan, and G. E. Hinton, "Adaptive Mixtures of Local 
Experts," Neural Computation 3 (Fall, 1991): 79-87.
150 Cortical columns seem to play a role in partially isolating and directing the spread of 
activation. This and detailed work on visual preprocessing provide a strong place to begin 
thinking about the interaction of neural structure and computational semiautonomy. On 
columnar organization: Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, 35-37. On visual 
processing: John W. McClurkin, Lance M. Optican, Barry J. Richmond, and Timothy J. Gawne, 
"Concurrent Processing and Complexity of Temporally Encoded Neuronal Messages in Visual 
Perception," Science 253 (August 9,1991): 675-677.
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this remains an unsettled area of connectionist research which bears watching 
by the educational community.
In summary, recurrent networks make possible a degree of complexity in 
which a wide range of "higher" cognitive functions can be modeled. This is 
possible w ithout abandoning the properties of distributed representations and 
the associative learning that first attracted the attention of learning researchers. 
While much work remains to be done in this area, there is little reason, in 
principle, to think that network architectures cannot subserve a very broad 
range of hum an activities.151
Summary: The Cognitive Plausibility o f Connectionist Networks
hi this section we have moved from a brief examination of the classical 
account of learning based in prepositional logic and deduction to an extended 
examination of the cognitive characteristics of network architectures with a 
special emphasis on the implications of these architectures for learning. This 
review has viewed relatively simple and universal features of networks such as 
emergence and distributed representation against a backdrop of worldly 
complexity. Connectionist architectures show a pattern of success and failure 
roughly analogous to the broad hum an pattern and in distinct contrast to the 
cognitivist approaches which grow more directly out of traditional approaches 
to knowledge. Learning is treated in some detail, w ith our understanding of
151 A recurrent call, from both sides of the divide that separates connectionist and symbolic 
modelers of cognition, is for so-called mixed networks. On the surface such a "compromise" 
may appear eminently reasonable: let each style of modeling do what it does best. 
Unfortunately, it is not evident that such a division of labor can be maintained or that those 
suggesting such a division of labor actually agree about what would be demonstrated in mixed 
systems. Symbolists tend to see connectionism, grudgingly, as implementation routines for 
troublesome subsystems such as perception. Connectionists mean something very unlike what 
the classical symbologists mean when they talk of symbol manipulation. See, for instance: Paul 
Smolensky, "On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 
(March, 1988): 1-74.
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what is possible w ith network architectures growing as we examine more 
complex examples.
We turn now to brief examinations of the neural and computational 
plausibility of network architectures. While important and useful sources of 
constraint on theorizing and deep sources of inspiration for further modeling 
that bear on the central issues of this work issues of neural and computational 
are less directly applicable to educational concerns than the cognitive modeling 
discussed at greater length above.
The Neural Plausibility of Connectionist Models
The neural plausibility of the connectionist model is one of its chief 
rhetorical strengths. Connectionist theorizing is significantly constrained and 
deeply inspired by what is known about the brain. This work is will endorse a 
rather weak version of the neural analogy. I take it that what is of interest to 
educators is that networks model effectively the cognitive ability to learn that 
hum ans share. In taking this position I view neurology as providing only a set 
of constraints to work in rather than as providing the phenomena to be 
modeled and understood. The cognitive modeling which is done should not 
violate what is known of the brain and its organization.
Most critically for the purposes of this work, the learning processes 
described above should be interpretable as credible simplifications of actual 
neural mechanisms. A brief review of the similarities and differences between 
actual neural networks and connectionist networks will serve to provide the 
reader with a general basis for making a judgment on this issue.
In broadest strokes the connectionist vision is plausible. That is, the brain is 
composed of large numbers of simple neurons which interact simply and 
locally. Unless we take a dualist position, human capacities must, finally, be
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explained on some basis which does not contradict the elemental facts of 
neurology. As was discussed in chapter 1, there is neither enough time nor 
enough space to accommodate an image of the mind based on the von 
Neum ann computer analogy derived from the traditional, logicist approach. 
W hat processing is done in the brain must be done in a distributed parallel 
fashion on the evidence that we currently have.
At the lowest level many details of the networks instanciated here are 
plausible. Neurons do appear to be quite simple units which do connect to 
many other such units. Neurons do exhibit the threshold phenomena where 
they spike only after they are sufficiently stimulated by input. The sigmoid 
activation function introduced above as part of the modification to the basic 
network model (which in combination with hidden layers allows the modeling 
of crucial logical functions) is based on what is known of the sensitivity of 
actual neurons. They, too, show nonlinear activation sensitivities.
On the larger scale of physiology, two-dimensional mappings of motor and 
sensory units corresponding to the device of hidden layers in connectionist 
networks is one of the more fascinating and well-established discoveries of 
modern physiology.152 Similarly, the mini-nets instanciated in certain recurrent 
networks discussed above are similar in concept to the well known phenomena 
of cortical columns in which much of the interim processing of sensory input 
seems to take place. The development of these cortical columns in the visual 
system is a fascinating case of self-organization that occurs only during an 
animal's experience with the world.153 Such columns are relatively isolated,
152 Richard F. Thompson, Foundations of Physiological Psychology (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967), 314-320.
153 Chiye Aoki and Philip Siekevitz, "Plasticity in Brain Development," Scientific American 
259 (June, 1988): 56-64.
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being much more densely interconnected within the columns than they are 
connected to other adjacent tissue. Recurrence, or looping internal feedback, is a 
massive fact of neural interaction.
In light of evidence of this type, it is apparent that a convincing case can be 
made that connectionist networks are a simplified model of neural function. 
Indeed, there are those in the field who take just this position.154 Our continued 
focus on learning will lead us to take a slightly more nuanced and cautious 
position.
Computational neuroscience has its roots in the simple proposition of 
Hebbian learning. Hebbian learning, in turn, is based upon the assumptions of 
the classic McCulloch-Pitts neuron. It is not certain that complete analogs to 
either concept actually appear in the brain; where they do appear to be fairly 
solid instances, it is not clear that these instances can be generalized beyond the 
specific, restricted region in which they appear. Tracking this research in detail 
is beyond the w arrant of this work,155 but a restricted review of the problems 
here will be useful in grounding the claim that connectionist networks do 
model the brain in ways that are interesting and useful for a theory of 
pedagogy. This claim requires a fair amount of unpacking. It will call for an 
outline of the principles upon which connectionist learning architectures are 
based, a review of the results of attempts to locate material processes which 
implement such, architectures, and an explanation of the philosophy of science
154 See, as examples: Aoki, and Siekevitz, "Plasticity in Brain Development," 56-64. and 
McClurkin, Optican, Richmond, and Gawne, "Concurrent Processing and Complexity of 
Temporally Encoded Neuronal Messages in Visual Perception," 675-677.
155 The interested reader, however, is enthusiastically referred to Churchland and 
Sjenowski's excellent book The Computational Brain, and especially chapter 5, "Plasticity: Cells, 
Circuits, Brains, and Behavior," for a lively if technical general exposition of the ongoing 
research in this area.
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which supports the particular style of research which computational 
neuroscientists and connectionists support.
Connectionists assume the validity of the basic process of associative 
learning. In particular, they endorse various species of Donald Hebb's original 
formalization of the principle, in which he says:
W hen an axon of cell A is near enough to excite cell B or repeatedly takes
part in firing it, some growth or metabolic change takes place in both
cells such that A's efficiency, as on the cells firing B, is increased.156
So stated, this is a principle rather than a proposal of a specific mechanism. 
There is a great deal of collateral evidence that some mechanism satisfying this 
principle m ust be at work. Workers in neurology generally assume that a 
mechanism (or, more likely, mechanisms) exist which satisfy this principle. It is 
this principle (and not a specific mechanism) which connectionists model when 
they design networks whose relations include weight changes in response to 
the input patterns taken as experience. As usually interpreted, this formulation 
assumes the existence of a McCulloch-Pitts neuron which either fires or does 
not fire. We have already encountered this on/off interpretation in our 
discussion of the basic logic gates which support serial computation. In general, 
research has not supported the existence of a McCulloch-Pitts neuron. Instead, 
most neurons appear to signal difference on the basis of rate of fire rather than 
on a binary basis. This means that the brain is better regarded as built of analog 
units rather than digital ones.157
156 D. O. Hebb, Organization of Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1949), 62.
157 Or at least I so interpret it. This interpretation is not controversial but does depend 
crucially upon accepting that the synaptic junction is the fundamental computational unit of the 
brain. While there is real argument about this, most that adopt larger arrays, such as cell 
assemblies, as basic units are more, not less, committed to an analog interpretation. (See 
Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire for a clear statement and review of research.) Even so this 
leaves open the possibility that at some level some neural computation takes place on a basis 
best characterized as digital.
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Further, there are apparently several Hebbian mechanisms which change the 
relative efficacy of the synaptic connections in response to changes in input 
activity. None of these mechanisms are securely established in the sense that all 
the gaps in the experimental evidence have been closed.158 Even in areas where 
considerable and convincing evidence exists—for instance, the role of the 
hippocampus in enabling the transfer of memory into long term storage—it is 
not immediately apparent that identical principles will apply elsewhere in  the 
brain.
Such a gap at the center of an active and respected program of research is 
disconcerting and deserving of some reflection. How much confidence is 
reasonably shown in the conclusions drawn from working inside this program? 
An answer m ust be based on our shared philosophy of science. To some degree, 
it will be argued here, our hesitancy is based in a misunderstanding of the 
relationship between empirical evidence and theory in science. Regardless of 
the wide dissemination and acceptance of alternate, more socially constrained 
perspectives,159 science is still widely regarded as properly proceeding from 
empirical evidence to theory. A more sophisticated approach, and a more 
historically accurate one, would be that the concepts of theory and evidence are 
a product of a certain coevolution. Let us consider one of the most influential 
scientific theories to illustrate this point: evolution. Evolution has a similar gap 
at the heart of its endeavor. It depends crucially on Darwin's principle of 
descent with modification. For a hundred years there was almost no idea of the
158 Churchland and Sjenowski, The Computational Brain, 250-254.
159 Two well known examples are: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Second edition, enlarged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/1970), and Gerald 
Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein, second edition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988).
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nature of the mechanism which supported the principle. Even following the 
discovery of DNA the crucial linkage between the presumptive genetic 
structure and the environmentally selected phenotype is opaque. By and large, 
while we do not doubt that such a connection exists, we simply do not know 
exactly what it is.160 In the history of seeking such a mechanism, we have 
altered both our theory and our idea concerning what the mechanism might 
be—all w ithout abandoning the principle of descent w ith modification (though 
we mean something a good bit different and certainly more specific these days).
This suggests that a principle may be useful in a theory or model if it breeds 
fruitful research, and that a good principle, such as descent, may survive—even 
if with modification. The general principle of the backpropagation algorithm, 
Hebbian learning, appears to be biologically realistic. Long term potentiation— 
the technical term for changes in the "irritability" of a neuron—is an observed 
phenomena; the details of exactly how this occurs have yet to be worked out.
While connectionist networks of the type we are interested in are 
constrained by their commitment to neural realism, their reason for existence is 
to generate a plausible theory or abstraction of the way the brain produces its 
results. Slavish adherence to reproducing the brain in silicon would not 
simplify and w ould not serve the purpose of theory-building. A model of an 
historical event which merely reproduced every detail would not be a theory in 
any useful sense. A simplified model which captured the phenomena of interest 
would, on the other hand, be very interesting. The connectionist hope is to 
identify the principles which govern network generativity without simply
160 Thjs js a very exacting area of research and has more than passing relevance to the 
networked, holistic approach advocated in this work. See: William Bechtel and Robert C. 
Richardson, Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific 
Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and John Rennie, "DNA's New Twists 
[Trends in Genetics]," Scientific American 266 (March, 1993): 122-132.
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reproducing the phenomena in question. A model which does so constitutes a 
very specific and testable theory.
This is not to say that the particularities do not matter. The existence of 
sigmoid activation curves in actual nervous cells inspired the development of 
nonlinear activation functions in network architectures that helped overcome 
specific learning problems in  multi-layer networks. That we do not understand 
the details leaves room for many more fundamental discoveries to emerge out 
of neurological research. Among the largely unmodeled features of the hum an 
brain is the brain's analog, not digital, operation. It is also uncertain that the 
neuron is the basic computational unit161 or that it is as simple as connectionists 
assume. Most networks are much less internally differentiated than the brain 
and are much, much less complex in terms of sheer quantities of connections. 
Most networks pay no attention to nonneural chemical changes which affect the 
rate of neural fire across broad areas.162 Recurrent networks have modeled 
recursive, cross-level feedback very minimally.163 All of these features of brain 
processes are ones which could conceivably strongly shape the emergent 
features of a network. For example, "smarter" rather than "simple" units of 
computation, hierarchy, structure, and sheer quantity are all ways in which the 
rapidity of learning has been improved in particular network implementations.
Current connectionist network modeling is essentially betting on 
parallelism, distributed representation, and Hebbian learning as constituting
161 Indeed, it seems likely that cell assemblies, groups of cells that react in concert, are the 
computational entities described by nodes in most network models. See Edelman, Bright Air, 
Brilliant Fire, 81-98.
162 Candace Pert, "The Material Basis of Emotions," The Whole Earth Review 59 (Summer, 
1988): 106-111.
163 Churchland and Sjenowski, Computational Brain, 117.
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the appropriate abstractions which will enable adequate theory building. This 
may not succeed, but the process of exploring our current network paradigm 
should be revealing, hi the end a useful match between levels of abstraction 
and particular applications such as education will be a matter of empirical work 
which m aps the phenomena of interest onto particular network models and 
then maps the activities of such networks back onto our observations of real- 
world phenomena.
This analysis, while generally affirming the neural plausibility of network 
architectures, gives us reason to show some caution in assuming that the 
current abstractions will m ap directly onto the sorts of learning that occur in the 
classroom. We can conclude that, while we may be finding some general 
principles which govern learning in networks (and that the brain is a complex 
instance of such a network), we should not assume that general models will 
map directly onto a particular hum an task. We will not be able to test a learning 
method on a machine. But the real promise is that we may be able to devise a 
learning method with a better chance of succeeding with actual students by 
using the principles that are discovered via modeling brain processes.
The Computational Plausibility of Connectionist Models
W hat would it mean to say that a model is computationally plausible? 
Computational theory is a very general framework which draws boundaries 
around what can be said to be possible and impossible. On the positive side it 
defines a general class of mechanisms which can compute any well-defined 
problem, given certain conditions. On the negative side it lends us a set of tools 
w ith which to examine particular implementations and to define computational 
architectures which can reasonably be expected to do particular jobs. A 
computationally plausible approach would be one which is powerful enough to
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solve the complex problems with which it is faced and which will get the job 
done in a reasonable amount of time on the available hardware.
Before we begin such an analysis, however, it is worthwhile to note that 
network architectures operate most usefully outside of the boundaries that it 
defines. A well-defined problem is, in a nutshell, a problem which can be 
transformed into a statement in formal logic. As we have seen above, one of the 
crucial preconditions of formal logic is that the categories be discrete. 
Additionally, the axiomatic basis for the statement examined must be free of 
contradiction. A very large part of the attraction of network architectures is that 
particular implementations can be designed to work passably well when 
neither of these conditions is true. What is lost in the trade from the traditional 
point of view is certainty. Networks which tolerate such conditions well do not 
necessarily find the best answer to a problem—they can become "stuck" in a 
poor solution and it may be very difficult to recover from this state. This was 
discussed briefly as "hysteresis" earlier in this chapter. From the point of view 
of education, it is precisely the ill-defined problems of the world that are the 
most interesting, and computational theory in its more formal instanciations 
has little to say about such conditions except to point out the inappropriateness 
of formal tools for the task at hand. Given the historical predilection toward 
mathesis in our culture, however, such a service is of no small import. It is 
rhetorically useful to be able to say that there is a rigorous, well-defined, logical 
reason to reject formal logic as a basic framework for understanding our 
interaction with the world.164
164 It should be noted that I cannot close a particular logical hole in my argument. To accept 
the position outlined in this paragraph, one must accept both that the world itself does not 
conform to the forms of formal logic and that the network structure of the brain which supports 
the mind does not provide a suitable basis for formal logic. As one might suspect from my 
exposition on the analytico-referential discourse, not everyone will accept these conditions. The 
unity of the mind, the world, and logic on the basis of forms is tire crucial identity upon which
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The Strength of Network Architectures
Are network architectures strong enough to solve the problems we would 
set up for them? With the caveat noted that even a positive response to such a 
question would apply to only the small range of the phenomena that interest 
educators, the answer appears to be yes. This restricted question amounts to 
asking if networks can solve the full range of logical problems or only a 
restricted subset.165 Logic, and the ability to check our reasoning using logic, is 
an im portant scholastic task and one of which humans are capable—even if that 
capacity appears much more limited than we once assumed.166 If it were the 
case that networks could not be configured to solve such problems, it would 
constitute a strong argument that networks were at best an incomplete solution 
to the problem of what processes subserve cognition, and at worst that it is 
simply wrong. As was discussed above concerning whether networks could 
learn to solve the full range of logical functions, the answer is yes. Learning sets 
a higher bar than the simpler question asked here. For learning to solve logical 
functions we needed multilayer networks and a nonlinear activation function. 
For properly solving a logical problem we need only a three-layer network. 
There are a number of different combinations of connection strengths and 
activation thresholds (mini-nets) which will satisfy the most difficult of the 
logical problems: XOR. By properly arranging these mini-nets hierarchically, 
logical problems of arbitrary complexity can be solved. In formal terms such
the current discourse is built. My argument that these axiomatic starting points are 
unreasonable is not, in the end, logically demonstrable—though I can use logical contradiction 
to throw doubt on them as I have attempted to do.
165 The claim that network architectures were restricted to a limited number of logical 
functions was the central argument of Minsky and Papert's influential book Perceptrons.
166 Kahnenan and Tversky, "Subjective Probability," 430-454.
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complex networks can be seen as a special type of Turing machine—a computer 
as powerful as any other.
However, network architectures are less efficient computationally than 
alternate architectures; many more calculations must be done to arrive at the 
answer computationally than w ith the contrasting serial architecture. In effect 
networks find it harder to do logic than do standard computers. But we are not 
directly interested in finding the most efficient solution to a particular 
computational problem; instead we are interesting in modeling hum an 
cognitive capabilities. It is more important to our purposes that a model mimic 
the successes and failures of humans—and humans notoriously find logic more 
difficult than perception or other cognitive functions. Computationally we only 
need to establish that networks are capable of logic to say that they are 
computationally plausible in regard to this issue.
Time and Space Constraints in Network Architectures
If network architectures are strong enough to handle the job posed for them 
it remains to be seen whether it is sensible to expect that such architectures will 
be able to complete these tasks in a reasonable time, given the constraints that 
the brain imposes on how these tasks may be done. The preceding section, 
which reviewed neurological plausibility, will have prepared us to see, for the 
simple reason that network architectures were in part developed to explain 
how the brain's particular structure could give rise to cognitive capacities, that 
there is a plausible correspondence between the brain and connectionist 
networks. Given the capacities of network architectures that we have examined 
and the tremendously more complex, layered, and differentiated nature of the 
brain—all of which increase computational power—it seems entirely possible, 
even likely, that the brain is best described as a network processor.
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Computational theory, by its very generality, can say little that is positive 
about whether hum an capacities do arise from network processes. It is limited 
to demonstrating that it is not impossible that this is so. Perhaps more 
interesting for our purposes is the possibility of demonstrating that other, 
competing architectures may be considered computationally impossible.
Chiefly, of course, we are concerned with showing that there are formal 
reasons for rejecting the logicist position discussed in chapter 2 and identified 
there with Descartes and the further development of the analytico-referential 
discourse. An attempt to show this turns upon a closer consideration of Turing 
machines and the role they play in computational theory than has been pursued 
to this point. By calling a mechanism a Turing machine, one refers to both a 
powerful general concept in computational theory and a moment in the 
intellectual history of mathematics and logical philosophy which seems to seal 
off the possibility of the mathesis of which Descartes and Liebniz dreamed.
The moment in history that Turing is in part remembered fo r167 centers on 
the logical project to formalize mathematics that was known as the Hilbert 
program. This project had inspired Russell and his friend Whitehead to write a 
book which attempted to restate mathematics in a bi-valued logical format. 
Initially the task was viewed as a tedious but necessary chore to establish a firm 
basis for the arithmetic functions which would support a more rigorous 
philosophy—a philosophy in  the Liebnizian tradition of mathematizing a full 
description of the world. While this work was still in progress, the Austrian 
logician Godel restated the problem of paradox in formal terms. The classical 
form of the logical problem of paradox is the old riddle of the Cretan liar in
167 Turing is also remembered as the leading light of the code-breaking team that allowed 
Britain to survive the darker days of WWII with an intact navy, and as the originator of the 
famous Turing test of machine intelligence. See Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984) for an excellent biography.
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which the listener is asked to judge the truthfulness of the statement uttered by 
the Cretan : "All Cretans are liars." Such statements lead to a dizzying spiral of 
self-reference and, as Godel formally demonstrated, are logically 
"undecidable." Godel's contribution was to press the point that all logical 
systems make possible such self-referential statements and, specifically and 
distressingly, that arithmetic was one such system. Systems which make 
possible statements that they cannot solve are known as "incomplete"—and no 
incomplete system could be expected to adequately model the world.
This was a real blow to the Hilbert project, and various protagonists in that 
play reacted in different ways. Chiefly, an attempt was made to rule out self­
reference. This was the basis of Russell's famous theory of logical types, which 
simply issued a rule against particular sorts of reference. In the case of the 
Cretan liar, for instance, some the confusion was deemed to result from a poor 
linguistic habit of referring to the class of all Cretans by the same label as was 
used to describe a particular member of the class. More fundamentally, all 
reference of this sort was deemed out of bounds precisely because it led to 
nonsensical "undecidable" propositions. Russell's defense, however, was only a 
way station on the road to salvaging the hope for a more rigorous, rational, and 
ultimately mathematized philosophy. To make Russell's rule solution for the 
general case, you had to have a general way of deciding what were and were 
not decidable propositions.
Turing bent his talents toward achieving this end. If he could find a general 
procedure for determining which statements were and were not undecidable, 
he could, theoretically, salvage the project. In a nutshell, if there was a 
procedure for deciding which propositions were not decidable, then they could 
be safely segregated from "real" mathematics. If they were not decidable the 
attempt to make a complete logical description of the world m ust fail. A logical
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formalism would be either too weak or incomplete.168 In exploring this hope he 
developed an abstraction of computation which reduced logical procedures to 
its essentials.169 His abstraction consisted of two states (on/off, true/false), the 
ability to move and read a serial tape, and the ability to replace the first symbol 
w ith the other symbol. This was all that was needed to compute what was 
computable.
This abstraction served as the concrete avenue to explore the consequences 
of Godel's demonstration. The general question was, "Can we, through the 
offices of logic, determine which propositions are and which are not 
decidable?" The more specific form it took on Turing's dream machine—a 
machine in which any formally logical system could be emulated—was to ask if 
there existed a system implementable on such a machine which would 
determine which propositions were or were not decidable. Crucially for the 
story which we want to tell, this imaginary machine had no merely physical 
limitations; it had infinite memory and infinite time. Turing showed that a 
logical system for deciding logical propositions was a logical system like any 
other and that it fell prey to the limits Godel had intimated. This took the 
particular form of not being able to decide at which point to stop a 
computation. If a theorem is undecidable, a calculation set up to solve it will go 
on forever. If, on the other hand, it is merely difficult, it can go on for an 
arbitrarily long time. There is no principled way to tell the difference
168 Strictly logically, of course, this is all aboutpossibility; even in the best case it might be 
empirically true that all logical formalism might be both incomplete and too weak. It is a 
measure of the strength of the analytico-referential discourse in these communities that this 
possibility, eminently reasonable for Toulmin's humanists, is seldom actively considered.
169 Philip J. Davis and Reuben 'Hersh, Descartes' Dream, The world according to mathematics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 139-141.
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beforehand.170 There is no way to secure the axiomatic basis of logical systems, 
and therefore no certainty in the conclusions that are draw n from them, or, 
assuming with the discourse that the world is self-consistent, to map a logical 
system accurately onto the world. Descartes' dream was only a fever-dream.
This broader story, as im portant as it may be for our larger concerns, also 
forms a backdrop for understanding the emergence of time and space 
constraints as a central feature in computational theory. Turing deployed his 
universal machine in the context of demonstrating the limits of logic. Computer 
science as a practical field (as opposed to computational theory) took relatively 
little note of this result but found great value in the abstract formulation of 
computation that Turing put forward while showing these limits. Turing's 
"tape" became computer memory, his two symbols became off/on computer 
gates and, with the addition of moving the input inside the computer in the 
form of a program which controlled the series of inputs, this image of 
computation became the von Neuman serial computer that we are familiar with 
today, the foundation of a huge practical enterprise supporting hardware and 
software producers on a scale unimaginable in the 1950's. Time and space 
constraints, throwaway items in Turing's strictly theoretical construct, have 
become central issues in the new science of computing and in its 
computationally oriented offspring, artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
The practical issue can be concisely stated and is the foundation for the 
software industry: given the hardware that is available, is it possible to do a 
given task in a reasonable amount of time? If so, how?
The simplest sorts of hum an cognitive capacities such as perception, for all 
practical purposes, would be impossible to implement if the brain were a serial,
170 Heinz Pagels, The Dreams of Reason: The Computer and the Rise of the Sciences of Complexity 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 295.
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digital, site-addressable computer in the von Neum an tradition. The two classic 
features of practical computation, time and space, can be used to demonstrate 
this problem.
Time is strictly a limited commodity. You can't take all day to decide 
whether that thing coming at you is or is not a car. The basic speed of the 
computer "gates" in the brain, the synaptic junctures, and the propagation rate 
of electrical potentials along the neural axon, are very slow by silicon standards: 
neurons work on a millisecond basis while computer gates work on a 
nanosecond basis. This is slow enough that the observed speed of a broad class 
of the simplest hum an capacities including recognition and motor skills m ust 
be done in 100 or fewer "cycles." A lot can be accomplished in 100 cycles by a 
parallel processor, but in a serial machine each instruction m ust wait in line for 
the previous instruction to execute. The typical recognition program takes, at a 
minimum, tens of thousands of cycles.171 This goes a long way toward 
explaining, given the disparity in basic gate speed, the fact that tasks involving 
pattern recognition can be completed in milliseconds by the hum an brain but 
take hours to be completed by a computer172. At a minimum we need 
parallelism; the basic serial model is not plausible on the basis of time alone.
But this does not mean that we m ust necessarily discard a strictly logical 
structure on this basis alone. A properly segmented logical problem can be 
solved in parallel if there is an appropriate central executive to segment the 
problem and reassemble the parts. We have already discussed the problems 
with admitting such a "homunculus" into our explanations in chapter 2, but
171 Bechtel and Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind, 106-107.
172 David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, "Introduction," in Parallel Models of 
Associative Memory, ed. J. A. Anderson and Geoffery E. Hinton (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1981), 1-7.
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here we are more concerned with showing that even if we were to grant the 
possibility of such central control the homunculus will not allow us to escape 
intractable computational difficulties.
Space constraints led us to finally discard the logicist position in regard to 
the process which supports hum an thought. This follows from the simple 
observation that there are not enough neurons or even synapses to encode all of 
the recall hum ans can display at the available number of discrete sites. The 
large ratio of sensory to cortical neurons, coupled with the observed fact that 
virtually all of the brain is active during sensory input, eliminates the 
possibility that there are any neurons left over to be dedicated to serving as 
long-term memory sites. Thus the site address cannot be seen as a viable model 
of the way the brain is organized. The only viable model is one which encodes 
multiple memories over many separate units: distributed representation.
Distributed representation solves the space problem by increasing factorially 
the am ount of potential representation. Consider a simple four-object matrix: if 
each "site" is a single address, there is room for four representations. If all 
possible combinations of o ff/on  are considered, you have sixteen. When one 
realizes that each neuron in the cortex is said to average 2,000 synapses173 and 
that the Purkinjie cells—implicated in information processing—have as many 
as 100,000,174 the impact of this progression in the expansion of address space is 
quite staggering. Distributed representation—at least in the forms which 
purchase the requisite degree of storage space175—is the bane of logicist
173 E. Larson, "Neural Chips," Scientific American 9 (Feb., 1986): 112-116,169.
174 T. Kohonen, Associative Memory: A System-Theoretical Approach (Berlin: Springer, 1977).
175 Noninteractive distributed memory is possible, but only at the price of making each 
discrete pattern completely separate. This allows many fewer units of storage.
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systems because of the nondiscrete nature of representation it allows. The law 
of the excluded middle fails and categories are no longer cleanly separable.
Simply put, given what we know of both the brain and computation, the 
abilities that hum ans show are not plausibly the result of a strictly logical 
architecture.
Connectionism's Inadequacies as a Theory of Instruction
This chapter has been largely devoted to explicating connectionism and 
exploring its plausibility. Largely, it has been contrasted with the dominant 
logicist account made most explicit in branches of cognitive psychology but 
deriving from broader discursive structures. A case has been made for viewing 
connectionism as plausible against this particular backdrop. Objections made 
from within this dominant tradition have been discussed as they arose in the 
exposition.
But these are not the only objections possible. Connectionism has been 
explored with an eye toward its possible utility in informing an educationally 
useful theory of learning. But adopting a connectionist stance toward learning 
leads to a very different understanding of what learning might mean. Generally 
learning theories have not been theories which concerned themselves, as 
connectionism does, w ith the material process of change of which learning is 
actually comprised. This has been possible because of the strong discursive 
assumption that this was already and almost trivially known. Thought, like the 
world and language, was assumed to be governed by the forms of logic.
Theories of learning, by and large, have actually been theories of knowledge 
acquisition. They are about the conditions under which particular atoms of facts 
are acquired. Some of these theories focused on developmental readiness and 
others looked at cultural conditioned factors. In education, theories of learning
146
styles, classroom conditions, and examinations of teaching methodology 
echoed the larger emphasis on determining the preconditions of knowledge 
acquisition. There has been a void in the space where learning, understood as a 
material change, actually occurs. It has simply been assumed that learning 
occurs naturally under the correct conditions and that the task was to 
determine and reproduce those conditions. Insofar as theories of knowledge 
acquisition speculate about the nature of thought and learning, they fall back on 
the forms of logic and the sorts of factual objects that logic requires. Innatist or 
constructivist, individualistic or social, child-centered or disciplinary-based, 
situated or psychologistic, the traditional arguments have been about 
knowledge: the degree to which it is acquired, whether it is best learned in the 
company of others or alone, whether the most appropriate forms are 
disciplinary, and where it is located. It is not by accident that the classic 
curriculum question is, "What knowledge is of the most worth?"
A connectionist approach replaces the default assumption that learning 
takes the form of logic with the position that learning is an emergent property 
of certain kinds of network architectures.
But if connectionism lends us a more robust theoretical position concerning 
learning as a material process, a closer examination reveals that this valuable 
advance is inadequate to support a theory of instruction.
The problem here is that understanding hozv learning occurs does not tell us 
what is learned. Connectionism, unlike theories of knowledge acquisition, does 
not make a priori assumptions concerning the nature of the object acquired and 
does not assume that knowledge exists prior to its deployment. Simply 
adopting a connectionist position regarding learning, however plausible that 
position may be when viewed in contrast to its alternatives, does not pu t us in a 
position to answer the questions that educators need to answer in order to serve
their students' needs. We need to know what knowledge is and how it exists 
outside the person in order to use the insights of connectionist learning. With 
situated knowledge as well as connectionist learning, we may be able to 
understand not only how the child learns to recognize her mother but also the 
sorts of regularities in the child's interaction w ith the world that can constitute 
"motherness."
In chapter 4 we will turn  to a possible candidate for a companion theory of 
knowledge which may help us gain a handle on these problems: situated 
cognition. Situated cognition will be represented as a theory of knowledge 
which helps fill the gap created by adopting a connectionist approach toward 
learning. Equipped with these tools, we will in later chapters turn  toward an 
exploration of research and instructional design which is suggested by the 
intersection of connectionist learning and situated knowledge.
CHAPTER 4 
C onnectionism  and  Theories of Practice
As it turns out, the answer to the question of how many patterns the 
machine can learn has as much to do with the structures of the world as 
it does to do with the abilities of the machine.
—Jim Jubak,
In the Image of the Brain, 1992, p.58
Knowledge, as we usually conceive of it, is difficult to locate in connectionist 
networks.176 An understanding of connectionist networks may support a theory 
of learning but not, directly, a theory of knowledge. Connectionist theorizing 
constrains our approach to the issue of knowledge by proposing a surprisingly 
different conception of representation. Representation is usually understood as 
a technical matter central to understanding how we can be said to possess 
knowledge but on my account is better regarded as a position adopted in 
consequence of a theory of learning. By proposing a particular way of 
understanding how representations are learned and how that learning shapes 
the qualities that representations can possess, connectionist theorization 
constrains our consideration of knowledge theories to ones that can 
accommodate such representation.
The process of category formation which connectionists propose would 
radically alter our understanding of representation were it to be accepted. 
Neither the traditional approach to categories as involving the common
176 In fact this has been a way to criticize connectionist networks as not being a useful model 
of cognition because it does not have proper symbols. See: Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. 




possession of necessary and sufficient features nor the strong dissenting view 
that categories are organized around prototypes is in full accord with the 
implications of a connectionist position. This is no small matter; what is at stake 
is w hat our culture takes to be the basic organization of knowledge and how 
knowledge is acquired. Nothing could be more fundamental to the practice of 
education.
The Representation Debate
The question of just w hat constitutes a representation has loomed large as an 
issue in cognitive science and philosophy. By and large the field has divided 
between those who understand representations as symbols and those who 
claim that representations are better understood as images.177 The strongest 
argum ent on the part of those who endorse the symbolic position is that 
symbols and the syntactical relationships that connect them are the only way 
that the generativity of hum an thought can be explained. Their position gains 
strength by being implemented by artificial intelligence workers in programs— 
programs that actually run and lend the verisimilitude of presence to the 
position. This position is in part inspired by the Chomskyian analysis of human 
language and is the basis for the language of thought (LOT) conjecture. In the 
Chomskyian account, thought is structured as language is structured, with a 
combinatorial syntax which enables the individual to generate the unlimited 
possibilities of productive speech. Viewed against the background presented in 
chapter 2, this can be seen as an explicit formulation of the foundational
177 The classic work of tire language of thought school is: Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of 
Thought (New York: Crowell, 1975). Bechtel and Abrahamsen present a succinct overview of the 
imagist position in: William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 147-175.
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discursive claim that thought, language, and logic share the same form. The 
LOT proposal differs from tire way tire issue has generally been depicted in this 
dissertation by emphasizing language and the combinatory generativity of 
language as foundational instead of logical form. Still, the LOT proposal only 
emphasizes an alternate leg of the unity between thought, language, and logic, 
and the idea of syntactic generativity relies on the formal, recursive relation 
between objects of knowledge rather than any semantic or meaning-based 
conception of the richness of language.
Tire opposing camp endorses the thesis that memory consists of images. 
These representations refer to a much larger scale of objects and events than 
those postulated by the proponents of the symbolic alternative. They can 
consist of whole events, temporal sequences of events, objects in the world, and 
configurations of objects. The strongest arguments for this alternative come 
from observations of the process of hum an recall. Hum an memory is clearly 
associative, and its ability to guide action in the world is predicated on this 
associative quality. Experimental findings concerning the priming effects of 
prior, associated experience buttress this approach.178 If one assumes that 
images are the basis of memory, associative recall is easily explained. The 
person who recalls one item of an event is assumed to also gain, for free so to 
speak, access to other items of the event.179
178Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of Categorization," in Cognition and Categorization, ed. Eleanor 
Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978), 27-48.
179 What is generally poorly appreciated in the presentations of those that endorse such an 
alternative is the degree to which they too fall into the trap of postulating objects. By 
postulating objects at a large scale they avoid some of the absurdities of the symbolic position, 
but they do not finally avoid the issue of how different objects can be related associatively.
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Those endorsing the imagistic alternative are conscious of the way their 
proposals challenge the traditional view of cognition.180 They explicitly reject 
the traditional understanding of categories that proposes that we know a 
category by its primitive features—the things that members of a category have 
in common. They point out that this position is taken by both the folk theory 
and the dominant technical theory of representation.181 That the common 
understanding and the technical formulation are similar in this way can be 
explained on the grounds that both operate within the assumptions of current 
analytico-referential discourse. The imagists have believed that the only way to 
explain the observable characteristics of hum an recall is on the basis of a stored 
prototype or prototypes which constitutes each category. In contrast to the LOT 
proposal, we will call this the prototype theory of categorization.
Representation in Connectionist Networks
Connectionist approaches to the process of category formation, and the 
implications of this process for representation, are generally endorsed by those 
embracing the prototype theories182 and vehemently rejected by those who 
endorse the language of thought hypothesis.183 Connectionist approaches
180 Lakoff is particularly clear about the sedimented status of the received view. See: George 
Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things; What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1-11.
181 See: Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 5, and Herbert Dreyfus, What Computers 
Still Can't Do (Cambridge, M A: MIT Press, 1992), 155-230.
182 See, for instance: Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus 
Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branchpoint," Daedalus 117 (Winter, 1988): 
15-43; P. N. Johnson-Laird and Ruth M. J. Byrne, Deduction (Hove, England: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
1991), 214, and Daniel C. Dennett, "Mother Nature Versus the Walking Encyclopedia: A 
Western Drama," in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, ed. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich, 
and David E. Rumelhart (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), 21-30.
183 For instance: Fodor and Pylyshyn, "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture," 3-71.
152
actually differ radically from either of the two earlier approaches, but the 
commitment of prototype theorists is to a body of empirical findings which 
leads them to infer an imagistic basis for memory. They are able to treat 
connectionism as an alternate way to account for the phenomena that are at the 
center of their concerns. LOT theorists, on the other hand, are centrally 
committed to a formal mechanism, syntax, which is incompatible with 
connectionism's process of distributed representation.
In chapter 3 1 discussed distributed representation as a form of 
representation which, by blurring the distinction between content and 
structure, enabled the pattern completion capacities of networks. These pattern 
completion qualities of categories are associated with distributed 
representation's ability to support categorization, generalization, and inference 
in  ways which are learning-like. Distributed representation was also noted to 
have the computationally important capacity to store many more 
representations over a set number of nodes than alternative, localist schemes of 
memory.
To briefly recall this latter issue: distributed representation is 
computationally plausible in part because it is able to store many more 
representations than there are individual neurons or even individual synaptic 
connections. Distributed representations show this characteristic because they 
are not objects, but relational patterns. Each representation is a pattern of 
relationships spread over many nodes in the network. Thus if we assume that 
each node in  the network has two states (off and on), a localist representation 
could encode the presence of only four "pieces" of information, whereas a fully 
distributed network could carry sixteen different possible configurations of 
o ff/on  patterns. The larger the number of participating nodes, the greater the 
advantage in storage space networks gain .
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This quality of network representation is known as superimposition: many 
representations can be imposed on the same set of nodes in a network. Recall 
here the Sharks network, which encoded a surprising amount of information in 
a useful associative array of 72 nodes. The associative qualities of this array 
arose as a direct result of superimposition. Superimposed memory of this sort is 
interactive. Each memory is, in effect, adjusted away from the set of strengths 
that w ould be the characteristic result of the input if there were no other 
memories, and toward the aggregate of memories already stored in the net. The 
new memory m ust "compromise." As the network moves beyond a minimum 
number of patterns that it can store without interaction, the characteristics of 
the process of storing these memories leads some to converge around the same 
patterns of activation. Similar patterns of input will result in very similar 
patterns of configuration in the inner, hidden units which are the analogs of 
memory. Different but similar input patterns will elicit the same output array, 
and we will be inclined to say that the network has categorized these as the 
same. This is what underlies category formation (and inference) in 
connectionists networks. This phenomena has been analyzed in terms of the 
interaction of nodes rather than at the level of the representation itself as I have 
done, and in that context it is usually referred to as a subsymbolic analysis.184
184 Smolensky's influential article popularized the use of the term "subsymbolic" though 
others used the term before him. Paul Smolensky, "On the Proper Treatment of 
Connectionism," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (March, 1988): 1-74. For the reader who wishes 
to follow out the implications of interactive representations, the literature is likely to refer to 
this phenomena as "subsymbolic" or "microfeatures" (Rumelhart and Clark respectively). See: 
James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart, "A Distributed Model of Human Learning and 
Memory," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, ed. 
David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 1986): 170-215; Andy Clark, Microcognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), 
108-114. This work places a particular emphasis on the interactive pattern of activation that 
constitutes a connectionist representation and for this reason prefers the term 
"superimposition" to those which focus on the role of constituent parts of the representation. It 
also avoids defining a central term using variants of the terms which it attempts to displace. 
Hofstadter uses the term "active symbols" to describe a related conception. Douglas R.
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Recall that it took the Sharks network longer to distinguish between individuals 
who shared many of the same characteristics and that the network, at its limits, 
was likely to incorrectly infer that a person in their forties was in their thirties 
on the basis of the preponderance of those in their thirties who shared the other 
characteristics of the individual sought. We saw in the Sharks example that 
such confusion could actually be an asset, as the network was able to generate 
plausible responses which had not been explicitly coded into the network. It 
would, for instance, settle on the name of a Shark who was most "typical" of all 
Sharks if its only input was the clue that the person referred to was a Shark.
As has already been emphasized, the associative qualities that give 
distributed representation its power are also the qualities that make it 
unsuitable as the representation that formal logic or syntax can use; the 
categories that constitute objects of knowledge are not separate. Contra 
Aristotle, connectionist models imply that humans cannot eliminate the hard- 
to-categorize examples in the middle185—and logical operations require 
separation. But the differences go deeper than just this. Most crucially 
connectionist representation is indissolubly tied to current experience, real or 
imagined.186 Rumelhart and Norman say, "Information is better thought of as
Hofstadter, "Prelude . . .  Ant Fugue," in The Mind's I, ed. Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel 
Dennett (New York: Bantam, 1981), 149-201.
185 Even if we could eliminate the middle we would not want to. Connectionists claim that 
eliminating difficult examples retards learning. If this is true, the idea that curriculum is content 
simplified for instructional purposes is a dangerous one. Chapters 3 and 4 explore the 
implications of using non-central examples in the context of materials design.
186 David E. Rumelhart, J. L. Smolensky, James L. McClelland, and Geoffry E. Hinton, 
"Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models," in Parallel Distributed Processing, 
Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, ed. David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and 
the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 7-57.
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'evoked' than 'found.' "187 This can be made clearer by referring to the Sharks 
example. The network's structure contains many possible patterns of activation 
corresponding to possible output arrays by virtue of the patterns of relationships 
between nodes. But no information is evoked without external input. That is, 
unless we turn on the "Sharks" input node and let its effect propagate through 
the network over several iterations, we do not get the usable information 
concerning the identity of the most typical Shark at the output layer. This is not 
just the trivial case of not getting an answer until a question is asked. The 
configuration of internal weights and propagated influences that is expressed at 
the output layer as, say, "Neal," does not actually exist until the question is 
posed, and the differences this posing causes propagates through the network. 
The information is simply not yet there to be "found" even though it is latent in 
the structure of the network. Further, as we have already seen, the particular 
configuration the networks settles into is also dependent upon the sequence of 
input, not just its presence or absence of certain features.
If we tie this to the hum an brain and the manifold sensory inputs which 
constitute its world, we can see human categories as a strange combination of 
stability and plasticity, hr this way of approaching the problem all recognition 
is category re-cognition. The child's recognition of her mother is never 
recognition of an object as such, but is the re-cognition of the category Mother. 
The child has never before seen exactly the same face that she sees tonight. But 
she "recognizes" her mother by re-calling the category—and she knows the 
appropriate response as part o f that recognition. She holds out her arms and is softly 
gathered in. This perspective indicates that every recall is the contingent
187 David E. Rumelhart and Donald A. Norman, "Introduction," in Parallel Models of 
Associative Memory, ed. James A. Anderson and Geoffery E. Hinton (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1981), 4.
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creation of the moment and necessarily differs from all other instances in which 
the child has recalled her mother. It is disturbingly malleable. But such 
representation is also, because it is plastic and not brittle as are logical 
programs, very stable. Mother in all her guises—and maybe some other adult 
wom en who act appropriately—gets the same treatment, and most often the 
child gets the result she desires.
Reflection on the characteristics of connectionist representation reveals why 
some researchers have found it so appealing in the context of the ongoing 
dispute about representation.188 Connectionist representations, for all their 
strangeness to one steeped in the Western tradition, have some very desirable 
characteristics. For those whose interests lie in a fascination with the generative 
qualities of hum an speech and thought, connectionist research into the 
emergent properties of networks reveals a different way to achieve the 
generativity formerly attainable only through the iterative processes of 
deductive logic. To this group connectionism also offers a glimpse of how one 
could go beyond the axiomatic mindset that leads some to insist that much of 
our linguistic and cognitive abilities are innate and that our development is 
essentially deduced.189 To artificial intelligence workers who demand that the 
theory be implementable, that it actually run and have presence in the world,
188 See: James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and Geoffrey E. Hinton, "The Appeal of 
Parallel Distributed Processing," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 1: Foundations, ed. 
David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 1986), 3-44. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the M ind , 56-65.
189 In linguistics the "deductive" stance is the classic Chomskyian position. Deep structure 
(grammar) is innate and sets up the range of possibilities—the particular language that is 
"acquired" is only one deduction. In the psychology of thought the best known example is in 
the Fodor-Piaget debate, ironically between two logicists, where Fodor insists that nothing 
develops from experience, that experience only triggers development. Piaget, while arguing 
that logic is what develops, continues to insist on interaction with the presumptively logically 
structured world as the path to that end. See: Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, ed., Language and 
Learning, The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980).
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connectionist representation also offers an alternative way of organizing their 
efforts. The connectionist alternative offers a more flexible means of 
implementing many characteristics important to their projects.
Similarly, those who have endorsed the imagery as an approach to 
representation now have a way to explain how the associative phenomena that 
interest them might be realized in the material world. The superimposition 
which is characteristic of connectionist category formation and reformation,190 
with its inherent generalization and inference, is a valuable tool in 
understanding how experience can be encoded nonpropositionally and still be 
generative and accessible. But connectionist representation does not simply 
endorse imagistic intuitions. It throws real doubt on the doctrine of prototypes. 
It also entails not regarding objects in the world as given primitives—a stance 
which those working with images as a metaphor for representation have 
generally accepted.
As valuable as connectionist category formation may seem for solving the 
problems posed by representation research, it radically destabilizes the concept 
of representation. Comiectionists hold that any particular representation is 
plastic and shifts w ith both the spatial and, more importantly, the temporal 
context w ithin which it is deployed. I have emphasized that this malleable 
representation has large advantages in overcoming problems that more 
traditional approaches founder on, such as the brittleness problem examined in 
chapter 3. But it creates new problems of its own. Most notably, postulating 
such plasticity, and indeed, making this quality explanatorily central, shifts us
190 Ideas of re-cognition and re-formation recall suggestively the Deweyian approach to 
cognition: "reconstruction." This is a particularly cogent idea placed against the current field in 
education in which "constructivist" ideas are important organizers of new approaches to 
teaching methodologies. John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," in John Dewey on Education, ed. 
Reginald D. Archambault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 427-439.
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from attempting to explaining the apparent flexibility of knowledge to needing 
to explain the apparent stability of knowledge.
One tactic would be to make the claim that knowledge is only apparently 
stable in the sense that is usually claimed. The standard story concerning the 
recognition of the mother's face is that the child possesses a stable 
representation and that the similarities between the mother-of-the-instance and 
that representation render the conclusion that this particular person is Mother 
trivial. As we have already seen, attempting to actually implement this triviality 
has led those working within that tradition to the profound and apparently 
insoluble problem of perception. It turns out to be a very difficult problem, one 
that is not trivial at all but is central to the capacities that we understand as 
most human. The competing connectionist story involves representation which 
is "custom-created" and which takes into account the ongoing activity and 
condition of the child along with her location in space and time. The 
connectionist representation is a response to the child's situation. The cliild is 
always already in a situation which shapes her ongoing perceptual/cognitive 
framework. It may very well be that the child has a history that leads her to 
anticipate the perception of her mother in a context in which she experiences an 
uncomfortably cool breeze. She has quite reliable experienced the presence of 
her mother whenever she has encountered such a situation in the past. The 
perception of the mother in such a moment is colored by this expectation and 
by accompanying expectations for being held and made warm. Considered 
from this angle, representations were only apparently stable, and the problem 
of their newfound plasticity is not a problem at all, but a solution.
But this will not, in the end, be enough for educators. What educators are 
expected to teach, and students to learn, are particularly the things which are 
not learned in an immediately useful context. Educators teach that knowledge
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which the community values but whose context of use is dispersed or in the 
future. Thus reading or arithmetic is generally learned to a fluid degree of 
expertise only in schools; the context in which they are encountered in the 
child's everyday world is too dispersed to typically foster the engagement that 
allows for fluid accomplishment.191 Other subjects are taught in order to be 
useful in a projected but not yet present future.
As seekers of a distinctively educational approach to the problems of 
learning, an approach which can inform the processes of learning that take 
place in institutions which we call schools,192 we need to look further than the 
relatively easy answers that accompany the sorts of contextually appropriate 
recognition that takes place in the context of immediate use. The child's story, 
as well as similar stories told by the advocates of apprenticeship,193 point us 
toward w hat we need to consider to understand learning in an educational 
context, bu t they do not, in themselves, constitute such understanding.
1911 take whole language instruction to be one attempt to close that gap by focusing on 
contextually appropriate instruction.
1921 do take the institution of schooling as a general constraint in producing an 
educationally useful framework for understanding learning. Not all would agree: see, explicitly: 
Jay L. Lemke, "Education, cyberspace, and change." (1992). [Electronic paper for the 
Information Technology and Education Electronic Salon, ITED-L@DEAKIN.OZ. AU]. and, 
implicitly, most of situated cognition work discussed below. This is not only a pragmatic 
judgment that the institution of schooling will continue to be the main site for the practice of 
education but an endorsement of much of the Enlightenment hope for schooling. I expand on 
this judgment in: John A. St. Julien, "Situated Cognition, Apprenticeship, and Schooling," Paper 
presented at the Fourteenth Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Dayton, 
OH, 14-17 October 1992.
193 They are similar in that the context of learning is the context of use—a situation which is 
exactly what distinguishes schooling from apprenticeship.
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Representation Outside Connectionist Networks
Connectionist representation's dependence on the world for the stability of 
its representations is not limited to the immediate context of use. In the 
connectionist recounting that we will explore here, there remains a need to 
understand something analogous to what we have been discussing as symbols. 
The connectionist account postulates that symbols exist in the world,194 that the 
world is its oion representation.195 In this interpretation the mother is herself the 
source of the stability in representation that the child experiences. The mother 
reliably acts as she has been known to act. These actions, her appearance, and 
the contexts in which she appears are all the basis for the stability that cannot be 
located in connectionist architecture itself.
Connectionists, while not focusing on this issue, have noted the problem and 
begun the rough outline of what would be necessary to move in this direction. 
Most cogently for the purposes that this chapter pursues are suggestions made 
by Rumelhart et al.196 which rely in part on the work of Vygotsky—a theorist 
whose social approach has also influenced situated cognition. Rumelhart et al. 
suggest, "People seem to have three essential abilities which together allow 
them to come to logical conclusions without being logical."197 They say that 
people that "are especially good at pattern m atching. . .  are good at modeling 
the world . . .  [and] are good at manipulating our environment." Their
194 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought 
Processes," 44-48.
195 Dreyfus discusses this idea as "concrete representation." See: Dreyfus, What Computers 
Still Can't Do ,6 1.
196 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought 
Processes," 44-48.
197 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought 
Processes," 44.
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discussion also suggests a special role both for language and for what they call 
external representations.
"Roughly speaking," they suggest, "the view is this: We are good at 
'perceiving' answers to our problems."198 That is, the apparatus that we use to 
locate things in the world (perceptual pattern matching), to anticipate changes 
in our situation (modeling), and to act (manipulating our environment) can be 
used to simulate what we usually understand as logical reasoning.
Three-digit multiplication is one of the tasks taught to students which can be 
seen as one of the "displaced knowledges" that we concern ourselves w ith in 
this chapter. Consider the way that this is actually taught in American schools. 
Two three-digit numbers are placed in a column and a repetitive pattern of 
manipulating the number signs as individuals, usually w ith no reference to 
their meaning within the larger numbers, is practiced. The last number on the 
bottom is paired separately with each separate digit on the top and multiplied. 
Then the second digit is handled in the same way but the answer is displaced 
one unit to the left. The third numeral repeats this pattern. Then the newly 
produced numerals are added together, preserving their leftward displacement. 
The final addition is considered the answer to the multiplication problem. This 
repetitive process builds on earlier practices of multiplying multiple digits by 
one digit, which in turn is built on the practices involved in multiplying two 
one-digit numbers which are placed one beneath the other, with the multiple 
digit answer displaced to the left, h i the context of a mathematics lesson, 
multiplying single digits by each other and displacing the answer leftward is a 
well-established habit. Seeing numbers placed one on top of the other, preceded 
by a large "X" and with a suggestive line placed beneath, is perceived as an
198 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought
Processes," 45.
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instance occasioning the activity described. To object that this is not real
understanding is to miss the narrower point made here: by perceiving a
problem as one which calls into play specific habituated practices, people turn a
forbiddingly difficult problem in abstract reasoning into a tractable task. It is
worth noting that it is only in the child who we have taught to do this explicitly
that we are concerned that there is no "understanding" of the event. When
adults engage in this activity in the course of daily life, we are not tempted to
assume that they are acting without understanding. Very few of us can
multiply 334 by 783 without resorting to pen and pencil or an imagined
analog—a model—of this activity. The qualities of connectionist representation,
pattern recognition, sensitivity to immediate context and history, and inclusion
of habituated activity, are crucial to making this rendering fully sensible. Such
an approach makes the world and our manipulation of it a part of our cognitive
apparatus. Rumelhart et al. are worth quoting at length on this point:
These dual skills of manipulating the environment and processing the 
environment we have created allow us to reduce very complex problems 
to a series of very simple ones. This ability allows us to deal with 
problems which are otherwise impossible. This is real symbol processing 
and, we are beginning to think, the primary symbol processing that we 
are able to do. Indeed, on this view the external environment becomes a 
key extension to our m ind.199
A key to understanding the power of this approach is the realization that our 
ability to anticipate changes in our situation, effectively to model the world, 
makes it relatively easy to see how one could internalize these practices. So far 
in this work I have tended to emphasize the specifically representational 
qualities of connectionist networks and recounted both historical and 
intradisciplinary debates in  which connectionist theorizing can be seen as an act
199 Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought
Processes," 46.
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opposing certain elements of these traditions. In this I follow the literature and 
the engagement of the participants, but this approach may actually do an 
injustice to the intuition which underlies connectionist models. By tacitly 
accepting the debate's assumption which separates representation and action, I 
may be misleading the reader (as may be the emerging literature) about the 
actual nature of the connectionist relaxation patterns that have been held to be 
connectionist analogs of representations. The tools that connectionists have at 
hand are computers, and computers have been constructed to be and are 
interpreted as passive representers of the world, just as the canonical tradition 
w ould suggest. But this is not the case with the biological beings from which 
connectionism draws its more interesting inspiration. For such beings 
relaxation states are not only the basis for representation but are also the 
physical basis for the ensuing activity in the world. A connectionist model does 
not provide any in-principle basis for separating the cognitive activity of 
representation from that of action. Following this line of reasoning, it is fair to 
say that the activity of perceiving the Mother includes reaching out in certain 
circumstances, such as w hen the child is uncomfortably cool. Similarly, the 
presentation and appropriate perception of the pattern of a three-digit 
multiplication problem can reasonably be construed as including the 
anticipation of the activity described above. This is an important advance 
because it eliminates a persistent conceptual bottleneck in our thinking about 
thinking. A large part of the tradition has been spent on trying to find a 
principled way to move from experience to representation and then from 
representation to action. The embodied account presented here attempts to 
avoid the initial, mistaken, division. The act of perception is also an act of 
representation and representation appropriately includes a readiness for 
context-specific action. The same relaxation state may subserve all three of the
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functions that we separate discursively. But this strong linkage of the world 
and connectionist networks200 carries a price—when interpreted within the 
analytico-referential discourse w ith which we are engaged, it brings into 
question the separability of the person acting from the context of action. For a 
culture which values the independent learning of the radically free individual 
above all other types of learning, this can be seen as a questionable advance.
The role of independent learning is much reduced in this interpretation of our 
cognitive abilities.
Not surprisingly then, connectionist architectures have often been criticized 
for requiring a teacher.2011 have argued in chapter 2 that this critique is without 
much force in an educational context, where the presence of the teacher is not 
understood as a problem. In more profound related criticisms, connectionist 
networks are taken to task as being architecturally passive in the face of 
experience.202 Both critiques stem from considering the qualities we are 
presently discussing as a disadvantage, h i the more sophisticated of such 
accounts, the discussant notes that without input from outside the system, the 
network settles into a rigidly stable state and would presumptively be 
incapable of activity. This actually understates the case. Connectionist models 
almost always include decay parameters, and certainly any model which has 
pretense to deeper biological plausibility does so. Decay refers to the gradual,
200 This way of understanding the problem on my part owes mudi to philosophically 
grounded discussions of intentionality. I am especially informed by Dreyfus, What Computers 
Still Can't Do, Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science ofMind-Brain 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 380-383, and especially Dreyfus, "Making a Mind versus 
Modeling the Brain," 15-43.
201 Jerry A. Fodor, "The Mind-Body Problem," Scientific American 244 Gan., 1981): 124-133.
202 Such more sophisticated critique is most often leveled from within connectionism by 
workers active in the field. A nice example is: Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton, 
"Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes," 39-40.
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proportionate reduction in the strength of connections between nodes that takes 
place as part of the calculations which determine connection strengths during 
each iteration. In such models a network which operates continuously203 
w ithout new input does not reach a stable state representing its response to the 
last input cycle and simply stay frozen there, as these critiques would suggest. 
The effect of decay is to wipe out the organization of differences in weights 
which was the network's analog to memory. It "forgets," and this has 
consequences which are graver than mere passivity: whatever has been learned 
from experience is wiped out.
So connectionist architectures buy a partial solution to the perennial 
philosophical and primal educational problem of separating the person from 
the world, but at the dual price of appearing to move much of what we 
considered rational thought out into the world and also making continued 
engagement with the world the price of maintaining what is learned.
Abstraction, Embodiment and Displaced Knowledge
We have been slowly building a rough outline of an alternate account for the 
cognitive abilities that support the competence that we hope our students will 
gain, h i chapter 3 we discussed very basic emergent properties of connectionist 
networks in relation to learning and began an account of what representation, 
abstraction, and category formation might be taken to mean under an 
interpretation based on network theorizing and experimentation. There we 
discovered that connectionist representations could not, alone, be expected to 
support the full weight of this enterprise, since they did not indicate a way to
203 Most often networks operate in a strange sort of analog to time wherein "time," 
understood as successive cycles of iteration accompanied by relaxation to a global state, occurs 
only when input is present.
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decide which of the many regularities in the world would be selected as the 
basis for category formation, which is connectionism's way of understanding 
the objects that the older tradition gives us. Out of concern for educational 
relevance, we directed our attention to the displaced knowledge that schools 
usually emphasize, passing lightly over the physical regularities that some have 
made central to their theorizing.204 Here we have pursued the thesis that 
socially ordered practices constitute the regularities that we seek. In doing so 
we have reached deeper into the properties of connectionist representation, 
emphasizing particularly the instability that is the darker side of 
connectionism's valued flexibility. The particular forms of instability exhibited 
by connectionism representations have led us to consider the possibility that 
much of what we call symbol processing is actually manipulation of an 
environment which we have created for such purposes and brought into our 
social and individual worlds as practices. Three-digit multiplication has been 
briefly explored as an example. Our embodied activity in the world has been 
seen as a key to understanding how the stability of symbols can be sustained in 
the face of the constitutional instability of connectionist architectures.
We have perhaps pushed connectionist insights as far as they can take us at 
this point. Establishing the need for a socially organized theory of practices is 
the most that a connectionist approach to cognition can aspire to. Connectionist 
theorizing continues to constrain our approach to the material that follows, but 
it cannot offer the same positive guidance that it did when we were discussing 
the relationship between representation and learning.
204 piaget (object acquisition) and Gibson (affordances) are the two most prominent in this 
regard. See: Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, Classification 
and Sedation (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as 
Conceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
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In what follows I will rely more explicitly on social theorists whose 
frameworks seems especially well-suited for the enterprise and context of this 
work. The path we have followed to this point has led to seeing practices (which 
are learned as patterns and integrated into both activity and perception by 
connectionist principles of representation) as the key to understanding the sorts 
of displaced knowledge which the community values and the schools are 
established to teach. Knowledge built on such a basis could be expected to 
exhibit certain peculiarities. It would, for instance, be context dependent in 
particular ways. Thus we would expect that simply learning the practice of 
multiplying three-column figures would not transfer to a situation in which the 
problem is laid out horizontally. Such a presentation would truly be a different 
problem to the uninitiated student. Staying at the level of practices, we can see 
how a new practice made up of specific patterns of multiplication and addition 
could be m apped onto the new, horizontally organized problem. One could 
especially easily imagine a practice which transforms the horizontal problem 
into a vertical one. But none of this activity produces the kind of understanding 
which the school generally strives to achieve. Again, it will be too easy to 
simply say that the abstract, "principles of mathematics" knowledge that 
schools value does not and never did exist in the forms that the tradition gives 
us. While both connectionist and situated cognition researchers might for their 
different research-based reasons endorse such a suggestion, this conclusion will 
not be sufficient to support an educational theory that deals adequately with 
the issue. That conclusion, while it may be well supported, fails to deal w ith the 
existence and utility of what has been called abstract knowledge.
Connectionism and practice theories do not deny the existence of a more broadly 
powerful way of knowing. They deny that it takes the logical form that the 
tradition describes, and that it is learned in the manner that would be
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appropriate to that form. The community's evident desire that students learn a 
powerful, generalizable form of knowledge is not somehow obviated by new 
research. More powerful understandings of this sort do exist and seem as 
inordinately valuable as the community apparently understands them to be.
The task before educators is not to dismiss such abstract, displaced knowledge, 
but to explain it on a different, more educationally adequate basis.205
This will be clearer if we return to the concrete example of three digit 
multiplication that we examined earlier. Educators generally agree that the 
mechanical, rote production of the answer, even the correct answer, which is 
produced by the practice I described does not constitute the sort of learning that 
is finally sought. Coming to understand the role of practices in the production 
of the student's competent response is an advance. But it is not all that we wish 
to understand.
As m ath teachers will testify, simply labeling the various positions that the 
numerals hold as "place value" does not result in the broader understanding 
that is sought. The student may be able to label the "tens place" correctly 
w ithout being able to use this concept in any other situation. Given the story 
that connectionism tells, this is not surprising. The student has learned to label 
a part of a practice—and does not possess what we w ould call an abstract 
concept. The label signifies only within this practice.
It is just at this point that our usual apparatus for explaining learning and 
knowledge most obviously fails us. A student who can repeat the definition 
and apply it appropriately is believed to understand. He or she is said to ,
205 I am indebted, in part, to Tony Whitson for this insight into the appropriate educational 
response to emerging research. See: James Anthony Whitson, "Cognition as a Semiosic Process: 
Grounding, Mediation, and Critical Reflective Transcendence," Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA, 20-24 April 
1992.
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possess the concept but apparently fails to "transfer" or "apply" it to new 
situations.206 This problem is generally understood as a failure to access the 
conceptual object stored in memory 207 Within the standard framework, a 
framework which posits objects (defined in terms of necessary and sufficient 
features) as the atoms in a logical calculus of thought, there is seemingly little 
that can be done. In this story the apparent context dependence of our retrieval 
mechanism is simply a source of failure. The most likely route to more 
accessible recall is to somehow strengthen the memory—a task to which 
repetition and practice are thought to be well suited.
In the view we are developing here the generally powerful abstraction that is 
sought is not inaccessible, it simply does not yet exist, regardless of the ability 
to repeat a definition or label a portion of a practice. There is therefore no 
failure to transfer or apply the concept and context dependence is not the 
source of this nonexistent failure. But, granting that powerful generalizations 
do exist—even if the traditional definition is inadequate—how are these 
generalizations achieved? It is at this point that the developing position that we 
take here has something radically different to say about the practice of teaching. 
It would suggest that this generalization is but another specie of category 
formation and is learned in the same way as other categories are learned, 
through the socially organized practices which led us to recognize difference as 
the same. Recall the child and her mother. The mother is different at every new
206 The prominence of application problems within the traditional research literature of 
education implicitly supports this claim.
207 Situated Cognition as an educational movement is motivated by the research based on 
this conception, which consistently finds context to be the most reliable way to predict whether 
the competent behavior with which the researchers are interested will be produced. See: John A. 
St. Julien, "Explaining Learning: The Research Trajectory of Situated Cognition and tire 
Implications of Connectionism," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA, 20-24 April 1992.
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perception of her and yet the child learns to recognize each as her mother and
to act appropriately. The pedagogical issue suggested by this is one level of
abstraction higher. The child has the label of mother (admittedly
prelinguistically) but does not have the next level of abstraction which we may
suggest is that of parent. Similarly, the label "tens place" located in the context
of a single practice is not the abstraction which educators seek. The labels
"mother" and "father" as set against other adults define for the developing
child the category of parent. But, importantly, there are not really labels which
pick out the mother or the father against the broader background of the
prelinguistic child's life is.
At this point we return to the intuition of Rumelhart et al. that their work is
consistent with Vygotsky's understanding of the relationship between concept
formation and language Vygotsky argued in Thought and Language.208 In
discussing their understanding of the way the same network which produces
perception and activity could also produce the anticipation of activity and
thereby effectively emulate a formal model of the world which they call mental
simulations, Rumelhart et al. remark:
There are a number of ways of controlling that sequence. One way 
involves the running of "mental simulations." Another way involves 
recycling linguistic inputs.... Suppose that the interpretation that led to 
the production of the internal speech was much richer than the linguistic 
forms could possibly suggest. Thus, the linguistic forms pick out aspects 
of the entire interpretation to emphasize. Once this emphasis has been 
taken place and the new input has been processed, the next state will be 
strongly affected by the new words we chose to express our first idea.209
While this formulation captures Vygotsky's suggestion of a pivotal role for
language and particularly his presentation of the role of the formal definition of
208 See especially chapters 5 and 6: Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language, trans. Alex 
Kozulin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1934/1986).
209 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 44.
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the word in scientific concept formation,210 it misses a central point in 
Vygotsky's formulation: that this meaning is established intersubjectively 
through activity. The word does not merely limit the plenitude of meaning 
given by experience but also plays a creative role in directing attention within 
the world. Rumelhart's formulation also misses the hermeneutic character of 
Vygotsky's position regarding the word. In Vygotsky's view the w ord's 
meaning develops over time. Initially it is very concrete and may refer to what 
an adult would judge an inappropriately broad range of objects or activities.
The child's "Ma-ma" may refer to all moving warm things that she likes— 
including her father and the family cocker spaniel. The child's experience and 
spontaneous categorization based on that experience take place w ith a socially 
structured framework. Calling her mother "Ma-ma" does not interrupt the 
process of being made warm, but calling her father by that term very likely will 
result in an interruption while he repeats "Da-da"—much to the child's chilly 
annoyance. We may fantasize that the term "parent" can emerge only on the 
basis of the previously developed complex surrounding mother and father in 
which the word and the social practices associated with those words played a 
central role. "Parent" may be considered a tertiary development which would 
be impossible to achieve without the earlier separating out of mother and father 
through language and other social practices. The development of the concept 
parent, however, in turn lends a very new meaning to the earlier labels father 
and mother.211
210 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 146-148.
211 This is far too schematic to actually be the case. The simple hierarchy suggested here is 
bound to be much more complexly configured in any real child's life.
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By analogy, what is needed to create a more powerful abstraction for the 
label "tens place" is another member of the same category, "tens place," 
complete with appropriate distinctive practices which embody the relationships 
that more sophisticated adults w ould understand in terms of place value. This 
w ould allow an abstraction similar to that of "parent"—an abstraction which 
would alter the original meaning of the original label in the more abstract and 
powerful direction that is desired. W hat is wanted is another practice using 
place value and, crucially, the word label "place value" used by the teacher to 
isolate the particular relations that comprise the new abstract object of place 
value. The two different social practices associated with the single term "place 
value" would help to isolate for the student the intersubjectively standard 
meaning.212 One way to do this would be to teach a second practice for 
multiplying three-digit numbers but for these practices to be embedded in a 
problem presentation that is organized horizontally rather than vertically and 
whose m apping onto the already established method of doing such problems is 
centered around what the teacher understands as place value.213 In such an 
event the term "place value" can be disembedded from its context in a 
particular problem presentation and progress made toward a more powerfully 
general conception of the term.
212 The "generalization" captured through this process would be another categorization, 
another instance of "seeing difference as the same." This is not a way of introducing "feature 
extraction" at a higher level.
213 In a remark which is interesting and suggestive for educators, Rumelhart, Smolensky, 
McClelland, and Hinton, note (p. 47) in "Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes," that it 
appears to be extremely difficult to invent novel and useful new external representations, 
saying: "It may be that the process of inventing such representations is the highest human 
intellectual ability." Heady stuff for the methods teacher who takes this task as a central 
element in his or her practice.
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Such an approach would serve to "displace" the formerly concretized label 
"place value."214 If we are to understand the sorts of "displaced" knowledges 
that education primarily deals w ith as learned in a connectionist fashion, it will 
be on the basis of this socially situated symbol/practice.
To engage in  a bit of displaced abstraction of my own, I offer the following: 
the process that I have described is one which establishes a particular practice 
and a very local competence based on that practice prior to the attempt to teach 
the abstract meaning that is attributed to the practice. This is in notable 
contradistinction to the path that the tradition lays out for us. Generally we 
teach the "atoms" of meaning first and expect that drill and practice will set 
these meanings in the proper context. The activity of introducing a unit with 
rigorously defined vocabulary words is common across the curriculum and 
reflects our underlying assumptions about knowledge and its acquisition.
In such a view the tradition has simply inverted the actual order of learning. 
Learning a definition, whether of the term "place value" or "eukaryotic," is 
simply not how meaning is established. This joins a dissenting tradition 
exemplified by the later Wittgenstein, Heideggerian phenomenology and 
hermeneutics which reject the claim that meaning is established through 
necessary and sufficient features (whether innate or induced) but that the 
meaning of a symbol is grounded in its history of use.215 The current account, 
informed by connectionist theories, grounds these claims in an understanding
214 It is reasonable to note that this is not really "concrete" in the sense that we usually think 
of the term that opposes it to abstract. On the conception put forward here, the distinction is 
one of degree rather than one of quality. That is, the term "place value" is still tied to a 
particular context and practice—we have simply enlarged the area and made the object more 
available through language.
215 See: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1968); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1962), and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and 
ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California, 1976).
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of the material process which supports an appropriately associative form of 
representation. The Wittgensteinian observation that there simply are no 
necessary or sufficient characteristics which define the term "chair" as it is used 
in our language can be seen as a condemnation of language216—a claim that 
language is not the tool it should be in that it does not accord with the 
presum ed purity of thought and logic. But according to the understanding 
developed here the "ill-defined" nature of representation is a quality of all 
hum an signification—and language is only one area that exhibits these qualities 
of thought. Indeed, far from being a source of imprecision, language in part acts 
to constrain the perfusion of meaning that our individual experience leads us 
to. It is not a source of error but of necessary inter subjectively derived stability.
Again we are faced w ith a too-easy opportunity to simply declare the 
dominant tradition wrong. Education has long been divided between advocates 
of a formal approach to learning centered around the memorization of abstract 
knowledge and those that advocate an experiential approach to knowledge 
acquisition.217 Beneath a long and bitter dispute, both agreed, in general, that 
what was acquired were the classical objects of knowledge and the 
transformational rules that connected those objects. What is offered here is the 
possibility that the classical objects of knowledge simply do not exist. This 
alternate account offers in the place of necessary and sufficient features that 
form the essential basis for classical category formation the possibility that 
abstraction is done on the basis of our embodied practices. Multiple practices,
216 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 21e. Interestingly, this analysis of the chair as 
defined by its use was earlier used by Dewey, see: John Dewey, "Experience and Thinking," 
chap. in Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 143.
217 From the progressive movement to the more recent back-to-basics movement, such an 
opposition has been a staple of educational discourse. For a Deweyian rejection of this 
dichotomy, see: John Dewey, "The Child and the Curriculum," in John Dewey on Education, ed. 
Reginald D. Archambault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 337-358.
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mediated by the teacher's discursive labeling of similarities between the 
patterns in particular practices, form the basis for increasingly abstract category 
formations, a basis for what we usually call concepts. This tempts us to reject 
the explicit teaching of definitions and rules which have been assumed to form 
the basis for competence.
Here, again we are restrained largely by our dedication to a distinctly 
educational enterprise. Even if we grant that definitions and rules (the 
educational expression of objects and laws) are not constitutive of our 
competence, it does not necessarily follow that definitions and rules are not one 
path  toward that competence. Caution in concluding that definitions and rules 
are useless are suggested by the endorsements, albeit limited, of both Vygotsky 
and Dreyfus. The dissent of both of these thinkers from the logicist tradition 
informs this work and the value they find in rules is explored below.
Vygotsky, whose strong social emphasis is the basis of much of the 
blossoming interest in social constructivism and other socially grounded 
approaches to learning, endorsed, in chapter 6 of his book Thought and 
Language, an approach to learning what he called scientific concepts that was 
based on providing a definition prior to experience. Similarly, Dreyfus, whose 
phenomenologically inspired critiques of the received tradition have 
powerfully influenced this work as well as the ongoing reevaluation in artificial 
intelligence, has put forth a description of hum an expertise that begins with the 
teaching of explicit rules of engagement.
Accounting for the power of such approaches and the experience of teachers 
that methods based on definitions and rules can be useful is one of the implicit 
tasks of any work that hopes to offer a usefully different understanding of 
learning. How can the effectiveness of such regimes be accounted for if we give 
up the traditional story which has supported them? Having accounted for their
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effectiveness, how does the account being developed here differ from or 
augment the alternate Vygotskian and phenomenological accounts? Is the 
difference such that education would be well served by preferring the 
interpretation based on connectionist representation and situated practices 
being developed here? To be able to say that the developing account should be 
preferred, one would have to conclude that this framework explains the 
phenomena more usefully. One way that an explanation might prove more 
useful w ould be if it yielded a more complete account which would make 
useful correctives to earlier descriptions.
Vygotsky on the Word
Vygotsky, in Chapters 5 and 6 of Thought and Language, projects one 
developmental path from poorly formed categories to concepts reorganized on 
a strictly rational basis during adolescence. Like Piaget in this one way, 
Vygotsky assumed that the ideal final state of development was logical and 
opposed this style of thought to the childish or primitive. In light of research 
done more recently, such an assumption seems naive. Connectionist 
representation allows us to see how Vygotsky's insight into how "scientific" 
categories are learned remains valid, and how the techniques based on this 
insight remain effective even if the basic mechanism which subserves cognition 
is not rationalized.
In Thought and Language, Vygotsky discusses two ways to come to mature or 
logical conceptions. The first path, the path "spontaneous concepts" take, is to 
move from the sorts of broad, concretized labels exemplified by the word "Ma­
ma" to rational categories characterized by their abstract features. The second 
path, the path of "scientific concepts," begins with a definition based on 
necessary and sufficient features and is characteristic of learning in schools.
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Vygotsky writes that this second sort of learning "plays a leading role in the 
development of school children."218 In light of the research done in intervening 
years—particularly in attempts to extend Piaget's similar intuition about the 
logical endpoint of development—this formulation must seem questionable. 
Piaget's project had been constructed in a way which made the developmental 
continuum leading to logic essential to the program which developed from his 
work. With the empirical failure to sustain a general, stage-like move to a 
logical mode of thought, the whole project was thrown into doubt. Vygotsky's 
work, however, has been seen as centrally concerned w ith the social aspects of 
development. Logic is not essential to the Vygotskian project in the same way 
that it was for Piaget.
Can we account for Vygotskian successes without making his assumption 
that what is constructed through the processes he describes, the formal, logical 
categories which we now doubt, can serve the fundamental role he assigns 
them?219 If we are to do so, what then unifies the two types of learning, 
spontaneous and scientific, if their telos—logical activity—no longer serves this 
purpose?
Delving a little deeper into Vygotsky's typology we notice that the word 
plays a central role in both of his forms of concept learning. In  spontaneous 
learning the word label is originally concrete and is not, for Vygotsky a full 
example of a sign but is only its functional equivalent. In his view young
218 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 148.
219 In view of the fact that Vygotsky emphatically rejected the then-dominant idea that 
logical categories were formed via the schema suggested by formal logic (see: Thought and 
Language, 142), it may prove useful for the interested reader to review pp. 138-140, where 
Vygotsky makes it clear that true concepts, for him, are composed of abstract traits. In part 
Vygotsky's work remains fresh to educational readers because he effectively resists the notion 
that logic is achieved logically—an approach that is as dominant in educational practice today 
as it was in Vygotsky's time.
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children pass from thinking via categories which refer to "unorganized
congeries" to thinking in terms of "complexes" to "pseudoconcepts" to, finally,
"true concepts." The passage that is described is one which moves
progressively toward abstract, logical categories.220 More interesting for the
present purposes is the role Vygotsky sees for the word:221
.. .words take over the function of concepts and may serve as means of 
communication long before they reach the level of concepts 
characteristic of fully developed thought.222
We are interested in this long period in which words may serve as a means 
for communication before they are said to become logical. During this period 
words are what I have called a practice and what Vygotsky labels a "functional 
tool."223
Words and other signs are those means that direct our mental 
operations, control their course, and channel them toward the solution of 
the problem confronting us.224
This role of the word is Vygotsky's distinctive contribution to our 
understanding;225 his work removes the word from its all too often 
disembodied and abstract status and remakes it as an exemplary practice
220 Each functional stage is described in reference to this endpoint. See, for example, the 
discussion of complexes on p. 113: "Since a complex is not formed on the plane of abstract 
logical thinking, the bonds that create it, as well as the bonds it helps to create, lack logical 
unity."
221 Vygotsky was ay/are that more than just words in language could function as a sign and 
his text makes this apparent, but the central role logic plays in defining a true concept leads 
Vygotsky to reserve full, logical signification for the word.
222 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 101.
223 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 107.
224 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 106-107.
225 And the role of the word is what he saw as his own contribution to the discussion in 
which he was engaged. See the early pages of chapter 5 for a review of the field and p. 106-107 
for his conclusion.
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reflecting hum an activity. Vygotsky's clearest examples and the thrust of his 
experimental studies lie in a fine-grained examination of the way the use of 
w ords is socially managed and how the word comes to have a more and more 
m ature meaning by the policing of its use by adults. By "mature" Vygotsky 
meant that the word came closer to the meaning and usage which an adult 
w ould display—an activity which he assumed was logical.
But Vygotsky revealed some ambiguity in this formulation. When he 
discussed pseudoconcepts, he noted, w ith an air of disappointment, that it was 
impossible to tell the difference between pseudoconcepts and true concepts in 
their use226 and that children are unaware of the difference in their own 
thinking when they use true concepts.227 Vygotsky also stresses that the final, 
logical development is never total, and that much everyday activity remains in 
the realm of complexes and pseudoconcepts.228 If pseudoconcepts are 
functionally identical to true concepts, what is the motivation that pushes the 
developing person to finally form true concepts? In contrast to the rest of 
Vygotsky's carefully laid out progression toward a mastery of word usage 
based on the practices of the social milieu in which the activity takes place, this 
final step is curiously unmotivated.
He gives the example of separating groups from a set of blocks, each of 
which has a unique combination of color, shape and size traits. Children 
progress from putting together maximally similar blocks to grouping on a
226 This is what Vygotsky is pointing to on page 121, when he says," . . .  separating a 
pseudoconcept from a real concept is not easy, and this task is positively beyond the capacity of 
phenotypical analysis."
227 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 123.
228 Vygotsky, Thought and Language,134-135. In this passage Vygotsky is moved to invent yet 
another category between pseudoconcepts and real concepts: the generalized representation. 
The generalized representation seems to be a pseudoconcept used by an adult.
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single trait such as color. Any grouping means foregrounding some attributes 
and backgrounding others. For Vygotsky this is the beginning of the creation of 
abstract concepts, "true concepts" in his terminology. For a true concept to 
develop, these traits m ust be abstracted from their context, appropriately 
labeled by a word, and the original complex (pseudoconcepts) which 
functioned as a concept in the child's daily life m ust be reconstituted as a true 
concept. This is just the sort of logical object that was described as emerging 
from the analy tico-referential discourse in chapter 2 of this work. In seeking to 
link his penetrating observations on the actual practices associated with 
children's categorization, Vygotsky is attempting to show how this sort of 
privileged knowledge can result from the process that he describes. Vygotsky 
describes a process built on practices or tools which move a learner toward 
increasingly more powerful abstractions continuously built on practices and the 
learner's activity in the world based on those practices. The Mother emerges 
from the background and is progressively abstracted from the child's earlier 
category which included all people and dogs (from our perspective) to a 
category which even in Vygotsky's explanation functions in just the way of true 
concepts. W hat makes this terminal abstraction different from any other act of 
abstraction? Is it somehow not based on social practices? If this distinction is a 
practice-based one, what distinguishes it from earlier abstractions, say the one 
where the term "Mother" included all women but no longer any children or 
dogs? W hat distinguishes it from further abstractions such as "nurturer?" What 
prevents Vygotsky from seeing logic as a category of practice, with all the 
vagaries that attend categories organized on the basis of practice?
The perspective being developed here throws profound doubt on the 
existence of logical organization as a possible basis of thought—be it in the 
child or the adult—and logic is instead understood as a practice among other
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practices arrayed within particular communities to ends conceived within those 
communities. That the scientific and academic communities have valued 
practices which enable their everyday activity should be no surprise and 
realizing this should in no way throw doubt on the value of those activities. 
Viewed against the discursive background, Vygotsky appears to have had to 
struggle, w ithin the analytico-referential discourse, to get to "real," abstract, 
formal logic grounded in formal categories composed of necessary and 
sufficient features or fail to locate true concepts and true thought at all. We 
need not be so constrained. Vygotsky does not, and perhaps cannot, say at what 
point the concrete, material attribute whose similarity is the basis of a 
pseudoconcept becomes a disembodied feature which is the basis of abstract, 
logical reason. This sleight-of-hand transition is compelling nonetheless 
because the tradition implies that logic is achieved, since that is the only way 
we have to explain our competent action in the world. The irony of Vygotsky's 
stance is that he went far toward showing just how it might be in that the 
socially organized milieu of language and other practices that pervade our lives 
are the functional equivalents of logical concepts. These pseudoconcepts— 
concretely formed and organized—are perfectly serviceable tools to get us 
through the daily routine. He balked, though, at understanding true concepts 
and especially "scientific concepts" as continuous with spontaneous ones. It is 
to this area, and a further elaboration of Vygotsky's understanding of the role 
of the word, that we now turn.
An analysis of Vygotsky's understanding of the leading role of definitions in 
acquiring scientific concepts is suggestive for the point being developed here. 
On Vygotsky's account scientific concepts and their acquisition in schools in 
formal terms are major factors in the achievement of abstract, logical categories 
during development. He understands this as a case of starting from the
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scientific, logical social product of a concept and arduously filling in the 
concreteness that is necessary to make it useful. Vygotsky strongly stresses that 
the development of scientific concepts moves in the opposite direction from 
that of spontaneous concepts. It moves from the abstract to the concrete, and 
the student—and the teacher—encounters the greatest difficulty in making the 
concept appropriately concrete. What is revealing for the present purpose is 
how this concreteness is achieved. Roughly, what Vygotsky finds is that though 
the child can repeat and even rephrase scientific concepts well, he or she does 
not, at first, have any deep appreciation of their meaning; in fact these are better 
characterized as images in many of the concrete ways that spontaneous 
concepts and pseudoconcepts are understood.229 What the child first acquires is 
the proper use of a word in the academic context of schooling. The practices of 
schooling continuously reorganize what this term represents to the student in a 
way which is strongly reminiscent of the process of moving to the more socially 
appropriate uses of terms like "Mother," which we discussed above.
A closer examination, an examination which Vygotsky himself enables, 
reveals a single process and a single line of development in the acquisition of 
appropriate conceptual apparatus. The child starts with concretized, imagistic 
categories embedded in social practices which are a part of the child's social 
environment. The child learns to wield these tools, generally in the form of 
words, more and more appropriately as he or she is inducted into practices in 
which usage is further constrained. Eventually the child is able to wield these 
tools in a way that is appropriate to the social milieu and has achieved 
functional mastery of the concept. This path is the same whether the tool in 
question is understood as a spontaneous concept or a scientific one. These
229 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 193. "This oversimplified development of the concept of 
serfdom looks more like an image than a scientific concept."
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concepts can only be differentiated from outside the analysis that Vygotsky 
performs. Concepts conceived as logical objects composed of abstract features 
are assumed prior to analysis. The unquestioned assumption that they exist at 
any point as the basis for our in-the-head thought (as opposed to being a valid 
practice in our discourse) is the basis for assuming that such concepts either 
develop from readily demonstrable concrete categorization or that preexisting, 
abstract, scientific concepts can be filled w ith concrete content.
Note that in all this I am not claiming that abstraction does not exist or that 
Vygotsky's work is not valuable to teachers. On the contrary, his work 
demonstrates in a fine-grained way that language and particularly words are 
valuable practices whose power lies precisely in their ability to be manipulated 
as external representations that encapsulate increasingly powerful 
abstractions—including abstractions constructed hierarchically out of earlier 
words. Working from the traditional understanding of what constitutes useful 
knowledge education has conceived of its role as teaching powerful 
abstractions. This remains a noble and appropriate goal, even in a situated 
connectionist accounting. But educational practice has not been as effective as 
we might wish, in part because we mistake the nature of abstraction and 
associate it w ith logical objects and objective definitions. Vygotsky brings us to 
the point where we can see words as effective practices and can imagine how 
they and other practices might be designed to help our students take useful 
possession of the abstractions that they represent. The issue is not how to 
encourage the construction an d /o r memorization of logical objects of 
knowledge, but how to build practices with the greatest generality, accepting 
that all representations-in-the-head and practices-in-the-world are dependent 
upon context for their realization. A central task becomes building practices 
that allow the student to perceive previously differentiated contexts as the
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same, and therefore to see particular, previously established practices as 
appropriate in the new context. Certainly language and the w ord that Vygotsky 
invests w ith so much power is a chief avenue toward that end.
Dreyfiis and Rules
Rereading Vygotsky through the lenses of practice and connectionist
representation helps us better understand the role that formal definitions in
particular and language in  general play in development. Such a reading
provides a way to understand the continued value of seeking powerful
abstractions in education while changing our image of what such an abstraction
might be and how it is to be learned. But this involves only one side of the
traditional framework as pu t forward in chapter 2. In addition to the logical
objects of the tradition, defined in terms of their features, the tradition also
points to the power of rules.
Again we are faced w ith a situation in which there is a temptation to say
that the emerging perspective endorses the position that there are no rules. But
as Bereiter has noted, rules are too valuable in the practice of education to
abandon.230 Bereiter, in his article "Implications of Connectionism for Thinking
About Rules," makes the educationally salient point that in a connectionist
interpretation rules are best understood as elements of public discourse rather
than the substance which constitutes rationality. As he puts it:
W hat about the explicit teaching of rules? Once we recognize rules as 
part of the public discourse rather than as lines of mental program code, 
we can afford to be entirely pragmatic about their use in education. 231
230 Carl Bereiter, "Implications of Connectionism for Thinking about Rules," Educational 
Researcher 20 (April, 1991): 10-16.
233 Bereiter, "Implications of Connectionism for Thinking about Rules," 15.
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But Bereiter gives little specific guidance on how to be pragmatic in this area; 
as educators we will need to listen to a more formed voice on the specific ways 
in which this might apply to education. Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest that rules 
play a crucial role in the development of competence that is compatible both 
w ith the line of reasoning we are developing here and the mission of teaching 
displaced knowledge w ith which the school is charged.232 On the brothers 
Dreyfus account the traditional story has the expert developing expertise by 
moving from specific cases to a higher, abstract understanding of the problems 
and a competence based on this understanding. This understanding is familiar 
to educators and is the source, in one guise or another, of the claim that there 
are wide swaths of competencies that schooling cannot prepare the student for 
precisely because schooling takes place in the context of school and not in those 
places where the actual building blocks of competence can be acquired. This 
understanding is made oddly more credible by the persistent inability of 
experts to articulate the rule-based basis for their expertise—granting the 
assumption that rules m ust be at the basis for their expertise, the experts' 
inability to verbalize their rules makes it all the more necessary that students 
join them in the field. The Dreyfus analysis, based on phenomenological 
considerations, triumphantly concludes that experts do not use rules at all— 
rather, they recognize many independent situations as calling for appropriate 
action.
This conclusion concerning the basis of an expert's competence dovetails 
well with the connectionist vision of representation that we discussed above; 
connectionist representation seems tailor-made to combine both perception and
232 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "From Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits 
of Calcutative Rationality," in Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look, ed. Paul Rabinow and 
William M. Sullivan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 327-350.
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action in the way the Dreyfus thesis demands. On one point, however, a 
connectionist would differ from their interpretation of the empirical data: the 
expert—or the competent actor in an area of hum an endeavor—would not 
recognize many thousands of separate instances but would recognize in many 
thousands of instances the relatively few categories which would call forth 
appropriate action. The Dreyfus brothers are willing to trade many thousands 
of particularized, unconscious rules for many thousands of separate, vivid, 
prototypical memories.233 A fair trade, they think, based on the evidence. But 
experts are as unaware of comparing the current situation to a stored 
prototypical memory and reacting appropriately on the basis of this perceived 
similarity as they are of following rules. Rosch's own later work in prototypes 
(the earlier version of which these two writers draw on in the work cited) has 
led to a much weaker version of prototypes without the strong, central, 
remembered instance 234 The two authors' own phenomenological roots would 
indicate the need for a process of representation and action that operates 
smoothly w hen uninterrupted. A phenomenological approach supposes a 
process in which perception brings, as a part of the act of perception itself, 
regularized activity in its wake. This activity is itself part of the reorganization 
of the field of perception and prepares the way for further, appropriate 
perception and activity. Any interruption, in the anticipated perception or in 
the activity, disrupts this process and calls for more conscious, considered 
regard. The connectionist proposals regarding hum an perception and activity
233 See the discussion in their section: "Stage 5: Expertise," 338-340.
234 See the discussion by Lakoff of Rosch's changing position and its implications in Women, 
Fire and Dangerous Things, 39-57.
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describe just this sort of process. Vivid (but unconscious), independent
prototypes are not a comfortable part of the story.
This difference should not blind us to the way the Dreyfus's account aids
our project. While they reject rules as the basis for the experts' competence and
endorse a broad range of experience in the area as an antidote, their account is
not one which calls for simply placing students in the context where their
desired competence is practiced and hoping that they will induce the
unconscious rules which lead to full mastery. Instead they believe that
competence begins—not ends—with rules. Novices are taught via r ules. Their
own formulation is brief enough to quote without paraphrase:
Normally, the instruction process begins with the instructor 
decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the 
beginner can recognize w ithout the benefit of experience. The beginner 
is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of these features, 
like a computer following a program.235
While we may choose to doubt the existence of "context-free features," the 
thrust of this formulation is clear. The teacher draws the attention of the student 
to particular parts of the overall situation. The student is then offered a set of 
rules which abstract skeletal practices common to the domain. The brothers 
Dreyfus use the example of a chess game in which each piece is assigned a 
value, and a rule is given that calls for an exchange at any point in which the 
value of the exchange is in the actor's favor. From the point of view offered 
here, explicit features and rules based on those features' presence or absence are 
pedagogically useful when they enable the student to begin to engage in the 
problem domain w ith even the roughest approximation of the fluid competence 
of the expert. Considered as teaching practice such a program orients the 
student toward the parts of the domain which the more competent find
235 Dreyfus and Dreyfus, "From Socrates to Expert Systems," 333-334.
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significant. This begins to engage the student in the type of activity that would 
follow from the perception of experts—the use of decontextualized features 
woodenly emulates such perception. Taking this position allows us to judge 
when rules and abstract features are likely to be useful—and to judge when 
they become a hindrance. Viewed from this position, the traditional story of 
abstract features and unyielding rules, one suspects, is but an unfortunate 
reification of valid teaching practices.
Vygotsky and the Dreyfus brothers advance our understanding of the 
abstract, powerful and displaced knowledge which education is charged to 
teach. An examination of their work reveals that the combination of 
connectionism and practices being pursued here can make meaningful contact 
w ith the "higher" functions that schooling pursues. While both Vygotsky and 
the Dreyfus brothers advance our understanding of how social learning take 
place, neither focuses on the practices which have emerged as central to the 
account of learning being developed here. The interests and subject matter of 
Vygotsky and the brothers Dreyfus are especially congenial to the interests of 
educators, but to gain a firmer grip on practices, we will need to examine the 
work of other social theorists.
Theories of Practice
There are historically many strands which may inform our understanding of 
how symbols exist in the world. Broadly we can divide these earlier attempts 
into two categories: the asocial and the social. Asocial approaches are typified 
by those who treat experience and the world as important determinants of what 
we learn but focus on this to the exclusion of the social organization of 
experience. This is archetypally represented in an educational context by the
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close-grained work of Jean Piaget in the child's acquisition of certain basic 
conceptual abilities.236 Such an approach is also apparent in the work of the 
perceptual gestaltists.237 Perceptual ecologists who descend from Gibson also 
have tended to work in a world in which "affordances" were simply there in 
the environment to be picked up.238 Such work can be mined for its important 
insights into the identification of concrete symbols and a long tradition of 
working w ith such concepts but, finally, they are not central to education's task 
because the sorts of symbols (invariances, gestalts, or affordances) that they 
investigate are closer to the em bedded knowledge that, like apprenticeships, 
are seldom appropriately taught in schools.
Our interests are more focused on those who have acknowledged the 
complexly social nature of learning and have struggled to understand how 
knowledge might exist as a result of people's interaction w ith each other and 
the world. This is an immensely more complicated task, and were our mandate 
other than the education of our children, we would be wise to avoid the 
prospect. Attempts to understand this connection have been many and the 
prudent educator will make use of a wide array.
The diversity of approaches is evident in a simple listing of the areas in 
which work has been done that is of interest to those trying to understand how 
knowledge might be embedded in the world. Pragmatism, phenomenology, 
semiotics, continental sociology, and a complex of Russian activity theorists
236 For example, see Inhelder and Piaget, The Early Growth of Logic in the Child.
237 This was true of Kohler's generation, but it is not true of their thoroughly socialized 
descendants who recognize the central importance of social shaping (for example, Laing or 
Rogers).
238 Again, not all who follow are as limited in their approach as the originators. See: Donald 
A. Norman, The Psychology of Everyday Things (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
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have all been fertile frameworks for research into this area. Each discipline has 
its particular strengths and weaknesses.
Pragmatism, descending from C. S. Peirce, gives us triadic semiosis, 
Deweyian educational philosophy, and Mead's understanding of the formation 
of the self and the role of institutions. Much of the power of these approaches 
can be traced to the Peircian concept of sign activity in which the object that is 
in the world, the representamena that is in the mind and the interpretant that 
the person produces (for example: a word, or an habitual action—reaching out) 
are irreducible parts of the sign in the process of hum an signification.239 
Viewed through the lens of semiotics, the present work is centrally about the 
representamena, how it is learned and what its qualities might be as a material 
entity. This chapter, in focusing on the social aspects of learning, acknowledges 
the Peircian insight into the importance of the interpretant in its socially 
organized guise. It is this interpretant that others, and we ourselves, interpret 
and act on the basis of. The dynamic quality of triadic semiosis, w ith its 
insistence that sign activity is a continuous participation in a complex network 
of relationships which together shape the hum an outcome, makes semiosis 
especially congenial to an interpretation of cognition based on network 
architectures.
Heideggerian phenomenology, which also emphasizes the indissoluble 
relationship between activity in the world and meaning, holds potential to help 
us explicate connectionism's external symbols. The instructive history of 
phenomenology, which moves from Husserl's attempt to describe explicitly the
239 por a funer explanation, see: Whitson, "Cognition as a Semiosic Process."
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predicates that he says compose the world (noema) to Heidegger's devastating 
critique of this project, reflects on artificial intelligence's similar project.240
The complex of Russian theorists who struggled to understand this area 
remains underappreciated. Vygotsky, of course, is now familiar to an 
educational audience, and his work—particularly ongoing research into the 
concept of the zone of proximal development—is possibly the most relevant 
work to issues of practice now being pursued in educational research 241 But 
other work, particularly that of Luria, who investigated the boundary between 
the social and the neurological242, and Bakhtin, who explored language and 
particularly genres in a way that will prove productive in later chapters, are 
also important sources of ways to understand how symbols can take on a stable 
external existence. Even less well known are the activity theorists such as 
L'eontiv who are heir to the richness of Russian social thought.243
Similarly, a reexamination of the classical sociological concept of role, of 
Bourdieu's approach to habitus,244 and Foucaultian senses of practice will 
surely prove fertile ground for those who wish to recast the symbols of 
cognition externally. To even begin to adequately explore these opportunities 
would be the subject of a m uch larger work than is possible here.
240 Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can 7 Do, 34-37,310n.
241 perhapS most useful example is: Denis Newman, Peg Griffin, and Michael Cole, The 
Construction Zone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
242 While Luria produced works which could be judged predominantly social (The Mind of a 
Mnemonist) or predominantly neurological (The Working Brain), a particularly inspiring book 
which cannot be so categorized is The Man with a Shattered World.
243 Bonnie A. Nardi, "Studying Context: A Comparison of Activity Theory, Situated Action 
Models, and Distributed Cognition," Paper presented at tire hi Proceedings East-West HCI 
Conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, 4-8 August 1992.
244 See: Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trails. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990).
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Here we m ust resist the temptation to exceed the current mandate. Our 
purpose is limited to showing why a connectionist approach to learning is 
incomplete w ithout a complementary social approach to knowledge and 
demonstrating that this connection can be fruitfully made. The author is 
indebted to a wider array of theories which bear on practice than are examined 
in this chapter, as will become more apparent in the two chapters which follow. 
Here this larger body of work will be slighted in favor of examining in more 
detail the possible connection to situated cognition.
Situating Situated Cognition
Situated cognition245 is examined in some detail here on a number grounds. 
Situated cognition is an active part of the current literature in education. 
Interestingly, situated cognition enters the discourse of education most 
forcefully through the offices of some of those associated w ith the cognitive 
science discourse that has been a background to the work of connectionism.246 
Situated cognition is also, frankly, as needy as is connectionism of a partner in 
making its case. Many of the approaches mentioned above are actually fuller 
theories which include a sophisticated approach to describing the self. The lacks 
of situated cognition and connectionism neatly mirror each other.
245 Situated cognition, like most young movements, is difficult to accurately delimit. Here it 
will refer most centrally to Jean Lave's work, the work of Cole and Scribner in 
anthropologically oriented approaches to which her work owes much, and the work of such as 
Brown, Collins and Duguid which attempt to use their formulations.
246 Brown, Collins and Duguid have all been associated with the cognitive science tradition 
critiqued in this work. For their latest position, see: John Seely Brown, Allan Collins, and Paul 
Duguid, "Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning," Educational Researcher 18 (January, 
1989): 32-42.
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Perhaps most important, though, is situated cognition's undeviating focus 
on student competence and its central appreciation of the role of practices in 
constituting such competence.
The key insight of situated cognition is that practices are constitutive of 
competence in the world. Because practices are relational, social activities 
situated in the world, situated cognition's approach to knowledge and learning 
is a thoroughly social one in which the particular actors are secondary to the 
socially formed and sustained practices that they enact. The originary unit of 
analysis is the community which sustains these practices.
Situated cognition is in part motivated by the attempt to account for the 
infamous problem of the failure of "learning" to transfer from the context of its 
acquisition to the context of its application.247 More precisely, knozvledge 
acquired in one situation, usually schooling, fails to be appropriately used in a 
situation where its application would seem obvious. In education, examples of 
this sort have traditionally been referred to, following Bloom's usage248, as 
problems of application. Situated cognition cuts the Gordian knot of tangled 
explanations which have followed upon education's acknowledgment of this 
problem by moving the analysis away from a focus on knowledge contained in 
the head of individuals toward practices embedded in particular situations in 
which community members participate.
This solution, while elegant and exciting, brings in its trail new problems. 
The basic move of situated cognition is to take what constituted the heart of the 
problem—that students' competence were impaired when they moved out of
247 For an overview of the trajectory of situated cognition, see: St. Julien, "Explaining 
Learning."
248 Benjamin S. Bloom, ed., Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational 
Goals, Handbook 1: The Cognitive Domain (New York: McKay, 1952).
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the context of acquisition and into the context of use—and make that very 
problem the solution by claiming that such competence as is available is 
embedded in the situation itself. This turns the explanatory world inside out. 
Accepting situated cognition's vision, we should no longer expect the student 
to show any transfer of competence between situations. In Lave's words, the 
learner will need to be a "legitimate peripheral participant" in the community 
of practice in order to acquire true competence.249 The trouble here is that while 
situated cognition gives us a strikingly plausible way of understanding the 
intractable problem of the failure of knowledge to transfer usefully, it leaves us 
completely unable to account for instances in which knowledge does transfer. 
At its basis this problem arises because situated cognition has built a theory of 
socially situated knowledge leading to competence on the part of participants 
in their communities. It is the community, finally, which is the unit of analysis. 
The student, as a separable, multiply constructed subject acting across 
situations, does not exist—only participants with varying degrees of legitimacy 
in ongoing communities of practice. Any explanation of successful transfer will 
have to, at least in part, be built on the basis of the person who acts across 
situations. W ithout a theory of the-person-learning, situated cognition will 
remain incomplete in regard to the purposes of education.250
This pattern is strikingly reminiscent of the connectionist resolution to the 
problem of representation. There the basic move was to take the problem that
249 Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning; Legitimate Peripheral Participation 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
250 It should be noted that Lave, at least, is strikingly unconcerned with such purposes. On 
her account, education as currently conceived is simply misguided and must fail because it 
encourages a form of learning which is bound to be systematically distorted. See, in one 
example, Lave, Situated Learning, 94-100.1 have commented on this problem and the 
implications of apprenticeship that follow from Lave's position in: St. Julien, "Situated 
Cognition, Apprenticeship, and Schooling."
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representation in use seemed altogether too plastic, changeable, and slippery to 
support the kind of rationality that our cultural background leads us to 
understand as essential to reliable thought, and invert the meaning of that 
plasticity by making the plasticity itself the basis of reasonable thought and 
action. Connectionism, I have claimed here, buys a theory of learning but at the 
price of being left without a theory of stable knowledge—a stability which must 
be located not in the mind but in the recurrent patterns of our interaction with 
the world. Dovetailing w ith connectionist insights, situated cognition purchases 
a theory of situated knowledge which locates stability in the world but at the 
price of losing the subject which acts across situations.
A theory of learning and knowledge adequate to support educational aims 
m ust do both. For our relatively narrow educational purposes we have come to 
focus on connectionist representation and situated practices as the locus of our 
examination. This has been motivated in part by our understanding that 
connectionist representational modes are dependent upon recurrent 
experiences which are the constant basis for our ongoing re-cognition of 
situations and things in the world.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced a path through the implications of the social forms of 
our lives for a learning theory based on connectionist principles. Against the 
backdrop of an ongoing debate about the nature of representation 
connectionism presents a startlingly new alternative. But it was less than clear 
that the learning that schools were mandated to encourage could be supported 
by an understanding of representation built on connectionist approaches. 
Constrained by a commitment to education and particularly to focusing on the
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fine-grained practices that constitute successful teaching, we then examined the 
work of Vygotsky and Dreyfus. Their work encouraged us to believe that there 
were alternate accounts that admitted the value of sharply defined words and 
domain-specific rules which did not conflict with, and indeed which could be 
enriched by, a connectionist account. We then briefly discussed other theorists 
who could inform the approach to practices that the earlier explorations had led 
us to emphasize. We finally settled on situated cognition as a potential partner 
for connectionist approaches in  part because the strengths and weaknesses of 
these two exciting new approaches were complementary.
In the two chapters that follow the tenor of this work will change. To this 
point I have been occupied with laying out a framework for understanding 
learning in a new light w ithout losing sight of the purposes of schooling and 
the needs of students and teachers. Having laid out one particular way of 
integrating connectionist insights into the universe of education—and having 
pointed to connectionism's very real deficits as a learning theory that w ould be 
useful to education w ithout a social component based in practices—it remains 
incumbent upon this writer to show how such a proposal could be fruitful for 
both educational research and instructional design. Chapter five will explore a 
research project based in part on the insights developed here, and chapter six 
will discuss an instructional computer program inspired by the research 
discussed in chapter five and exemplifying the combination of situated 
practices and connectionist learning developed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 5 
Eukaryotes or Prokaryotes?
The locus of the mind is not in the individual. Mental processes are 
fragments of the complex conduct of the individual in and on his 
environment.
— G. H. Mead,
The Philosophy of the Act, 1938, p. 372
This dissertation has proposed an unfamiliar way of conceiving learning and 
knowledge. It suggests that representation is best understood much more 
broadly than is currently the case. Both perception and readiness for action are 
integral parts of the material cascade of differences that compose a 
connectionist network's analogs to traditionally conceived memory and 
thought. I have suggested that these qualities and more technical qualities 
related to networked architectures make connectionist models of learning 
powerfully explanatory w hen viewed against the background of difficulties 
arising from received explanations. But the valuable qualities of contextually 
sensitive plasticity which make connectionist forms of representation attractive 
bring in their trail questions about how the observable stability of knowledge 
can be accommodated by connectionist models of learning. The account given 
here turns radically away from trying to correct such deficits within the model 
of connectionist theorizing251 and toward finding the necessary stability in
251 Though such an approach is possible and is the main path those working in connectionist 
paradigms are following. Most such work, in my interpretation, buys stability at the cost of 
biological plausibility or by giving up some of what makes connectionist representation 
valuable, such as interactive representations. A little explored possibility and one which would 
seem to have much potential is the possibility' that patterns composed of patterns would be 
more stable than individual ones. For a brief exposition of this idea see: John A. St. Julien, "New
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external, material symbols. Such symbols, tied to hum an activity through 
practices, make good use of the pattern recognition and completion qualities 
inherent in the superimposed representations characteristic of network 
architectures.
This image contrasts so vividly with the traditional understanding of 
learning and knowledge that it was not apparent just how connectionist 
explanations could connect with the usual understanding of the role of the 
school and the practices common in schools except to condemn them. Chapter 4 
dealt w ith some of these problems on a theoretical level by attempting to 
support social and phenomenologically inspired accounts of such "higher" 
activities w ithout discarding the valuable portions of received practice. This 
chapter and the chapter that follows will attempt to put such ideas into play 
and to serve as a test ground where the reader can judge the potential practical 
value of the approach developed earlier in this work for research and 
instructional design.
The Background of the Study
The study discussed in this chapter grows out of an interdisciplinary 
microscopy teaching project with a research component. This project, and the 
exploratory research study this section focuses on, were rich in implications 
which have been reported on elsewhere.252 One element of the project brought
Understandings of Cognition," Paper presented at the Tenth Conference on Curriculum Theory 
and Classroom Practice, Dayton, OH, 26-29 October 1988.
252 Jim Wandersee, "The Graphic Representation of Biological Knowledge: Integrating 
Words and Images," Paper presented at the NATO Conference on the Structure and 
Acquisition of Biological Knowledge, Glasgow, Scotland, June 1992.
The microscopy research discussed in this chapter was supported by NSF-LASER grant 
(1991) HDR 01: "Exploring Microstructures: Introducing Biology Students to the Images, Tools,
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students from groups that are traditionally underrepresented in scientific 
professions into the university to explore the use of the university's electron 
microscopy laboratory. Finding a way to teach students to make sense of the 
other-worldly images produced there was a central challenge for the 
developing project.
The long-standing interest of Dr. Jim Wandersee (the principle investigator) 
in the use of graphics and imagery in scientific texts along with his pedagogical 
experience and that of others in the project suggested that making sense of 
scanned electron images was not a trivial problem. As research into transfer 
might lead one to suspect, it was the common experience of teachers that 
students who are capable of doing well on a traditional test on the features 
which characterize this distinction do not thereby gain the ability to recognize 
the cells on a page or in a laboratory setting.253 The use of micrographs in this 
project pointed to a central conundrum in biology education: even though 
much of the knowledge base in biology was originally gained by looking at 
objects and images, surprisingly little understanding is conveyed through this 
m edium in most textbooks. A body of research suggested that the simple 
availability of accurate images in textbooks was insufficient—students seldom 
gleaned from the textbook images the knowledge that the designers had 
intended. A wide array of reasons for the disconnection between image and 
textually-based understanding was suggested in research group meetings and 
included such factors as testing methods, a functional rather than analogical or
and Applications of High-Tech Microscopy." Other members of the research team, without 
whom this chapter would not have been possible, were, from Life Sciences: Drs. Becky Dernier, 
Cindy Henk, Sharon Mathews, and Marion Socolofsky, and from Education: Drs. Catherine 
Cummins and Jim Wandersee.
253 See Hugh Gladwin, "In Conclusion: Abstraction Versus 'How It Is.' " Anthropology and 
Education Quarterly 16 (Fall 1985): 207-213.
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narrative textual style, and leaving implicit the imagery in the Greek and Latin- 
derived technical terms.254 The larger research project pursued all these 
possibilities, but the author's attempt to turn to connectionist representation is 
the current focus.
The particular problem the research team decided to investigate suggested a 
strong contrast w ith connectionist approaches. This problem was teaching the 
taxonomic distinction between Eukaryotic and Prokaryotic cells using locally 
developed micrographs. Taxonomies are archetypal examples of traditional, 
classical category formation. Linnaeus built his seminal work on the basis of 
necessary features, and his grand project was based on the assumption that one 
could reliably categorize the entire living world into discrete categories based 
on these features. Linnaeus's design (Systema Naturae, 1735) was a 
systemization of the natural world within the analytico-referential discourse. 
The Eukaryotic/Prokaryotic distinction, however, is based on the latest widely 
popular taxonomy of life: the five kingdom system. This system, in line with 
m odern biological theory, emphasizes ecological and evolutionary 
considerations in addition to Linnaeun features.255 Even so, this distinction is 
typically taught as though it were based solely in Linnaean assumptions; our 
local text, for instance, listed features of each group and produced an extensive 
chart comparing the essential distinguishing features.
Even more suggestive was the struggle that our life sciences colleagues went 
through in trying to convey the proper basis for making the distinction. It 
became apparent that they—experts all, who could make this distinction
254 For example, "eukaryote" derives from a Greek phrase meaning "with nucleus."
255 Lyn Margulis interview by Neil A. Campbell, in Biology (Menlo Park, CA: 
Benjamen/Cummins, 1987), 497-500.
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themselves at a glance—could not easily tell us on what basis they made this 
distinction. They struggled, disagreeing, to give us a list of definitive features. 
Rather than take our experts as inarticulate,256 1 took them as experts . . .  if they 
did not know how to respond, then it was likely that we were asking an 
inappropriate question. Like the experts the Dreyfus brothers discussed, it 
seemed possible that their expertise in this matter lay more in their experience, 
and the perception that appropriate experience engenders, than in a knowledge 
of any set of features or rules. The contrast between their perceptual 
competence and their analytic difficulty focused my attention on perception 
and its relation to category formation. So, the focus shifted toward what these 
experts did best: making perceptual rather than analytic distinctions. Because 
the explicit purpose of the project was to bring students from underrepresented 
groups into the scientific community as participants, it seemed appropriate to 
attempt to teach the competencies that actually support that community.
The contrasts between the observational grounding of taxonomy and the 
way it is taught and between the experts' practical competence and their 
inability to articulate a list of definitive features were striking and suggested a 
role for the perceptually based pattern completion of connectionist models.
Connectionist Constraints, Practice-Based Design
It would be straightforward at this point to simply recap the analysis already 
laid out in the preceding pages, to apply that analysis to the design of elements
256 The assertion that experts are inarticulate about the grounds for their own rule-based 
knowledge is a chief presumption of "knowledge engineering" and expert systems. The present 
account assumes that the question which demands a culturally canonical rule to cover all cases 
is "inarticulate" in that it misses the perceptual basis for category formation—and that rules are 
not the basis for such learning. (For a connectionist-based discussion of rules in an educational 
context, see C. Bereiter, "Implications of Connectionism for Thinking about Rules," Educational 
Researcher 20 (April, 1991): 10-16.
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of the research instrument, and then to analyze the results using this same 
theoretical apparatus—straightforward, and a necessary task, but less than the 
whole story. Such a discussion would obscure the fact that the theoretical 
exposition laid out in the preceding chapters was critically shaped by my 
encounter w ith the empirical problem of designing teaching and research 
materials for this project.
The practical project of designing learning materials for this problem made 
clear that while connectionist principles strongly constrained the sorts of 
representation that might be considered useful—leading to a rejection of usual 
ways of organizing the material and especially the images that were my central 
concern—they did not lead to much in the way of positive suggestions for 
design. As discussed above, connectionist approaches explicitly reject the 
standard, historically sedimented understanding of knowledge and how 
knowledge is acquired. Connectionists believe that objects of knowledge 
modeled on the discrete categories of classic logic do not exist. Because category 
formation is not a matter of necessary and sufficient features, a connectionist 
account would reject the traditional assumption that categories can be acquired 
through the memorization of features or that such features are what is induced 
during experience. On the other hand, the chief competing model of 
knowledge, the prototype account, is implicitly rejected because connectionist 
models are not based on and do not imply that representation is based in 
persistent, unitary, central instances against which all other members of the 
category are compared.
Interestingly, taking either of the two older competing approaches could 
reasonably lead to the design of curricular material similar to that found in the 
standard textbook. Regarding images and making the categorical distinctions 
which are central to taxonomy, both would imply that one should start w ith an
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ideal image which exemplifies either all the relevant features clearly or presents 
the perfect example clearly. Both cases begin by presenting the unity of the 
category to be learned as unproblematic. One simply bases that unity in a single 
set of features while the other bases that unity in a vividly experienced, holistic 
image. In both cases the unitary object represents the ideal of useful knowledge. 
They differ chiefly in how this ideal image is apprehended. Neither truly 
challenges the cultural givens of objective knowledge upon which the current 
discourse depends.
Connectionist modeling, on the other hand, indicates the danger of such an 
approach. In connectionist experiments it has proven crucial to present the full 
array of possible members of a category to a network in order that the network 
learn to generalize properly.257 If a narrow range of examples is presented the 
net will undergeneralize and treat only the exemplars as appropriate members 
of the class. In fact, a crucial element of network training is to determine the 
range and the total number of different examples that will, effectively, overload 
the memory space and force generalizations. Too few will allow the net to settle 
into a configuration in which each of a small number of similar exemplars is 
treated as a distinct case. In solving some problems, workers in this area have 
even resorted to reducing the number of hidden nodes to force 
"overgeneralization. "258
The implication of this for the design of educational materials is that the 
discursively "natural" tendency to present only perfect examples during the
257 Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of Mind-Bmin, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 458-474
258 A widely quoted and interesting example of both under and overregulation is found in: 
James L. McClelland and David E. Rumelhart, "On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs," 
in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, ed. David E. 
Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1986), 216-271.
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initial learning stage is misguided. For category formation at least, a 
connectionist approach w ould argue that the impulse toward simplicity 
exemplified by the phrase that "curriculum is content simplified for 
pedagogical purposes" is misguided. It may—and in connectionist models it 
does—result in faster and more reliable reactions to the particular exemplars in 
question. But it does not result in competent learning of the category, only in 
reliable responses to essentially memorized instances. Outside of those specific 
stimuli, the network reacts in a way reminiscent of the brittleness of symbolic 
systems: essentially no coherent response results. The flexibility of distributed 
representations is lost.
This is the sort of difference in theoretical implications which is testable. It is 
also a difference w ith immediate pedagogical implications: in teaching for the 
future competence of our students, is it most effective to teach a new category 
as if it were a single, central unity or is it most effective to teach that category, 
from the beginning, as if it were a dispersed, practical, category? In the former 
case, we choose one or few ideal exemplars and focus quickly either on making 
the features explicit (in the classical case) or on making the holistic image vivid 
(in the case of prototype theory). A distinctive connectionist approach would, 
instead, present a wide range of examples, and would include "outlier" 
instances in an early attempt to create a category which would encompass a 
range of instances similar to the final shape of the category in the use of the 
discipline from which the distinction is drawn.
The eukaryote/prokaryote distinction presents itself as an almost ideal point 
at which to test this conjecture. First, teaching this distinction is easily 
understood as enabling a perceptual distinction. Perceptual distinctions are 
usually thought of as difficult to teach in schools; enabling students to make 
such crucial practice-based distinctions is understood as a property of
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experience and a strong reason for moving toward the apprenticeship models 
which have developed out of situated cognition.259 While much of connectionist 
theorizing is understood as minimizing the in-principle distinction between 
perceptual and so-called higher forms of thought, categories with clear real- 
world referents, such as chairs or birds,260 are the sorts of categories about 
which people seldom disagree in their lived lives and which support their 
shared interaction. The sought-after competence is a matter of seeing an object 
as a member of a socially agreed upon category.
The particular case of distinguishing eukaryotes and prokaryotes is valuable 
because it is unlikely that most people outside of disciplinary communities 
have much, if any, actual experience with the distinction. Eukaryotes and 
prokaryotes do not exist in most people's lived experience and they are brought 
into the lives of biologists and microscopists chiefly through photographs taken 
by inaccessible and expensive electron microscopes. For most people it is a truly 
new distinction made between unfamiliar objects. There is less prior meaning 
and association to potentially confuse and bias our analysis of learning than in 
most instances of new learning.
But if connectionist approaches question the wisdom of the traditional 
idealist approach to category formation and suggests that a wider set of 
examples is appropriate in teaching categories, they do not suggest concrete 
practices that replace the use of single ideal examples. This problem emerges 
clearly w hen we realize that no student is at all likely to take a stack of
259 See, for instance: Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), and work in this school. For a comment on the dangers of accepting the thesis that 
schools cannot teach through practices and are hence "unnatural," see: John A. St. Julien, 
"Situated Cognition, Apprenticeship, and Schooling," Paper presented at the Bergamo 
Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Dayton, OH (14-17 October 1992).
260 These were favorite examples of Wittgenstein and Rosch, respectively.
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micrographs and spontaneously divide them into eukaryotic and prokaryotic 
piles when asked to bifurcate the original pile. Immediately the issue becomes: 
how is an unorganized mass of materials to be made into a coherent 
presentation which will signify a difference between the two groups and lead to 
a perceptual reorganization that causes the student to see one set as eukaryotic 
and another as prokaryotic. On the surface it seems that one m ust invent 
signifying practices. Unfortunately, by their very nature no single individual 
can invent such a practice. There m ust always be another to whom the practice 
signifies. Practices are preeminently social and are usefully established only 
through a history of concerted use. Obviously, this is an unsettling conclusion if 
the current project is to create new curricular materials. It is not immediately 
clear how one can design a new way of presenting materials w ithout using the 
already established practices which signify a particular, mistaken idea of what 
constitutes a category. How does one establish the unity within a category and 
the opposition between categories that bifurcations such as the 
eukaryotic/prokaryotic distinction rely on?
Struggling w ith this design problem led to a fuller realization of the 
necessity for taking into account the socially organized regularities of the 
world. I found I could not bring into play the ideas of connectionist 
representation and the power of pattern completion that it offered w ithout a 
better grasp of the social practices and regularities that preexisted my attempt 
and, it became obvious, were essential to it. I was perhaps lucky to have the 
austere discipline of typography and graphic design in my background. This 
field frankly counsels that design elements are conventional rather than natural 
and, somewhat ironically, that the hallmark of good design is that it appears 
transparently natural to the reader. Apt use of convention in the service of 
textual meaning defines the field. The practitioner learns to see the text in terms
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of visual conventions and the possible manipulations of these conventions to 
convey meaning.2611 fell back on such an approach without, at first, fully 
realizing its appropriateness.
Luckily for the designer, there are practices in graphic design which signify 
to the reader opposition and unity, and these practices can be used to point to 
and, more profoundly, create relationships between objects. These practices are 
usually not consciously understood by the reader and are hence felt to be 
natural, but the designer m ust be able to see them as discrete practices to be 
manipulated in the pursuit of the craft. Unity, for instance, is conventionally 
signified by placing tilings to be grouped "uncomfortably" close together in an 
organized fashion. The six members of a management team are shown by 
placing their separate photographs in two rows w ith very little space between 
photos in a row or between rows. They reader "sees" a unit, easily, fluidly and, 
to all but the designer, naturally. Opposition is pointed to by placing the two 
opposing sides literally on opposite sides of the page. "Dueling" pitchers in a 
feature story on an upcoming baseball game are often placed on opposite sides 
of the page, a hostile relative positioning which every fan can read even if both 
images are stock, smiling publicity stills. Practices such as these, which seem 
natural but which actually have been established through long usage, are as 
available to the designer of educational materials as they are to any corporate 
designer. It is to such practices that I turned in the design of materials for the 
study. On reflecting about why a particular arrangement was appropriate for 
the meaning that I intended to convey, I came to fully understand that these 
common design principles were best described as social practices deriving their 
power from their previous history of use; as such, they were available to me to
261See, for instance: Jan V. White, Editing by Design: Word-and-Pictnre Communication for 
Editors and Designers (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1974).
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signify or point to particular qualities of the images I hoped the students would 
learn to distinguish. I now turn to the study which occasioned these reflections.
The Study
In the microscopy project study we developed four one-page examples of 
textbook treatments used to introduce the eukaryote/prokaryote distinction. 
The first, representing a traditional approach, was draw n from Biology,262 a 
major college textbook that uses the five-kingdom system. The alternate 
treatment used two groups of five transmission electron micrographs 
developed by the team and a text that was organized around a metaphor of 
community—town and city—that emphasized complexity and differentiation. 
Two further treatments mixed these conditions; one associated the traditional 
treatment of the text with the newly developed micrographs and the other 
joined the traditional micrographs w ith the newly developed text.
The Experimental Materials
The traditional text exemplified the conventional practices of textbook 
publishing. It used a descriptive introductory paragraph, a single prototypic 
image of each cell type, and a cutline w ith the photographs pointing out the 
definitive features of the cells. This treatment is typical of introductory biology 
texts and of the genre of science texts. The text was expository and did not refer 
to the accompanying micrographs, the micrographs were prototypical 
examples of their class, and the cutline to the micrographs referred to the 
features exemplified by the micrographs. The alternate treatment used ten 
images, five micrographs from one category on the left and five from the other
262 Campbell, Biology.
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category on the right, w ith the text running down the center. The images were 
chosen to represent a wide range of members of the category, some of them 
"outliers." Social conventions involving symmetry, grouping, and opposition 
were employed to design a page that would lead the students to perceive a field 
in which similarities were to be sought within examples grouped together and 
differences to be sought between groups on opposing sides of the page.263 Our 
hope was that this could come, over a history of interaction w ith such texts, to 
be recognized as an occasion for category formation based on the differences 
suggested by the written text. We hoped that such practices could be added to 
the storehouse of tactics available to textbook designers and would constitute a 
more effective use of images in support of the activity of category learning, 
thereby extending the textbook genre.
The Conditions o f the Study
The experimental materials were distributed with an accompanying protocol 
to the teachers in the biology department of a large junior college participating 
in the grant activities. 257 students completed the activity and accompanying 
questionnaire. The pre-test portion consisted of the four different combinations 
of traditional and newly developed imagery and text discussed in the previous 
section. After the initial materials were taken up a questionnaire was 
distributed which asked the students to recognize elements of the cells as 
described in the text and to categorize newly presented images as eukaryotic or 
prokaryotic.
While a number of interests were pursued in this portion of the work, 
including work on developing another genre element introduced in the post­
263 vvhite, Editing by Design.
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test portion of the protocol,264 the portion of the project which is relevant to our 
current interests is the students" responses to a question asking them to 
categorize five previously unseen micrographs as either eukaryotic or 
prokaryotic. By grouping the two conditions which used the traditional 
imagery and the two conditions which had utilized the newly developed 
practice of placing two groups of five images in opposition, it was possible to 
isolate the independent effect of the imagery in the pre-test from the effect of 
the textual treatment in the pre-test.
Statistical Measures
Because the distinction that the learners in our study make are basically 
categorical, albeit a bifurcating nominalism, the more common parametric 
statistics are not appropriate.265 The nonparametric measure chi square (X2) 
was chosen to reflect this constraint. This measure was used in two ways. The 
first, following Cohen,266 is known as the "goodness of fit" test and tests to see 
if the treatments, considered separately, successfully "taught" the distinction 
between prokaryotes and eukaryotes. In the language of statistics the null 
hypothesis is that, for each image categorized, the treatment did not 
significantly improve the students' score over chance. Were this conjecture true 
we would expect that on the average students would answer correctly fifty
264 We explored the value of a consistent underlying grid in tire production of the perception 
of relative size in making the categorical distinction between eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells. 
Prokaryotic cells are usually much smaller than eukaryotic cells, but the traditional conventions 
of publishing and the practical economic constraints of printing make direct representation of 
this difference impractical. A reference grid would be a partial solution to this problem.
265 W. R. Borg and M. D. Gall, Educational Research (New York: Longman, 1983), 558-9.
266 Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Academic 
Press, 1977).
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percent of the time and this statistic will allow us to characterize how often the 
observed result could have been achieved by chance alone. (See table 5-2) Here, 
and below, the level of significance is set at .05—indicating that I am willing to 
accept the risk that 5 times out of 100 a conclusion that there is a difference 
between the two treatments will be wrong.267
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Euk 111 59 45.831
Prok 7 59 45.831
91.661
267 There are numerous special forms of chi square. To avoid problems in comparing 
numbers drawn from differing algorithms, I have taken the basic formula from Steele and 
Torries and have implemented it in a Microsoft Excel worksheet. The tables that follow were all 
constructed from that worksheet.
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If the first use of the chi statistic was to test whether or not either given 
treatment (and an undetermined prior experience) would allow the student to 
correctly categorize the images, the second use tests whether one treatment can 
be said to be significantly better than the other in teaching each image. There 
are two statistical approaches using chi square that can aid us in making this 
judgment. The first involves comparing the total number of right and wrong 
answers across questions in order to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between the effects produced by the two treatments. The results of 
this approach are shown in figure 5-3. It demonstrates a significant difference 
between the two treatments at the .05 level. (Indeed, this result is significant at 
the .005 level.)
Table 5-2: Chi Square test comparing traditional and alternative treatments 
comparing Trad & Alt totals
observed expected
right 481 419 9.174
wrong 107 146 10.418
19.592
The second statistical approach to making this judgment relies on the chi 
square characteristic of additivity.268 Because the chi square statistic is additive, 
table 5-4 can be used to contrast the overall difference between the two 
treatments by simply adding the separate chi square measures for each of the 
five instances and figuring the significance based on five degrees of freedom. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the two populations 
that received the alternate and traditional treatments of the images. Again the
268 por additivity of chi square, see: Robert G. Steel and James H. Torrie, Principles and 
Procedures of Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 375.
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found statistic, 25. 637, w ith five degrees of freedom, is significant at the .05 
level. Like its sibling it also is significant at the .005 level.269
Table 5-3: Chi Square test of homogeneity; comparing traditional and alternative treatments via the 
addition of individual statistics
comparing Trad & Alt Qa comparing Trad & Alt Qb
observed expected observed expected
Euk 8 12 1.333 Euk 110 99 1.222
Prok 110 102 0.627 Prok 8 14 2.571
1.961 3.794 I
comparing Trad & Alt Qc comparing Trad & Alt Qd
observed expected observed expected
Euk 37 51 3.843 Euk 47 52 0.481
Prok 79 60 6.017 Prok 71 61 1.639
9.860 2.120
com paring Trad & Alt Qe A d d itive  Chi Square: 25.637
observed expected
Euk 111 97 2.021
Prok 7 17 5.882
7.903
(ldf, .05=3.84)
Knowing whether the differences in the data are significant at the .05 level 
allows us to say whether the differences could reasonably be interpreted to 
have occurred by chance alone. While such statistical significance is valuable, it 
does not directly give us a sense of how important these differences might be. 
Power statistics can be used to provide a sense of the relative size of the 
difference. Such statistics are underutilized in educational research w ith policy 
implications, where confirming a difference does not necessarily imply that the 
difference is large enough to warrant the investment necessary to change 
ongoing practices. The effect size index "'W" is adopted from Cohen for this 
purpose.
269 Steele and Torries, Principles and Procedures of Statistics, 435.
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Table 5-4, Effect Size: W
Power Statistic (W)
observed expected
right 0.818 0.742 0.008
wrong 0.182 0.258 0.023
0.030
W= 0.175
Discussion of Statistical Results
The statistics used above can be conceived of as attempts to answer the 
following series of questions. 1) Does this teaching tool work? Do students do 
any better than chance on the post-test after exposure to the pre-test 
instrument? 2) Does the tool do its job any better than the usual alternative? 
Will students do significantly better after using the novel design than similar 
students do after using a teaching instrument adopted from a traditional text? 
3) Supposing a significant difference is found, just how important is it?
The "Chi Square Test of Significance" table 5-2, reassures us that the method 
does work—students are able to do significantly better than chance after 
exposure to the pre-test instrum ent (see the column "alternate treatment"). The 
table also shows that for three of the images the traditional treatment was also 
successful, although at lower levels of confidence. What is most interesting is 
the two images for which the alternate treatment was successful and the 
traditional treatment was not (images C & D). Both of these image are of 
prokaryotic cells and were images which were included in the data set during 
development as "outlier" cells. College instructors and former biology teachers 
identified these as images which would, in their opinion, be among those in the 
total set which were most difficult for students to classify correctly. The 
intuition of these teachers was borne out under both conditions. These are the
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images which students in the traditional treatment failed to classify successfully 
at better than chance. Less dramatically, while the students who experienced 
the alternate treatment did better than chance, these are the two images in 
which we have the least confidence that random error has not fooled us: the 
other three images have confidence ratings that indicate that only 5 times in a 
1,000 could these findings have occurred by chance.
These two images were difficult, at least in part, because they had a 
discernible "center." For those students who were looking for a feature, the 
only candidate provided by the pre-test was the nucleus. On this interpretation 
those students who were looking for a nucleus but who had insufficient 
experience to correctly identify the nucleus—or more pointedly, had experience 
of the wrong kind—were tem pted to interpret any central body as a nucleus. 
The students who were exposed to the alternate set of images were presumably 
better able to disambiguate nuclei from other organelles.
While the results of the first set of statistics encourage us to regard the 
alternate treatment as successful and while it is apparent that the alternate 
treatment tends to be more successful than the traditional treatment, we need to 
be careful not to make the unsupported claim that the pattern that we see could 
not be generated by chance alone. The difference in the degree of confidence 
that is shown in rejecting the null hypothesis in table 5-2 does not mean that we 
can assume that the two treatments differ significantly from each other; we 
know only that they differ significantly from chance. To answer the question of 
whether the student using the alternate imagery does significantly better than 
the student using the traditional imagery, we use the chi square in different 
way. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 test the differences of each sample from each other 
rather than from the presumption of a random distribution. If no significant
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difference is found the samples, regardless of any perceived pattern, they are 
understood to be homogenous with respect to the variable measured.
Both measures find the alternate treatment to be superior to the traditional 
one in helping students to distinguish the eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells 
found in this example. We can conclude from these statistics that the two 
treatments can reasonably be seen to have different effects.
Interestingly though, the overall pattern cannot be read down to individual 
cases; not all of the differences between individual instances achieve 
significance. In two of the cases (C and E), the alternative treatment is 
associated with significantly better results, another case, b, comes very close; 
and the other two produce so little difference that there is less than a 5 in 100 
chance that repeated measures would not show the result to be achieved by 
chance alone. Such results are difficult to interpret and are the usual basis for 
concluding that more research is necessary to determine the grounds for the 
perplexing differences found.
On one level, one can simply say that this uneven result at the level of 
individual images is the way that statistics work and the chief reason that we 
value them as tools. That is, small differences that are insignificant or of 
unreliable importance in individual instances can be shown to be related to a 
m uch more reliable overall pattern that can guide our practice. What is being 
demonstrated here is more on the order of concluding that classrooms of 
students taught in the same manner would benefit by instructional materials 
similar to those in the alternate treatment. But educational research is in the 
position of attempting to draw conclusions about what will be best for the 
students that come to us as individuals. In such a situation overall trends do not 
translate easily into the conclusion that particular students will be helped by the 
treatment.
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The most straightforward interpretation is that the positive effect is 
relatively weak against the background of prior knowledge and experience that 
account for most of the difference from pure chance, and that the effect shows 
up only in the aggregate for that reason. On this account some measure of the 
power of the discovered statistical significance to account for the effect 
measured is called for.
Table 5-1 above details a power measure (W) developed by Cohen (1977) 
from the chi square statistic. Cohen's formula270 results in a W of .175 which is 
by Cohen's statistically defined standards a small effect. This represents a 
statistical conclusion which tends to confirm the idea that the failure of some of 
the individual images to achieve significant results is because the differential 
effect of the alternate treatment regime is small relative to large background 
factors and the traditional treatment.
This conclusion should give us cause for pause. If the demonstrated effect, 
however "real" in terms of significance, is small, should we advocate changing 
our practice based on such finding? Is the difference large enough to justify our 
changing our practice? I suspect that we should not be too quick to conclude 
that a statistically small result is necessarily an educationally insignificant 
result. Cohen himself cautions that his standard is statistical and that an "ad 
hoc" sense of magnitude "for a particular problem in a particular field"271 is 
called for when considering the practical use of results.
An argument for considering these results practically important can be 
constructed on two grounds: first, that the small statistical result is actually, 
within the particular field of education, a relatively large one, and second, that
270 Steele and Torries, Principles and Procedures of Statistics, 216.
271 Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis, 224.
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this "instantaneous" measure does not adequately reflect the potential power of 
the strategy over time.
A reexamination of Table 5-1 reveals that those learning from the new, 
alternate treatment averaged approximately 82 percent correct, while those 
exposed to the more traditional treatment classified the cells correctly only 74 
percent of the time. In a classroom this w ould translate into a situation where 
the average grade would be a B rather than a C on an identification test 
involving cells. This, I submit, would be an educationally significant result.
But this places the emphasis on a single test taken at a single time. 
Classrooms are places with a history. The recent emphasis on competency- 
based education, regardless of other problems it had, gained its credibility 
largely through the insight that those left behind at one level of instruction were 
likely to get further and further behind as they tried to build on concepts and 
learnings of which they had only an incomplete grasp. Any method which 
promises to bring along a greater percentage of the students at any one moment 
will, like a higher rate of compound interest, pay out disproportionately greater 
dividends at a later date.
Both of these rationales remain firmly within the standard justifications of
testing and achievement. And this is as it should be; MacIntyre's advice that a
new theory m ust be judged, at least initially, by the standards of the theory it
seeks to displace can be applied to instruction as well. To again cite:
The best theory so far is that which transcends the limitations of the 
previous best theory by providing the best explanation of that previous 
theory's failures and incoherences (as judged by the standards of that 
previous theory) and shows how to escape them.272
272 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Moral Arguments and Social Contexts: A Response to Rorty," in 
Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1985), 222- 
223.
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The failures and incoherences of the current approach to instruction, as is 
well recognized from within that viewpoint, center around the problem that 
educational discourse discusses under the rubric of application. Students are 
not able to turn their school knowledge into a reliable basis for action in the 
world. The most common descriptive explanation has been that school 
knowledge is "about" the world while the more useful forms are "of" the 
world. By its nature this dichotomy bodes ill for the institution of schooling. 
Accepting such a dichotomy, educators either accept the general lack of utility 
of material learned in schools for the daily activities of life or attempt to erase 
the differences between schooling and the world. Neither road is, finally, 
palatable, and the choice offered is a desperate one.
The full benefit of the approach offered here, as has been argued earlier, lies 
in the ability to teach something different rather than the ability to teach the 
same thing better. It offers the possibility of teaching for the sort of perceptual 
competence which supports our lived experience w ithout abandoning the 
institution of schooling. It offers an opening toward making full and conscious 
use of the perceptual mode of learning that supports the child's easy and fluid 
recognition of her mother. This is the same ability that supports the expert's 
recognition of a eukaryotic cell.
Conclusion
This chapter has served two functions: to demonstrate that the particular 
combination of connectionist and practice-based theorization suggested here 
has implications for the design of educational research, and to begin to show 
that practices based on this conceptual framework can be successful.
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The design of the research tool itself as well as the analysis of the data that 
resulted from its use were intimately tied to connectionism and practice 
theories. A more standard approach to improving students' the use of images 
would have presented prototypical images (as both classical, feature-oriented 
and prototype theories would suggest) the approach suggested by 
connectionism emphasizes multiple images, some pointedly marginal to the 
category. Similarly, the design practices drawn upon and the attempt to array 
them as a new genre of image usage would have been less consciously and less 
thoroughly arrayed outside of a theoretical context that emphasizes practice.
To the extent that this study has demonstrated that a treatment based on 
situated connectionism, which varies in notable ways from the traditional ways 
of presenting such material, can be successful this study indicates that such an 
approach is capable of generating new and successful approaches to designing 
teaching practices.
While these results are gratifying a short reflection upon the principles 
advanced in chapter 4 will reveal that at least two principles discussed early in 
that chapter have received short shrift in this example. Both activity and the 
temporal embeddedness of situated activity were stressed as essential to 
understanding the apparent stability of representation in a situated 
connectionist framework. These themes will be taken up in the explication of a 
more fully realized instructional treatment developed out of the emerging 
framework of this study in chapter six. There I will discuss a program I have 
developed which builds on the design features partially worked out in the 
present study, and will address the issues of temporal sequencing and activity 
in category formation. Developing a computer-based implementation was 
tempting for two reasons: to take advantage of the plasticity that the medium 
offers and to show that the computer medium need not be limited to the sterile
reproduction of older forms, e.g. electronic worksheets, for which it has become 
infamous.273
273 The most commonly cited example of this problem is the pervasive use of computers to 
implement drill and practice routines and to emulate worksheets. But this critique can 
reasonably be extended to even such an apparently unique application as hypertext which, as 
far as I can see, does not go beyond the tools available to the early French encyclopedists. Most 
hypertext links are simply more convenient implementations of glossaries and indexes and the 
more sophisticated (and rare) interdocumentary links are first cousins to the traditional 
reference footnotes.
CHAPTER 6
Designing a Programmed Environment 
to Induce Category Formation
In asking w hat computers can do, we are drawn into asking what people 
do w ith them, and in the end into addressing the fundamental question 
of what it means to be human.
—Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores, 
Understanding Computers and Cognition:
A  New Foundation for Design, 1986, p. 7
The current chapter attempts to demonstrate that the positions developed in 
this work are generative. An all too often accurate observation is that some 
styles of theorizing make a "distinction without a difference."274 Because one 
theme of this work has been to reconceptualize the efficacy of such educational 
practices as rule-based learning, repetition, and abstraction in light of the 
perspective being pu t forward, there is some danger that the reader may 
conclude that the theoretical position implies such a distinction without a 
difference.275 The computer offers itself as a particularly tempting medium for 
developing a demonstration of the potential difference that follows from 
adopting the perspective advocated here. It is generally agreed both to be under 
utilized and to have great potential in education. This potential flows chiefly 
from its flexibility, which allows the designer to develop theoretical
274 Henry Fielding, The History of Tom ]ones, A Foundling (New York: The Modern Library, 
1749/1950), 262.
275 See particularly chapter 4 and the defense there of objects-of-knowledge reconceived as 
external symbols and rules as potentially pedagogically useful tactics which are, nonetheless, 
the product, not the producer, of competence.
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implications which would simply be impossible in any other single media. In 
the present case both activity and time-based recurrence are crucial aspects of 
the position on learning and knowledge that has been built in this work. It 
w ould be very difficult to build both of these features into other media. The 
computer medium can be designed to provide "virtual" manipulation of 
external objects, which is analogous to the activities that form categories in our 
everyday experience. Similarly, temporal sequencing can be rigidly ensured, 
making certain experiences follow one another in time and ensuring the 
repetition of key activities that our earlier explorations indicated were crucial to 
building connectionist memories.
The Challenge of Software Design
Designing an educational computer program is a risky business. Much 
educational software has been roundly criticized for reproducing the errors 
already found in print materials. By and large this criticism has been fair. Both 
worksheets and programmed texts have been reproduced in this medium 
without any discernible improvement being achieved by the shift in display 
medium. Even more sophisticated software packages such as hypertext suffer 
from this critique. Most implementations of hypertext are more convenient 
forms of glossaries, indexes, and occasionally, the reference footnote. There 
seems to be little here that was not already incorporated into the dreams of the 
original French encyclopedists. Hypertext software that attempts to push these 
limits is usually considered "complex" and is condemned for not being "user- 
friendly." Indeed users do find them difficult to use and often find themselves 
lost deep in a string of interconnections that has led them irretrievably far from 
the text that occasioned the side trip.
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But the computer remains extremely tempting to the designer. The 
underlying digital simplicity enables an almost infinite flexibility of possible 
uses: calculate n, expand a fractal, lay out a newsletter, balance your checkbook, 
manipulate the tonal range of a photograph, or write a novel. The plasticity of 
the computer, its chameleon-like ability to be what the user wants it to be, is 
very seductive.
The contradiction is apparent: if computers are valued for their plasticity, 
why are they so conventionally used? I will argue that this happens for two 
interrelated reasons, both of which connect to themes in this work. First, 
designers, like others in our culture, mistake the nature of learning and hence of 
knowledge. They begin w ith the idea that knowledge is an object and that it can 
be cleanly transferred and unproblematically transformed by rules analogous to 
those of logic and grammar. Such a conception seriously constrains the possible 
ways in which knowledge can be represented to ways which have already been 
widely explored in conventional print design.
Second, software designers—in part because they unreflectively accept the 
idea that knowledge exists in this objective way—are unable to adequately 
conceive the role of practices in learning. W ithout an understanding of the role 
of practices in  learning, they cannot grasp how signifying practices can, 
through connectionist styles of associative learning, be built into experience. 
W ithout any way to build new practices, they m ust fall back onto practices 
which are already understood among the literate population. This, I suspect, is 
why the possibilities of hypertext are so conventionally implemented—the 
typical user finds truly different practices confusing, and the designer cannot 
conceive of teaching the learner a new, more useful practice during the use of
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the material since the designer does not recognize the role of such practices nor 
understand how such practices have lasting cognitive effects.276
The real task before the designer is to grasp the possibility of creating new, 
more useful practices and the larger structures within which such practices 
signify. Such larger structures will be characterized here as genres, following 
Bakhtin. Such practices and genres would need to be taught to the user or 
student; the designer w ould need to recognize that their meaning would appear 
only in the course of the users' interaction with the material and design the 
experiences to facilitate this. Only on such a basis can truly different tactics 
which make use of the computer's plasticity be successfully assayed.
A Theoretical Background for Category Learning
This program explores the possibilities for designing learning materials from 
a connectionist/practice standpoint. It attempts to teach students to bifurcate a 
series of cells into two categories: Eukaryotic and Prokaryotic. The problem is 
both apt and ironic. Apt because this is a category that is specifically scientific, 
logical and "hard." If the Wittgensteinian and pragmatic characterization of 
categories, which emphasizes the formed-in-use character of the categories of 
our everyday use, is to be shown inadequate, the most likely candidate is a 
category which is self-consciously objective. However, if connectionist 
speculations are to be taken seriously, even such categories m ust finally depend
276 j ] le original conceptions of hypertext suggested much more radical possibilities, 
possibilities, including mimicking the associative qualities of human memory. However, even 
here the basic image was that hypertext would be easy to use because it projected a "natural" 
human form on the world—no consideration is given to seeing the reciprocal relation between 
cognitive artifact and human learning. See: Theodor H. Nelson, Dream Machines (Chicago: 
Nelson/Hugo's Book Service, 1974). Republished in 1987 as Computer Lib, Redmond, WA: 
Tempus).
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on the external symbology of embodied practices in order to be learned and to 
remain stable over time.
The irony lies in attempting to design a program which teaches a user to 
experience the category as a bifurcation, an either/or, using design tools, 
semiotic and practice-oriented theories, and connectionist learning theories 
which all point toward the idea that our categories are not and indeed cannot 
be so discrete. But this is the sort of irony w ith which our culture has already 
become comfortable: witness the way in which semiotic theories of meaning 
find their most pervasive influence in the construction of largely meaningless 
advertising.
Practices and Genres
Genre, as used here, refers to Bakhtin's valuable but somewhat unfamiliar 
characterization of the term. In Bakhtin's usage, genre refers to a stable type of 
utterance used within, and to signify the presence of, a particular type of 
hum an activity.277 Such genres can be simple or complex; complex genres are 
those composed of simpler genres. Bakhtin suggests that complex genres are 
made up of simpler elements which can be used in various patterns to make up 
different genres. This leads Bakhtin to conclude that the elements take on their 
compositional character only as part of the whole utterance that determines 
their interpretation. Here my usage will diverge from Bakhtin's, largely in the 
interest of clarity. Rather than talk of simple genres which compose more 
complex ones, I will speak of practices which compose all genres—including 
ones which Bakhtin discusses as simple. Interestingly in this context, Bakhtin
277 This usage is pointedly broader than the more common use of "genre" to denote a style 
of novel—an interpretation that Bakhtin specifically disavows. See: M. M. Bakhtin, Speech 
Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 6061.
227
was trying to establish a taxonomy of genre types on a unified, elemental 
basis278—a foundationalist project. I do not share this task and suspect that it 
obscures the utility of Bakhtin's formulation. Establishing a formal boundary 
between simple and complex genres w ould be at least as difficult, I suspect, as 
drawing an uncontroversial line between eukaryotes and prokaryotes. I hope a 
more productive path will be to see each signifying utterance that we pick out 
as composed of practices—practices which in other times and for other 
purposes could be analyzed as utterances w ith their own constituent practices. 
W hat I will w ant to retain is the understanding that the meaning of each 
individual practice can be usefully understood only against the background 
established by the whole genre understood as a purposeful utterance. Thus the 
overall page layout can be considered the background "genre" against which 
we understand the efficacy of such practices as grouping and spatial opposition 
in explaining the page's ability to enable learning. For other purposes the 
overall page layout itself might be considered a practice pointing to a 
bifurcating category formation in an attempt to design a new genre of textbook 
design. The chief implication of this point of view is that any actual genre can 
be considered as composed of a hierarchical series of practices. How we choose 
to describe any concrete practice—as a practice or a genre—depends upon our 
purposes in taking up the analysis.
The problem addressed in chapter 5 involved an attempt to array already 
established practices in a new pattern create a new genre for textbook images 
which w ould be more effective than the traditional single, prototypical 
illustration. As we saw in chapter 5 there is some hope that the design 
alternative we explored might be a successful candidate for this role.
278 See: Bakhtin, Speech Genres, 64, and note 'a' on that page as well as editor's note 4, p. 101, 
for a discussion of this project.
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It may be helpful to recall that the practices from which the candidate genre 
discussed in chapter 5 were designed were ones which were already familiar to 
the typical user educated w ithin Western conventions of print design. Unity 
was signified by placing images together closely, more closely than convention 
would allow conceptually separate objects to be arrayed. Equality of status was 
indicated by making the two groups the same size and placing them on the 
same level relative to the horizontal axis of the page. Finally, position between 
the two groups was established by placing the two groups on "opposite" (this 
convention is embedded in our language as well as our page design) sides of 
the page. These practices, it was argued, were not natural, but were the result of 
each individual's history of interaction with texts which assumed the meaning 
of these conventions.
Practices and practice-like concepts are both widespread and variously 
defined—as the varied background of theorists discussed in chapter 4 makes 
apparent. In the present context, viewed against a background of connectionist 
learning and looking toward their participation in genres as discussed above, 
practices will be particularly understood. Looking back at connectionism we 
see a practice as the sort of recurrent, patterned, relatively stable event which, 
when recognized, can make a difference in the ongoing activity of the perceiver. 
It is this sort of event, an event which recurs often enough against varied 
backgrounds to be perceptible as a relatively stable object, which is easiest for 
the hum an cognitive processes to register and recall. Looking in the other 
direction, we realize that such practices appear in the context of larger hum an 
enterprises which constrain and direct the sense that can be made and the range 
of reactions that are appropriate in a situation. Adopting Bakhtin's terminology, 
we can call these constraining contexts genres. It is this context-defining genre 
within which a particular practice signifies.
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In this work we have returned periodically to the seminal example of a child 
learning to recognize her m other's face. She repeatedly encounters the smell, 
the tactile softness of her m other's clothing and touch, the shapes of nose and 
cheek, the soft brown eyes, and the motion of reaching out and the sensation of 
being picked up when she is uncomfortable, when she is cold. The recognition, 
the activity, and the result are indissolubly tied together. Each separable 
"practice," be it recognition of her mother's face, the activity of reaching, or the 
socially mediated result of being picked up and made warm are parts of larger 
genre activity for which we have no ready name. Let us call it a "comforting- 
when-cold" genre.
The constituent practices of this "comforting-when-cold" genre could be 
recruited to other genres where their contextualized meanings would differ 
with the different genre activity that they helped constitute. It is im portant to 
note that such genres, following a connectionist account of learning, are not 
classical schemata with the structural assumptions that so bedeviled artificial 
intelligence theorists.279 Genres, unlike schemata, are flexible, learnable patterns 
without definitive fixed boundaries or a fixed internal pattern which controls 
their expression. This is the type of learned regularity supported by the 
networked relations which constitute hum an cognition. Such a formulation also 
differs from more traditional approaches by drawing no in-principle distinction 
between the activity of the child and the activity of the mother in constituting 
the genre activity as a whole. As discussed in chapter 4, connectionist memory 
remains stable only in a stable environment. This approach eliminates any easy
279 This is most interestingly shown in Rumelhart's rejection of his own earlier structural 
work in favor of a connectionist conception of schemata: David E. Rumelhart, J. L. Smolensky, 
James L. McClelland, and Geoffry E. Hinton, "Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in 
PDP Models," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, ed. 
David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 1986), 7-57.
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dichotomy of world and mind. Such mental activity as exists m ust exist
between persons engaged in  activity as well as within the individual bodies of
the participants. The approach to practice and genre outlined here gives
substance to the pragmatist description of mind:
The locus of the mind is not in the individual. Mental processes are 
fragments of the complex conduct of the individual in and on his 
environment.280
W ith a connectionist approach to learning, w ith the tool of practices that are 
learned through connectionist processes, and w ith genres which are composed 
of these practices, we can approach an explanation of the social nature of 
cognition that is not merely descriptive but which refers instead to a material 
set of processes, both inside and outside the head, that can subserve a theory of 
instruction.
Practices and genres as discussed here rely on two factors which were only 
marginally explored in the eukaryote/prokaryote research discussed in chapter 
5. The research instrument was a largely passive and somewhat atemporal tool. 
There was little extension in time over which to develop the recurrence 
necessary to basic forms of connectionist learning and there was little 
opportunity for the activity of classifying the cells. Both of these characteristics 
are hard to build into the largely static print medium.
The plasticity of the computer medium makes it possible to build a much 
more interactive and temporally extended text. Both activity and temporal 
recurrence are crucial features of the position developed in this work. 
Demonstrating that they can be usefully integrated into the design of 
instructional materials is central to presenting a case that a learning theory
280 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1938), 372.
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based in connectionist ideas can be educationally useful. It is to these issues that 
we now turn.
Activity and Temporality
The intertwined issues of activity and temporality which appear periodically 
throughout this work are brought together here. In chapters 2 and 3 we 
discussed the atemporal nature of the analytico-referential discourse as 
exemplified by the static structures of expert systems. The "brittleness" of such 
systems and their failure to perform as expected derive from their inability to 
learn, an inability to alter their fundamental structure as a result of experience.
It was argued that this is not simply a technical problem but a profoundly 
conceptual one: the division of form and content is implicit in the discourse 
from which such work draws, and this generates intractable problems in 
practice. Working from the underlying metaphor of timeless, placeless 
structures of knowledge—the formal, logical forms familiar from geometry— 
particular content was understood to fill only the slots left by more 
foundational logical work.
The connectionist approach to learning presented in  this work as a way of 
overcoming this discursive impasse is, we discover upon closer examination, 
profoundly dependent on the particularities of both time and place. In the guise 
of context-dependence, the implications of particularity in learning had been 
conceptualized as a problem. But a connectionist approach to learning makes 
context constitutive of competence and not an impediment to it. The 
connectionist understanding is that all learning is learning of just this particular 
kind.
The central property of network architectures in regard to learning is pattern 
completion. Pattern completion as an emergent property of network
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architectures can occur only through a history of repeated interaction with 
regularities in the world. As we saw in the Sharks example, the order in which 
a set of information is revealed does matter; the sequence in which information 
is presented biases the eventual output of the network and may either facilitate 
or prevent the network's settling on the correct answer. This time ordered 
sensitivity to initial conditions is a key source of the flexibility and error 
resistance which recommend neural nets to many researchers. The passage of 
time and a history of repeated interaction with a category of events is essential 
to the sort of learning proposed by connectionist theorizing.
But the valued flexibility of network architectures is purchased at the price 
of unstable representation within the brain alone. The pattern of relationships 
which constitutes the connectionist analog to memory will degrade without 
continued, stable interaction w ith worldly situations which sustain the 
pattern.281 This led, in chapter 4, to a broad exploration of the ways in which 
the necessary stable categories of the world are largely socially ordered. The 
speculation of Rumelhart et al. that connectionist symbols were largely 
"external symbols" was taken up and discussed in the context of Vygotskian 
concepts and the practices of situated cognition. Sustaining order in the social 
world, and especially in the "higher" realms of abstract thought such as 
mathematics, depended upon manipulating material, external symbols. The 
example of three-digit multiplication accomplished through pen and paper 
manipulation of such external symbols—which are and remain difficult to 
manipulate in the head—was explored as an example of such external symbols.
The program discussed below attempts to extend the strategies developed in 
chapter 5 to program design. In tins example, intended to explore the
281 Though recursive networks were discussed as one way that time dependent comparisons 
of nonsimultaneous events could be accomplished.
233
possibility of creating a more effective practice of illustration for the textbook 
genre, the limits of the textbook genre needed to be respected. In the context of 
a computer program, however, where both active manipulation and a temporal 
recursion can be instituted, different possibilities appear. A learning material 
can be created which mimics more of the characteristics associated with 
everyday experience. To the degree to which instructional materials can be 
created which reproduce the elements of experience which make it effective a 
learning environment which incorporates such materials should share in that 
effectiveness. The program described below attempts, based on the theoretical 
positions developed in this work, to extend computer-based instructional 
design in this direction.
The Category Learning Program
In emphasizing temporal sequencing and the student's activity in this 
discussion, a very real difficulty is introduced into the presentation. Succinctly: 
a text like the one you are reading now can only talk about time and activity—it 
is especially poor at demonstrating how these factors might be important. While 
this is often a problem in written texts, it is particularly poignant when a major 
point of the work under discussion is to point out the inadequacies of such texts 
and to suggest an alternative. Consequently, the reader is encouraged to make 
use of the disk found in appendix A: Category Formation: An instructional 
program. Running through the program a few times should provide an 




This program is intended to demonstrate the utility of combining a 
connectionist approach to learning w ith situated insights into the particular 
practices that constitute knowledge. Design features linked to connectionist 
learning and practice-based knowledge broadly conceived will be discussed 
first.
Connectionism and This Program's Design
Connectionist architectures are built around a broad conceptual model in 
which a system "settles" into a solution based on "pressure" exerted by a 
dynamic transformation template for correlating external data with internal 
response; eventually the system settles into a stable response pattern which 
corresponds to differences in  the problem set it is learning to classify. The 
template has been conceptualized as a teacher and as representing 
environmental "reality." In either case each act of categorization by the net is 
coupled w ith immediate corrective feedback based on its last response. In a 
connectionist framework this is not a useful adjunct that makes learning easier; 
it is an integral and necessary part of each act of attempted classification.
The Category Learning Program reflects this imperative by making each 
classification an act which appears, at least from the user's point of view, to 
contain its own confirmation or rejection. The user picks up the image that is to 
be classified and drops it on the group which the user thinks it most resembles. 
The program either rejects an incorrect categorization by bouncing the image 
back and presenting the choice again, or it accepts the correct classification by 
including the new image in the array used to define the category. The activity 
of categorization has immediate effects in the experiential world afforded by 
the program. That "world" either accepts or rejects the categorization.
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Connectionist modeling indicates that features are not the basis of 
recognition—an assumption made by folk theory and many cognitive theories.
A network that has learned to correctly parse its "sensory" experience does so 
on the basis of the overall pattern of relationships in the data. Connectionist 
nets do not discover a set of necessary and sufficient features by which they 
then correctly classify the input. They are holistic pattern completers. Generally, 
any feature recognition nodes or grouping of nodes that observers pick out to 
talk about are, in fact, not essential to the classification. (I would contend that 
this is true of hum an perception and discourse as well.)
The Category Learning Program implements this approach by deliberately 
avoiding giving the user the features traditionally used to teach the category. It 
also attempts to discourage our common habit, based on our intellectual 
practices, of searching for these discrete critical features.
Connectionist modeling also throws doubt on an alternate cognitive theory 
that recognition is based on generalization from prototypical (central or best) 
examples. The early use of a training set limited to exemplars makes it difficult 
to acquire outlier members reliably. The network encodes the pattern of relation 
that characterizes the exemplar and classifies all remaining members of the 
problem set by that limited pattern. Either over- or undergeneralization may 
result, depending on the particular problem set. The more difference that the 
category actually contains, the greater this problem becomes. The Category 
Learning Program does not use exemplars and chooses its examples from a 
broad range of taxonomic categories and degrees of difficulty.282
282 Differing degrees of difficulty were established during the design stage of the project 
discussed in chapter 5 by asking microbiology instructors and science education students to 
rank order the available pool of micrographs in order of their difficulty for the student.
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The network models which are the basis of connectionist theorizing also 
depend on a recurrence of events over time. The mother's face reappears in 
various contexts and against multiple backgrounds but always means, among 
other meanings, w arm th and comfort. The detachable quality which results 
cannot appear w hen the event is either a constant background feature—and 
hence cannot represent a notable difference—or is so intermittent as to fail to 
correlate with any useful difference. It is at this point that connectionist models 
force a look outward, toward the socially grounded regularities of practices 
discussed below.
In sum, the Category Learning Program is designed on connectionist 
assumptions concerning the nature of learning. This stance differs critically 
from a traditional view of learning implied by this stance is that 
category/object learning depends on direct confirmatory or nonconfirmatory 
linkages to the world and holistic pattern recognition which is not based on 
prototypes. Both of these positions turn our attention outward, toward the 
socially organized regularities that constitute the objects of our experience.
Practices and this Program 's Design
Practices as used here are socially organized and signified regularities 
further constrained by the assumptions inherent in connectionist learning. This 
category includes objects and more temporally extended events which are 
perceived by the user as separable from the background in which they appear. 
They correspond closely to the design professional's concept of design 
elements. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of practices in the 
successful completion of the tasks set up by the world this program makes 
available. Even so mundane a task as "picking up" an object and moving it is 
mediated by clearly social, learned practices such as the "click and drag" 
feature common to all mouse-driven computer interfaces.
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The Category Learning Program trades on a whole set of such already given, 
social practices. These practices are not "natural." They are simply so much a 
part of the person-acting that they are not noticed—but their effectiveness 
depends entirely on the history the user brings to the task.
For instance, representing unity by grouping things that we intend to 
represent as a category is an old and honored practice. Most folks looking at the 
initial learning screen of the program see three things represented, not ten, 
because our history of interaction with similar objects grouped together in a 
deliberate pattern has meant this in our past experience (see figure 6-1 below: 
"Initial learning screen").
Prokaryotic Cells Eukaryotic Cells
%
F
“Unknown" Cell "Unknown” Cell
One of the "Unknown Cells" 
is a Eukaryotic cell and one is a 
Prokaryotic cell.
Hold down the mouse button 
to ‘click and drag' the box 
containing one of the cells to 
the group it most nearly 
matches.
Some advice:
Regard your selection as an 
attempt to divide the two 
"unknown" choices between 
the two categories on the basis 
of overall similarity.
Figure 6-1: Initial learning screen
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Or consider how this organization structures difference: the two categories 
are on opposite sides of the page, denoting opposition. Similarly the unnamed 
group is beneath and between them, and contains fewer members. We are not 
predisposed to assume that they are opposed in the same way that the screen 
design, and the user's history, encourages the viewer to take the upper two 
categories.
The plasticity of the computer also makes available practices using motion 
and sound that are not usually available for use in educational material. The 
practice of putting members of a group "in a pile" and of reacting to correct 
choices w ith sounds of approval and admittance to the pile, while reacting to 
incorrect choices with sound of disapproval and a rejection from the pile 
(forcing the student to try again) are equally practices, whose meaning is 
established in the user's history and only drawn on here.
At the point where the learner has to act in order to categorize, he or she is 
presented with one example of each of the two categories to be learned. This 
effectively means that each selection enacts the bifurcation that the program 
hopes to teach. Bifurcation is a familiar way to form categories—and the 
dominant academic practice.
These practices build knowledge into the world so that the learner will 
recognize a particular pattern in the material given. The activity of sorting in 
this way—without rules, exemplars or critical features—is crucial to forming a 
category. The practices discussed constrain the activity of choosing which 
image goes in which group by trading on knowledge already embedded in the 
situation in which the problem appears. Unity, opposition, bifurcation, 
grouping, and approval/rejection sounds all constrain the possible pattern— 
out of the plenitude of possible patterns—which the learner will settle on. It is
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highly unlikely that a user given a screen full of unordered, uncommented 
images w ould discover anything like the taxonomic distinction this 
implementation attempts to teach.
Such a student would have only pattern recognition to rely on and pattern 
recognition, unallied to our socially constructed history of signifying practices, 
is not enough.
Constrained by what we know about both category learning and practices 
which situate knowledge in the world, an approach such as this enables the 
teacher to design a learning experience which makes available to the student 
the categories through which the community of use (in this particular case, 
biologists) structure their world. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this in 
the current, textually limited, context is to lead the reader through a brief 
recounting of the experience of using the program which emphasizes the 
various theoretical constructions that are embedded in the program.
Interacting With the Category Formation Program
The program opens with a screen which briefly explains its purpose and 
asks for the user's name and other useful data—versions for use in a particular 
context could ask for the class currently enrolled in or about prior experience in 
the area.
Starting w ith the initial learning screen, the student encounters a layout 
composed of two groups of four images (representing the category) and a 
group of two images (unknown cells to be classified) and text which calls for 
her or him to move one of the two unknown cells into either the eukaryotic or 
prokaryotic group by clicking on an unknown cell and dragging it to one of the 
groups (see figure 6-2: Moving an unknown to a category).
If the categorization is correct, an "ahh" sound is played and the successfully 
classified unknown replaces the member of the category that it was dropped
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on, becoming itself part of the new set of images of the now reconstituted 
category which presents itself to the user during the next iteration of the 
categorization (see figure 6-3: A new grouping results). A new set of unknowns 
from which to select is presented.
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Figure 6-2: Moving an unknown to a category Figure 6-3: A new grouping results
If the categorization is incorrect, an "uhn" sound is played, the image is 
"rejected" by being bounced back to its original position, and the same choice is 
offered again.
This activity is repeated, seven times in the current instanciation. This 
extension in time allows the learner an opportunity to encounter this occasion 
to categorize as a regularity in the socially constituted world. But, as in the 
world we are used to, it is not encountered in exactly the same way each time. 
The program 's design allows the user to pick up and categorize either of two 
unknowns each time a new set is created. The learner can pu t the chosen cell 
into one of four spaces. In categorizing the first set there are eight possible 
different outcomes. Starting with one of the two category sets altered by the 
previous choice in one of the eight ways, there are eight new choices for each of 
the eight branches established earlier—at this point sixty-four possible
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outcomes. By the time the user has worked through seven sets, there are over 
two million possible different paths through the alternatives. From a user's 
point of view, this is effectively infinite—no user will ever see all the possible 
combinations. While the number of possible valid solutions is very large, no 
single action faces the user w ith an unmanageable array of choices. One of two 
unknowns is selected. The selected unknown is dropped onto one of two 
groups; if the attempt to categorize fails, the user knows to try the other group. 
The activity is simple; only the result is complex. Within the constraints set up 
by the program, the learners can order their own experience and set up 
groupings of images that best aid their learning.
Finally, at the end of the set, the program calculates the percentage of correct 
categories, makes an encouraging remark based on the learner's success, and 
allows the learner to exit this portion or work through the examples again. A 
history of the user's interaction records each choice, how long it took to make 
the choice, and where on the screen the unknown was dropped. This entry is 
extended each time the user returns to the machine and is entered under his 
name with a different date and time. This record could be used for further 
research and for diagnosis and evaluation.
Following the analytical frame sketched above, the practices constituting an 
activity genre of categorization are such pre-understood elements as grouping 
the cells to form a category, denoting membership by moving a cell into the 
group which represents the category, moving by clicking and dragging, 
including particular unknown cells to denote success in categorization, and 
hearing an "uhn" sound to denote failure. This genre, once its constituent 
practices take on regular meaning through participation in the whole activity, 
can become a practice available to teach similar categorization, it can be treated 
as a practice of bifurcating categorization to be arrayed within a larger genre of
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computer based instruction. For instance, the category "contains nucleus" or 
"contains vacuoles" can be established using exactly the same series of practices 
in a larger instructional genre of computer-based cellular learning.
Note that each successful act of categorization reconstitutes the category that 
the user experiences and that the final distribution of images emblematically 
constituting the category is under the control of the learner, who may choose to 
"keep" a series that retains the greatest variation or may try to focus on perfect 
examples or may simply replace the most similar member with the new 
nominee. This "reconstruction" is an externalized example of the connectionist 
thesis that each act of recognition is an act of recategorization. The act of 
categorization physically changes the category to which the particular example 
is assimilated.
Note as well that category learning, as exemplified here, is a unified whole 
ranging from perception to pattern-matching thought to action. Once well- 
learned, the activity is a seamless one. The unknown is recognized as a member 
of one group and the activity of joining it to the category fluidly follows. In a 
description of the fluid competence of the expert categorizer, it may appear that 
perception initiates the sequence, but historically, activity and the world's 
reaction to that activity—whether it rejects or accepts the choice—provide the 
ground for pattern matching between cases treated similarly; the perception of 
a particular cell as a member of a category follows. Finally the unit of analysis is 
the whole activity itself; further breakdown may be useful in discussions, but 
any particular perception, thought, or action only makes sense in the context of 
the whole activity.
In some ways this program presents a particularly constrained virtual world 
to the learner. Interestingly, it is through the constraints and not through the 
millions of choices that the program proves itself useful to the learner. The
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current rhetoric of virtual reality follows the now-traditional interpretations of 
hypertext in finding value in the infinite possibilities that can be made 
available. The account given here challenges that assumption and suggests that 
constraint is more im portant than infinite choice in constructing a useful 
learning environment.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the theoretical positions 
developed in this work lead to significantly different design principles which 
can be implemented in the new, plastic, computer-based media. It has focused 
on temporal extension and activity as two crucial elements in a 
reconceptualized approach to learning that are not available in the atemporal, 
passive textbooks which dominate our current learning materials. The 
implication being developed is that if this approach to learning is correct in any 
large measure, education needs to pay more attention to providing temporally 
extended, recurring opportunities to actively participate in creating the objects 
of learning in material ways in the world. This constructivism is a thoroughly 
social one: it claims that constructing a schema in the privacy of our own head 
is precisely w hat we do not do. Rather, we learn to recognize pattern though 
our interactions with a socially patterned world from which we adopt and 




As long as our brain is a mystery, the universe—the reflection of the 
structure of the brain—will also be a mystery.
—Santiago Ramon y Cajal,
We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a 
habit.
—Aristotle
I open this chapter with two quotations, quotations which symbolize the two 
factors around which this dissertation has emerged. In the first, Ramon y Cajal, 
the seminal Spanish neurologist and philosopher, remarks on the connection 
between understanding the brain and understanding the world. Quite rightly 
he claims that we cannot understand the world until we are able to grasp how 
we grasp it, and that understanding the organization of the brain is central to 
this understanding.
In the second, Aristotle declares that habit, not will, is the foundation of the 
self. In this he is followed by the pragmatists who shared his understanding of 
the role of habit. Viewed from the standpoint of the community, habits held in 
common are the practices that have been central to the social portion of this 
work. Socially established "habits of mind" are the glue that allows us to 
coordinate our actions and are fundamental to our sense of identity.
Taking these in concert implies that to understand the universe—including 
ourselves—we will need to understand how we learn the habits of mind that
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are formative of the world in which we live. This reciprocal relationship 
between how we learn and what we learn is one of the deepest mysteries of our 
humanity. Recognizing this relationship enmeshes us in a recursive, 
hermeneutic web that emphasizes hum an activity in meaning-making. It 
uncovers, as well, limits and possibilities for our own activity. We can begin to 
see that our habitual understanding of how we understand our selves and the 
world is a critical linchpin in our construction and our society's construction. 
Pull that linchpin and disorganization is likely to result—but a disorganization 
which holds the possibility of an emergent new order which we may more 
readily turn to our purposes. In this dissertation those purposes are educational 
ones; I have contended that the older habit of understanding ourselves as 
logical machines has not served our students well, that in fact, if too strictly 
applied, it limits their ability to become competent actors in their world.
Critiques of logicism are a feature of our intellectual landscape, as the 
continuing romantic reaction to Enlightenment rationalism demonstrates. But 
to stop at critique is both irresponsible and, more to the point, ineffective. We 
need to present an alternate, more humane and useful story for the one that we 
have grown used to telling ourselves.
This dissertation is largely dedicated to laying the groundwork for telling 
the newer story which will allow us to reconceptualize ourselves, to change 
how we understand the very way we learn.
As laid out in chapter 1, pursuing this goal entailed a triadic strategy: first, to 
focus on learning as a material process and to avoid descriptive theorization 
where possible; second, in view of the pervasive character of current habits of 
thought concerning learning, to explore a broad array of evidence across 
historical, biological, social, and even computational fields that support the 
thesis that the older position is unlikely or impossible and that the connectionist
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position on learning better fits our current understandings; third, in order to 
avoid the trap of offering a theory without clear implications for change, to 
demonstrate some of the implications the emerging perspective would have for 
educational research and practice.
Reviewing the Path
This dissertation has roughly followed the path of laying out a context, 
examining the particulars of connectionist learning and situated knowledge, 
and offering two examples of how adopting the new perspective could make a 
difference in the way educators do research and design instructional material. 
Along the way I hoped that a broad and convincing case would be built that 
our received conception was untenable and that an alternate understanding 
was viable.
In chapter 1 ,1 contend that the descriptive style of theorization that 
dominated learning theory does not, in fact, produce a theory of learning 
because it does not attempt to account for the material process of change which, 
by any non-dualist account, m ust be the site of learning. What passes for 
learning theory is better understood as a theory of knowledge acquisition, and 
confusing the two has resulted in a blind spot in educational theory. The 
metaphor of a blind spot in our vision is a fairly precise one: one does not notice 
a blind spot until a special attempt is made to demonstrate that something that 
you don't normally question is actually not there. We usually fill in the absence 
w ith the next nearest thing—in this case with theories of knowledge 
acquisition—and fail to notice that nothing is actually there.
In chapter two I attempt to produce an awareness that the particular logical 
image of learning with which we have filled our blind spot in not natural, that
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it is the product of particular historical circumstances. Reiss and Toulmin's 
account of the rise and elaboration of the current discursive structure focuses 
on issues of how people demonstrate, to themselves as well as others, that they 
know something. When reference is unclear, as Reiss claims it was in the 17th 
century, a crisis of representation results. Reiss shows us that the current 
discourse arose to settle the problems of representation which grew out the 
collapse of an older way of making meaning. The solution that evolved to cope 
w ith that collapse postulated a formal congruence between three systems: 
language, logic, and material causality. Toulmin's attempts to understand how 
our cultural systems have developed make it clear that formal logic has come to 
dominate our approach to understanding. Descartes' crucial introjection of logic 
into the mind and the accompanying abstraction of linguistically stated, 
geometric reasoning into the mathematical formalism of the calculus made 
possible the rise of securing certainty as a central western project, a project to 
which both Dewey and Toulmin object.
The latter portion of chapter 2 takes the modern example of cognitive science 
and traces the way in which the image of thought as logic has been given 
material instanciation in the development of the program of artificial 
intelligence. I point to the way in which artificial intelligence was born in a 
recursive relationship between the Western image of thought as logic and the 
development of computers as material instanciations of logic. Following our 
cultural history, the computer was built on the image of the reigning, logical 
conception of thought, and our understanding of ourselves was recursively 
affected by the presence of a machine that computes. By making the 
assumptions of the traditional position both material and explicit, artificial 
intelligence constituted itself as an un-selfconscious test of the discursive 
position that hum an thought is logical. If we contend that hum an thought is
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logical then computers ought to be able to think as hum ans do, for as Turing 
demonstrated, anything that can be done on one computer can be done on 
another. As the experiment has developed it turns out that artificial intelligence 
actually disproves this contention. The logicist model of the serial digital 
computer is inadequate as a model of hum an thought. The hum an brain is 
neither fast enough nor large enough to be built on the serial model. Models 
built to mimic logic are logically capable in ways that no person is and fragile in 
practice in ways that even the simplest hum an is not. But the most telling 
critique is that such models are incapable of learning, and without being able to 
learn remain literal, dependent simpletons.
Connectionism arises in the attempt to solve the problems of the serial 
model. With very little consciousness of its potential discursive role 
connectionism posits an alternative account of meaning-making. It provides 
ways out of the difficulties produced by the previous conception—it is fast, 
capacious and robust. Most importantly for the educator connectionist systems 
shine at learning tasks, are able to perform recognition tasks far beyond the 
level of its serial competitor, and provide a ready model for content- 
addressable, associative memory.
Chapter 1 attempted to orient the reader and chapter 2 worked to build a 
background against which to understand the emergence of connectionism. 
Building on this chapters 3 and 4 are engaged in the task of laying out in some 
detail the nature of connectionist thought concerning learning, problems with 
connectionism considered from the point of view of instruction, and the need to 
bolster connectionist learning with a theory of knowledge based in social 
practices.
Chapter 3 explores the characteristics of the network architecture associated 
w ith connectionist models w ith an eye toward detailing the way in which
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particular, material models account for associative memory, simple learning, 
temporal learning, and abstraction. The rather intricate exposition of 
simulations and particular learning architectures serves to ground the claim 
that connectionist models are plausible models of hum an learning. The 
exploration of this claim, however, exposes weaknesses as well as strengths. 
Network architectures, at least in the forms which yield the valuable 
characteristics of associative memory, fluid category formation, easy 
recognition, and learning, are inherently unstable. Although some researchers 
explore solutions strictly within the resources of connectionist architectures, I 
suspect that the stability of representation is finally a function of the patterned 
social interactions that sustain and construct individuals. The issue of 
knowledge, dismissed in earlier chapters as mere theories of knowledge 
acquisition, has returned to haunt a theory of instruction based on 
connectionism.
Chapter 4 takes up the problem of developing a theory of knowledge which 
is adequate to the needs of instruction. Attempting to understand knowledge 
brings up the representation debate in philosophy and cognitive science and the 
opposition between logical and imagistic approaches to hum an representation. 
Connectionist accounts propose a third path, offering the infinite generativity 
valued by logical accounts value and a material process by which the effects 
that interest the imagist camp can be generated. But connectionism asks both 
sides to give up something as well. Logicists lose, well, logic. They can no 
longer appeal to the sort of categories which support classical concepts of 
certainty. Categorization and hum an reason are painted as fully contextual. The 
imagists, on the other hand, give up the central, definitive prototype for a 
diffuse, contingent category.
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Connectionist representation is so unintuitive that accepting its story tempts 
one w ith the possibility of simply declaring that stable knowledge such as the 
tradition gives us is illusory. But a commitment to teaching constrains us. 
W ithout a way to conceptualize knowledge, connectionist learning is useless in 
an education context. Situated perspectives are offered as a way to understand 
how stable symbols can be located in interaction with the world rather than 
possessed in the mind. The intersubjective habits which constitute practices are 
proposed as the location of the sought-for stability. Following out the insights 
of Vygotsky and Dreyfus, both the objects and the rules of the classical account 
of knowledge are reconstituted on a connectionist basis. Taking this path allows 
us to understand the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of teaching practices 
associated with defining objects of knowledge and rules of relation. By shifting 
the basis for understanding these phenomena from logical form to social 
practices, we gain the ability to predict the effects of our practice as teachers 
more accurately.
In chapters 5 and 6 the focus shifts to utilizing the framework built in the 
preceding chapters. This shift is motivated by the suspicion, raised in chapter 4, 
that connectionists perspectives only provide a different basis for justifying 
present practice. Were this the case, no matter how "true" the approach is, it 
w ould be ultimately sterile in practice. Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to show that 
the distinctions proposed do make a difference and develops some of the 
differences that flow from taking the stance advocated in this dissertation into 
concrete demonstrations.
The implications of adopting a situated connectionist stance for educational 
research and the design of instructional materials is the focus of chapter 5. In it I 
explore the implications of combining connectionism and practice theories in 
designing materials that will help teach students to distinguish between
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eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells. The eukaryotic/prokaryotic distinction is 
interesting because it is outside the normal range of experience—most images 
of these cells are taken w ith electron microscopes—and is therefore relatively 
free of prior learning. It is also interesting because the ability to recognize these 
cells as members of either the prokaryotic or eukaryotic kingdom is a good 
example of the practical, perceptually-based knowledge that supports the 
diagnostic competence of experts such as doctors and medical technologists, 
and is precisely the sort of knowledge that some advocates of apprenticeship 
claim cannot be adequately taught in schools.
One place in which connectionist theorizing differs from its more traditional 
competitors is in the fundamental question of how we form categories. In 
connectionist accounts categories are based on multiple, concrete experiences 
which are structured to lead the individual to classify difference as the same—a 
perspective which is at considerable odds with the classical account, which 
assumes that categories are built on the basis of the pre-existing similarity of 
distinctive features. Connectionist modeling implies that using single "best" 
examples which exhibit clearly the features associated w ith classical category 
theory is not the best way to form categories which are useful in the fluid, if 
messy, way that experts display. Instead, simulations imply that categories are 
most quickly and accurately formed by using multiple members of the category 
which are deliberately weighted toward the inclusion of marginal members. 
This follows from the practice of emphasizing boundaries (rather than central 
membership) which is implicit in a connectionist understanding of how 
categories are formed.
The work of designing actual materials proved enlightening. In doing this 
work I fell back, almost automatically, on previous experience in graphic 
design. In graphic design there is the assumption that the role of the designer is
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to present the meaning of the piece in such a way that the effect is perceived, 
effortlessly, as "natural" by the reader. To achieve this natural effect the 
designer, paradoxically, has to be quite conscious of how naturalness is 
constructed. The experience of finding myself almost automatically arraying 
social practices w ith particular meanings established in other, quite different 
contexts, in the service of teaching bifurcating distinctions based on 
connectionist assumptions, brought home with force just how important 
practices actually are in communicating meaning. Without these practices it 
would have been impossible to design materials which taught the distinction 
effectively. These practices were the prior learning upon which the successful 
presentation was based.
The final materials, which used multiple examples which included marginal 
members, employed the conventions of page design to indicate which elements 
were to be taken as similar and which to be read as opposed. A simple 
exploratory experiment was performed and I analyzed portions of the data for 
differences between the situated connectionist materials and those materials 
derived from a traditional text. Gratifyingly, since we were introducing new 
practices and unfamiliar ways of "reading" the images, the newer materials 
exhibited a statistically significant, positive difference from the traditional 
materials.
Although the design of materials for the experiment was inspiring and the 
result reassuring, it was also frustrating. I became acutely aware of the 
constraints of the one-shot, essentially passive paper-based medium on any 
design of materials inspired by connectionist principles. Connectionist 
principles include a strong emphasis on the repetition of patterns to be learned, 
a stress which places a special value on learning over time. Connectionist 
principles also lead to viewing the activity of the learner in altering the state of
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the learning materials as im portant in its explanation of how the differences 
that characterize concrete, particular objects come to be recognized as single 
categories which we take as objects of knowledge (such as "chair"). Chapter 6 
pursues these issues into the realm of the design of educational computer 
programs. The computer tempts the designer with its almost infinite plasticity. 
It is possible both to control the way in which the user repeats his or her 
experience of the material over time and to allow for, and even insist on, the 
active manipulation of images presented on the screen.
Reflecting on computer design, I was led to adapt Bakhtin's concept of the 
genre for its clarifying insight into the dependence of the meaning of any 
particular utterance on the activity-signifying genre in which it occurs. No 
experimental data is presented with this program; instead, this portion of the 
work emphasizes the ways in which the situated connectionist position 
developed in this paper can lead to the design of educational materials and 
particularly educational programs which do not simply reproduce the 
characteristics and assumptions associated with earlier media. The program 
developed in chapter 6 is proposed as a candidate genre for making the 
bifurcated distinctions common in educational practice.
In this dissertation, then, I have attempted to show the reader a path which 
will lead to a reconsideration of the way he or she conceptualizes learning. I 
have tried to show how learning theory is a problem in education and is not to 
be taken as an unremarkable background factor to our practice. I have 
emphasized that this is not a matter of simply exchanging a bad theory for a 
good one, but a problem which is built into the most fundamental ways in 
which the present discursive way of making meaning operates. The 
implications of discarding a discursive structure without having an alternate, 
more useful story to tell of our practice is daunting, and I have worked to
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present at least the bare outlines of an alternate way of conceptualizing learning 
and knowledge that evades the problems w ith the current understandings of 
representation. Finally, I have made an effort to demonstrate that the newer, 
situated connectionist story that I tell can imply different and more productive 
approaches to educational theory and practice.
But this path is not as smooth as one w ould like; it remains unpaved and in 
need of further work in many places. There are also tempting side paths and 
potential extensions which are still unexplored. The proposed stance is different 
enough to have much broader implications than have been discussed to this 
point. Indeed, it is unlikely that all the implications can be seen from this 
vantage point. It is to these absences and possibilities that I now turn.
Absences
In offering an alternate understanding of learning I have outlined a story 
which stretches from physiology to sociology. This is a broader range of 
disciplines than have been understood as being relevant to learning. By 
emphasizing factors on either end of this scale I have implicitly ignored other 
points in the continuum. This approach was motivated by my determination to 
build a theory of learning which would be a useful component of a framework 
for instruction. By dismissing descriptive theorizing as inadequate to the task at 
hand, I was led to adopt a stand calling for an understanding of the material 
processes of change that constitute learning. Connectionism is the only realistic 
competitor in this arena. Adopting a connectionist stance leads very quickly to 
a search for external sources of regularity to support the unstable matrix that is 
central to connectionist representation and memory. Exploring the pedagogical 
implications of connectionism presses the researcher toward attempting to
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understand situated knowledge. In a very real sense, the story told here is the 
simplest story that could be told given the assumptions and intent that guided 
its development. By adopting a position that favors material process over 
functional description, however, I have left little justification for ignoring other 
material conditions which undoubtedly effect what and how people learn.
The Individual
Most notably I have little discussed the individual. In other contexts I have 
critiqued situated cognition for not giving an adequate role to the person acting 
across situations, a critique I repeat in chapter 4.283 I do not here, however, 
present a theory of the social constitution of the self. In part that is because 
George Herbert Mead and John Dewey, in their respective social psychological 
and educational contexts, have already presented a position on the self and its 
basis for autonomous action that fits comfortably with the perspective on 
learning that I propose.284 Recall the quote from G. H. Mead which headed 
chapter 5:
The locus of the mind is not in the individual. Mental processes are
fragments of the complex conduct of the individual in and on his
environment.285
Pragmatic theories have not lacked explanatory power but have been largely 
unable to resist the weight of cultural assumptions that militate against their
283 In Chapter 4 see the section "Situating Situated Cognition;'' see also: John A. St. Julien, 
"Explaining Learning: The Research Trajectory of Situated Cognition and the Implications of 
Connectionism," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, San Francisco, CA, 20-24 April 1992; and especially John A. St. Julien, "Situated 
Cognition, Apprenticeship, and Schooling," Paper presented at the Fourteenth Conference on 
Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, Dayton, OH, 14-17 October 1992.
284 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1938), and John Dewey and Arthur F. Bently, Knowing and the Knozun (Boston: Beacon, 1949).
285 Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, 372.
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adoption. Among these cultural assumptions is the logical image of thought as 
the only justifiable basis for rational action in the world, an image which is 
basically incompatible with a pragmatic understanding of the basis for action. 
As I have discussed in relation to pragmatic theories of the individual, strongly 
bio-social perspectives are at a considerable disadvantage in presenting a 
convincing case because their view of the self is at odds with the socially 
sedimented self-understanding of those of us raised in Western traditions of 
radical individualism. This dissertation is a step toward a conception of 
learning which is not at war with pragmatic insights.
A situated connectionist position on the self provides support for visions of 
the self as multiply and contradictorily constituted in social interaction.286 It 
decenters our attention from a reified individual actor and moves it out into the 
world of social practices. If such social practices are what constitute us as social 
actors, it is easier to believe that individuals may be composed of different 
practices within differing social situations and that potentially contradictory 
practices, understood as intersubjective habits, will be instilled in differing 
circumstances.
One future task, particularly in the context of teacher education, will be to 
explore the possibilities of building explicit links between the learning theory 
proposed here and pragmatic concepts of the self. These linkages would be 
particularly useful in understanding how education students become teachers. 
W hat practices support the transition to "thinking like a teacher?" Can we build 
practices into our educational programs that encourage the teacher to see, as 
the phenomenological perspective would have it, "with teacherly eyes?" Such a
286 por an excellent rendition of the implications of such a position from an educational 
point of view, see: Cameron McCarthy, "Rethinking Liberal and Radical Perspectives on Racial 
Inequality in Schooling: Making the Case for Nonsynchrony/' Harvard Educational Review 58 
(August, 1988): 265-275.
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sense of the self w ould allow us to relink the issues of habit, perception, and 
cognition within the still-active pragmatic tradition of reflective inquiry which 
supports a style of teacher education in which an ethical imperative for teachers 
to choose to be open-minded, responsible, and whole-hearted is emphasized.287
A plural understanding of the constitution of the self and the role of social 
activity in that constitution also lends a distinctly different understanding to 
issues of multicultural education. Particularly in cases where school practices 
are understood in opposition to practices developed in family, ethnic, or gender 
groupings, a sensitivity to the ways in which successful students who are also 
members of such groups are contradictorily placed can lead to a different set of 
solutions for such students. Typically, following an individualist ideology, 
schools encourage "positive attitudes" linked with "self-esteem." Such 
programs implicitly attem pt to reconstruct the individual on the basis of values 
approved by schools and serve to reinforce tne opposition between schooling 
and the practices of alterna tive groups. Schools seldom succeed in convincing 
students to abandon the local groups which are the foundations of their identity 
unless such students are already marginal in those groups. A more successful 
attempt to serve the legitimate educational goals of schooling might be to 
devise practices promoting scholastic excellence that can be interpreted from 
within the perspective of one participating in oppositional groups as conferring 
prestige. This would be a matter of devising a matrix of practices, a school 
climate if you will, which encourages a multiple, contradictory self which 
includes a successful scholastic self rather than insisting on a unitary identity 
constructed on the basis of school values. Schooling and the scholastic attitude,
287 This is, of course, a reference to Dewey's formulation. For a piece which emphasizes tire 
ethical dimension of the pragmatic stance, see: Carl A. Grant and Kenneth M. Zeicher, "The 
Teacher," in Preparing for Reflective Teaching, ed. Carl A. Grant (Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 
1984), 1-19.
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w ould be offered as one of m any "ways of being" in the world—not as the 
master form.
Institutions
In making suggestions about the construction of the institution of particular 
schools on the basis of their interaction with the social groups which organize 
personal identity, I enter another set of issues which have been largely absent in 
this work. The social aspects examined here have remained focused on the 
shared, habitual practices which comprise individuals and which define social 
groups. I have not talked about those social groups. In sociological usage, or 
more precisely in a sociological usage which descends from G. H. Mead's 
seminal work, institutions such as schools, classrooms, affinity groups, 
ethnicities, and families are central to understanding hum an sociality.
Attempting to design the practices which help shape such groups is 
particularly touchy since these institutions are precisely the sorts of 
organizations that have shaped those who are attempting to reconstruct them. 
Ethical questions and questions of power, a final, almost terrifying power to 
even shape what is understood as power, would pass into the hands of the 
designers of alternate practices. This poses an immediate ethical dilemma for 
my own understanding that the work produced here is most directly useful to 
teachers in the design of instructional practice through which to teach content 
and in the design of practices which organize the classroom as a learning 
community. It is precisely at the point where a "better" theory of instruction 
will allow the construction of effective technologies of control to replace the 
patently ineffective ones currently in place that the ethical issue of power arises 
for any teacher. This concern invests w ith an additional emphasis the
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traditional pragmatic charge that teachers act on the behalf of their students 
and in the pursuit of democratic ideals.
The Body
While the work of this dissertation does lead to an embodied conception of 
hum an cognition, it focuses chiefly on practices and connectionist learning. 
Other elements of our bodily constitution are also clearly important.
Connectionist perspectives, conceptually built on the interaction of many 
simple parts, systematically ignore factors which directly affect its functioning 
at a global level. The best example of this is the lack of remark on advances in 
understanding the chemical component of hum an thought. The brain, in 
addition to being composed of many densely interconnected neurons, is also 
bathed in a continually changing flux of internally generated chemicals which 
affect mental function on a global level and have been implicated in mood.288 
Consideration of this absence makes it clear that connectionist theorizing is not 
to be identified w ith brain function as such but that it is more usefully 
understood as a neurologically plausible model of particular brain functions. It 
cannot be read directly down onto actual individuals in any simple way.
The work of Mark Johnson considers the body as a whole and the ways in 
which our particular bodily configuration constrains the way that we can 
understand the world and the metaphors through which we think. This, too, is 
well worth the study of teachers, for such work helps us understand the limits 
that may apply to our attempts to construct new practices based on differing 
metaphors. Such metaphors will be most readily accepted and used if a clear 
experiential analog can be found.




Some implications of the perspective offered in this dissertation have been 
explored in chapters 5 and 6. There I work on a few of the implications of a 
situated connectionist stance for educational research and the design of 
educational materials. In general, the task before the teacher or researcher is to 
investigate the ways that situated knowledge is appropriated by students who 
are using the practices that constitute such knowledge. The situated 
connectionist approach advocated here assumes that this appropriation occurs 
via the processes of connectionist learning. This approach does not, however, 
assume that what is appropriated is very much like what the classical tradition 
gives us as the objects of classical knowledge; not only are such representations 
unstable, slippery, and context-dependent but they are also not simply located 
in the brain and possessed there by the individual.289 In this view creating new 
knowledge is not the province of obscure researchers or writers of Ph.D. 
dissertations but is the journeyman work of teachers who create and sustain 
appropriable practices, hi an interesting aside which is suggestive for 
educators, Rumelhart et al. note that it appears to be extremely difficult to 
invent novel and useful new external representations, saying, "It may be that 
the process of inventing such representations is the highest human intellectual 
ability."290 Heady stuff for a teacher who takes this task as a central element in 
his or her practice.
289 This is not always apparent in the writing of all those who work in the Vygotskian 
tradition who call on the phrase "appropriation." Like Vygotsky himself (see chapter 4), they 
often seem to believe that a logical object is formed in memory.
290 David E. Rumelhart, J. L. Smolensky, James L. McClelland, and Geoffry E. Hinton, 
"Schemata and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models," in Parallel Distributed Processing,
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Recovery and Reconstitution
Taking a view of the teacher as a creator of knowledge through the creation 
and sustenance of practices, and as an active agent in the co-construction of 
learning via his or her participation in those practices while teaching, leads to a 
different way to regard the history of teachers' work. It seems likely that many 
of the practices that teachers use casually are more valuable resources than are 
commonly realized. These, and not simply the content that they purportedly 
carry, are the "stuff" of curriculum. In an increasingly technocratic era many of 
these practices have been "rationalized" and largely lost to the everyday culture 
of teaching. Practices such as heterogeneous cooperative grouping and peer 
teaching are being reintroduced as the latest methodology after being earlier 
suppressed as inefficient and as relying on non-experts to teach. One is led to 
suspect that other practices could be recovered through historical research and 
that these w ould be a potential buried treasure in an archeology of education.
Other practices which remain a troubling feature of our school experience 
could be reconstituted under the perspective presented in this dissertation. For 
example, it is popularly understood that memorization is simply a poor form of 
learning. Yet memorization, in part because "possession" of facts remains the 
discursive sine qua non of learning, remains common. Teachers often experience 
a conflict between the need to teach basic factual knowledge in a new area 
before a contextually meaningful framework for learning is established and 
their distaste for memory work. Interestingly, especially in the elementary 
grades, such work is often accomplished through rhymes, songs, and nonsense 
patterning. These are precisely the common practices that classroom teachers
Volume 2: Psychological and Biological Models, ed. David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and 
the PDP Research Group (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 47.
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avoid when "showing off" their students to visiting student teachers. If we 
understand learning as connectionist pattern completion mediated by social 
practices, the common habit of employing patterning exercises to move quickly 
through largely meaningless material can be reconstituted as an appropriate 
learning practice in particular situations. The plaint of the social studies 
methods teacher that learning the capitals of the states is not social studies is 
often met with the reply that the state-mandated test for this grade level implies 
a different understanding of the nature of the social studies. An appropriate 
response might be to abandon the largely futile attempt to make salient the fact 
that Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska in a reasonable length of time and 
instead to spend three or four 15-minute sessions singing a nonsense rhyme 
about the states over a few weeks' time. This could free time in the social 
studies portion of the day for a more meaningful approach to cultural 
differences or the decision-making powers of the students.
Intentionality
Indeed, meaningfulness is a difficult problem not only for the teacher but for 
the broader discourse in which teachers are embedded as well. Philosophers 
have discussed this under the rubric of intentionality. This goes back to the 
issues explored in chapter 2 as problems in representation. Somewhat simply 
put, for both teachers and philosophers, a problem in representation exists 
w hen it is not clear how a correspondence between an object in the world and 
the sign that people use to designate that object is warranted. The whole 
problem has been attacked by no less than John Dewey as a false problem based 
on an unwholesome Descartian dualism.291 The problem, for Dewey and for us,
291 This was a major theme of Dewey's. See: John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of 
the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1929).
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is to formulate a coherent alternative monism that can substitute for the 
discursively natural division between the sign and the thing signified. The 
pragmatists, of course, implicitly relied on the insights generated by C. S. 
Peirce's triadic version of sign constitution which includes the object signified 
as a part of the sign.292 But semiosis has remained marginal, perhaps in part 
because it seemed a speculative formalism without an obvious vital connection 
to the world. A situated connectionist approach has the virtue of providing an 
explicitly material monism. As has already been dwelt on, meaning in this 
approach is established through practices. Understanding these practices as 
patterns to be completed by the learner and understanding representation to be 
directly tied to the experience of that pattern, undoes the assumption that the 
relationship between the sign and the thing signified is arbitrary. At least in the 
experience of the student, the sign is directly linked to the pattern it represents.
More profoundly, the world is its own representation—connectionist 
memory is directly tied to the continued experience of the world for its 
sustenance; the link to the world is not merely originary but maintaining. The 
categories of experience emerge from our active engagement with problems. A 
dualistic perspective, however persistent it may be in our day-to-day language, 
is avoided here, and the dualistic problem of justifying the connection between 
symbols and objects is evaded.
Because in the alternate monist account all learning takes place through this 
interplay of practices, it is not, strictly speaking, possible to understand any 
form of learning as meaning/ess. But it does introduce differences not found 
within the traditional account. Learning that fails to transfer to its appropriate 
context of use is the sort of learning that we often label meaningless. It is either
292 Peirce's style is notoriously difficult; for a readable rendition of triadic semiosis, see: John 
Deely, Basics of Semiotics (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 1990).
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forgotten or not recalled at the appropriate time. In the traditional story this 
inability is about a failure in the storage and retrieval mechanism. In the monist 
story built here the "unrecalled" knowledge just does not exist, and the 
problem lies not w ith storage and retrieval but w ith cognition and re-cognition. 
The practices which constitute our individual cognitive extension into the 
world are not present, are not recognized, or are not re-created. The appropriate 
teacherly response would be to work with new practices more closely tied to 
the context of use.
Take, for example, vocabulary building. One common practice is a spelling 
test. But simply because a child can spell "veto" does not mean that he can 
understand very much about the way that President Bush ran the country when 
faced w ith the short phrase "Bush governed by veto—and look where it got 
us." m uttered in daily discourse. A situated connectionist analysis would 
support the practices of whole language in which new vocabulary in 
encountered is the context of use. But it would go beyond the simpler versions 
of whole language and also endorse the use of sources in which the sense of a 
word is "stretched" to its reasonable limits. In addition to a consistent use of the 
term "veto" in its central political meaning, it would also be useful to extend its 
sense to situations where a father might "veto" his son's plan or where a law of 
nature might "veto" the construction of a time machine.
Development
One area deserving further consideration from the point of view of the 
analytic being cultivated here293 is development. The integrated position 
suggested here can help to make sense of the often contradictory and confusing
293 John A. St. Julien, "Complexity: A New Analytic," Paper presented at the 50th Annual 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Charlotte, NC, 18-21 March 1994.
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data of child development. McClelland, one of the original workers in the field 
of connectionism, has advanced a model which shows how slow, incremental 
learning in neural nets can lead to the apparent plateaus and sudden dramatic 
changes in performance which teachers observe and which have lent a sense of 
truth to stage theories.294 McClelland's position, however, is compatible with 
positions that locate the change locally—it is not the global change in ability 
which Piaget's model postulated.
Stage theories of children's abilities have remained a feature of educational 
discourse, despite convincing research which questions their validity, largely 
because of their heuristic value. They still seem to help guide a teacher's 
practice. Teachers' experience-based understanding that while children's exact 
developmental path cannot be predicted, the broad outline of their changes can 
be safely assumed, is contradicted by the present discourse which understands 
such reasoning as unsubstantiated and teleological, as illegitimately attributing 
cause to the result. The educational language that sees a child as developing 
"toward" certain competencies such as language use is outlawed. But perhaps 
the persistence of such language reflects a failure of the current discourse to 
account for the regularities that teachers actually encounter. Just as the analysis 
of cognition suggested by the traditional, logicist discourse (discussed as the 
analytico-referential in chapter 2) has proven inadequate to the task of 
understanding cognition, so too, perhaps, will it take another approach to 
development to explain that phenomena to teachers in a useful way. One way 
to approach this would be to look to the larger field of complexity theory, 
which is developing in response to perceived isomorphisms in new and
294 James L. McClelland, "The Interaction of Nature and Nurture in Development: A 
Parallel Distributed Processing Perspective," Paper in submission for: Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, Psycholoquy listserver, ftp @ princelon.edu —pub/harnad, ©1993.
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productive approaches in many fields such as genetics, ecology, immunology, 
and not incidentally, connectionism.295
A Pragmatic Contextualization
Chiefly, I hope, moving to a new vision of the process of learning can help to
sustain a move away from the technocratic mode of education and toward one
based on embodied practices, ha large part this is continuous with a long
tradition emphasizing practical competence.296 Most recently and accessibly
this tradition has been located in pragmatist approaches to education.
Interestingly, both John Dewey and G. H. Mead espoused an approach to
education which affirmed the role of both the biological and the social. Mead, in
particular, used the term "bio-social" as an adjective to modify his position. A
series of remarks draw n from the pragmatists may serve to emphasize the
compatibility of their approach w ith the approach taken here:
. . .  based on what must happen in the brain. Every sensation 
corresponds to some cerebral action. For an identical sensation to recur it 
would have to occur the second time in an unmodified brain. But this 
strictly speaking, is a physiological im possibility.. . .  Every thought we 
have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a 
resemblance of kind w ith our other thoughts of the same fact. When the 
identical thought recurs, we must think of it in a fresh manner, see it 
under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in different relations 
from those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we
295 An overview of the "new sciences" is developing, though their implications for 
education are little appreciated. For educational implications, see: William E. Doll, A Post- 
Modern Perspective on Curriculum (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 86 -108. and St. 
Julien, "Complexity." In a broader framework the synthetic task is further advanced. See: 
William Bechtel and Robert C. Richardson, Discovering Complexity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), and J. Doyne Farmer, "A Rosetta Stone for Connectionism," in 
Emergent Computation: Self-Organizing, Collective and Cooperative Phenomena in Natural and 
Artificial Computing Networks, ed. Stephanie Forrest (City, MA: Ham Press, 1991), 135-187.
296 For an excellent example of the principles of practical competence in use, see: William B. 
Stanley and James A. Whitson, "Citizenship as Practical Competence: A Response to the New  
Reform Movement in Social Education," The International Journal of Social Education 7 (Fall,1993): 
57-66.
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cognize it is the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with 
the consciousness of all that dim context.297
The proposition [that no two "ideas" are ever exactly the same] is more 
im portant theoretically than it at first sight appears. For it makes it 
impossible . . .  to formulate the mental facts in an atomistic sort of way, 
and to treat the higher states of consciousness as if they were all built out 
of unchanging simple ideas . . .  .298
The initial stage of that developing experience called thinking is 
experience. This remark may sound like a silly truism. It ought to be one; 
but unfortunately it is not.299
So far as the significant symbols which the individual uses are stimuli to 
his own responses, these processes lie in the individual. So far as things, 
characters, and imagery are indicated, the processes extend beyond the 
individual. The locus of the mind is not in the individual. Mental 
processes are fragments of the complex conduct of the individual in and 
on his environment.300
The theory of knowing which is advanced . . .  may be termed 
pragmatic . . . .  It holds that knowledge consists o f . . .  all the habits that 
render our action intelligent.301
Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion 
is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts 
are in us. 302
In many ways the pragmatists advanced a framework which seems 
surprisingly current when viewed against the background of connectionist 
learning and situated knowledge. The series of remarks above describes a basic
297 William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1892/1961), 23.
298 William James, Psychology: The Briefer Course, 2.
299 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 153.
300 Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, 372.
301 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 344.
302 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume Five, ed. 
Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1934,1935,1958), para. 289 ftn 1.
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arc of this dissertation. Beginning w ith a frank confrontation with the full 
import of a nondualist, materialist conception of mental processes, implies that 
there can be no simple reductionist conception of "ideas." Ideas of this sort are 
grounded not in logical simples but in experience. But this is not the experience 
of the sovereign knower whose gaze possesses a scene, but of a person-acting, a 
person engaged in the world whose mental processes are both about and of the 
world in a literal way. Mind and thinking extend beyond the brain. Habits, 
what I have called practices from a pointedly social perspective, are the basis of 
a pragmatic conception of knowledge and therein lies the origin of intelligent, 
competent action. We are profoundly enmeshed in a world of thought, a 
universe of signifying practices; we are literally "in" thought. The world thinks 
us no less than we think the world.
The valuable tradition that the pragmatists leave us can be usefully 
extended. While the pragmatists, being determined monists, affirmed a role for 
both the biological and the social, they did not have the resources to apply to 
their broader project that we have today. In particular we have developed 
useful tools in the complex, emergent properties of connectionist learning and 
in the practices that support situated knowledge. With these we can build an 
account that constrains our theory and practice, our praxis, more effectively 
than was possible for the pragmatists.
Connectionist learning, at the biological end of the scale, makes it possible to 
explain how experience results in associative learning, and it helps inform us 
how the repetitive, socially-organized, encounters with the full range of 
category members enable the act of categorization. Understanding the 
processes that support learning allows us to understand the qualities of the 
learning experience that are salient to the act of learning. For example, given a 
particular socially framed category, we can say more about what sort of
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examples (central or noncentral) should be presented to form a category with 
boundaries similar to the socially constructed original. We can also see how the 
sequence in which they are presented can affect how rapidly the category is 
achieved and think productively about trade-offs between rapidity of learning 
and achieving a finely tuned boundary distinction. Certain practices might 
allow a more rapid entry into the field of activity in which the category is 
arrayed while others would tend to delay entry but would result in a more 
accurate category and hence a fuller participation once entry is achieved. 
Choosing between such practices is part of the craft of teaching under the 
conception of learning presented here.
The m odern conception of practices extends the pragmatist conception of 
"habits" by stressing the intersubjective nature of their construction and by 
detailing the potential that such intersubjectively established activities have for 
becoming sedimented in particular material objects. It is possible to explain in 
much more detail the practices that compose a cultural object such as a map 
and its competent use. Being able to see such differences allows the teacher to 
recognize where things have gone awry for a particular student and to focus 
that student's attention on those points.
Practices and connectionist learning are much more productive considered 
in relation to each other than they are when considered alone. Together they 
show us how the puzzling qualities of knowledge (context dependence, shifting 
boundaries, etc.) are established and how practices are learned. They fill in the 
perennial question of how "internalization" occurs while questioning the 
division that makes internalization a sensible concept. Practices help us 
understand zvhat is learned and which patterns, out of the plethora of potential 
patterns the world offers, are signified as carrying knowledge.
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Taken together, connectionist learning and situated knowledge form a 
powerful way to think about learning, a perspective I have labeled situated 
connectionism.
The Child
In chapter 1 ,1 introduced a child who recognized her mother's face and
suggested that a theory of learning adequate to the purposes of education
would be able to explain how such a wonder could occur. This first instance of a
child's learning is manifestly meaningful learning. Almost every child learns to
recognize Iris or her m other's face easily and fluidly. A theory of learning which
leads us in the direction of making such meaningful, readily achieved learning
available in the school contexts is what I seek in this dissertation.
I seek a story which can usefully explain this instance of learning:
I sit in a room and watch a young child in a crib beneath an open 
window. She is beautiful, or I think she is. I sit immobilized, fascinated.
A cool gust of w ind moves the curtains, annoying the child. Her mother, 
harried, returns and bends over the crib. The baby perceives motion, 
turns her head and recognizes her mother. She gurgles, smiles, reaches 
out and is softly gathered in ....
Can we at least begin to tell the how of that story? I believe we can.
The first move in explaining learning lies in clearing away the hegemony of 
logic in explaining hum an thought. The hum an mind does not, and if we play 
the game by strictly logical standards, cannot work through discrete objects 
ordered by the seriality of deductive logic. This conclusion depends on 
accepting the materiality of thought and locating thought in the hum an brain 
and material social practices. In doing so we reject the Descartian idealism 
which buttresses the present discursive structure. If we settle on this material 
pattern of explanation it is a short path to the conclusion, based on the 
architecture of the brain and its observed speed of operation, that hum an
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thought is composed of parallel processes and interactive representations that 
cannot be mapped onto simple, deductive logic in a credible way.
This denaturalization of logic as the basis of hum an thought is easier to 
achieve if we recall that the idea of logic as the basis of the best hum an thought 
arose in response to a particular seventeenth-century crisis of representation in 
Western culture. In solving that problem the West postulated that deductive 
logic, the grammar of language, and causality in the world all shared the same 
perfect, timeless form. That postulate is no longer intellectually tenable but our 
culture has yet to adjust its fundamental discursive structure to accommodate 
the change. Cognitive science and particularly the research cited herein 
marshals a large body of evidence against Descartes' extension of that 
discursive structure which claims that thought is itself logical.
In an alternate story the child is not a "natural" logic machine as Descartes 
presumed, nor does she "develop" logic by reading it off the world as Piaget 
believed. Instead the child operates by different principles than those which 
organize geometry. She operates, if you will, on the contrasting principles of 
poetry. Meaning-making is a context-dependent, holistic, relational operation 
which operates in accord w ith the individual history of the interpreter—such as 
we habitually consider it to be in the restricted realm of poetry. At the same 
time much of the context for that meaning-making is established socially, and a 
m uch larger amount of knowledge than a Western individualist ideology 
would have us believe is based in practices that operate and change in the 
world and which are only later, if ever, internalized through connectionist 
processes of appropriation.
In the story of the child we start with a situation:
I sit in a room and watch a young child in a crib beneath an open 
window . . . .  A cool gust of wind moves the curtains, annoying the 
child. Her mother, harried, returns and bends over the crib.
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This is an old image, one we all recognize in some way. "Mother and 
Child"—it might be a painting by a latter-day Rembrandt, chronicling the 
domestic pleasures of our day. But it is important to recognize that it is also an 
old situation for this mother and tills child. This has all happened before in 
their lives and their activities are well coordinated. The mother, as harried as 
she is, does not need the child's cry or even her arms reaching out to know that 
she is wanted. It is cool, the wind has picked up—she feels her daughter's need 
as surely as she feels the wind. So she returns to the room to tend her daughter. 
The daughter, for her part, may or may not yet know her discomfort, but by the 
time she sees her mother bending over in the context of a cool breeze and the 
fluttering drapes she does know her role and is eager to play it.
The baby perceives motion, turns her head and recognizes her mother.
She gurgles, smiles, reaches out and is softly gathered i n ----
W hat we need to be able to say is how she recognizes her mother and hoiv 
that recognition is tied to the competent response of reaching out and the 
reciprocal response of being softly gathered in.
She recognizes her mother through the emergent primitives associated with 
connectionist architectures. There is a literal quality to the word "re-cognizes" 
used in a connectionist explanation. The child re-creates her mother; she does 
not, cannot, retrieve a memory which, in the conventional sense, does not exist. 
The raw material of this recreation is the impression of her history upon the 
malleable organization of her brain. That history contains multiple instances in 
which there has been a cool breeze, an open window, a crib, a fluttering 
cu rta in . . .  and a mother bending over. The overall pattern is quite reliable and 
not every element m ust be repeated in just the same way for the competent 
response of reaching out to become active. The daughter completes the pattern; 
she does not analyze the scene and then deduce an appropriate response. There
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is no separation, except in our analysis, between the perception of her mother 
and the act of reaching out. It is all poetry, all perception, all action.
But the act of reaching out is not to be understood as a "natural" hum an 
response any more than we believe that the image of Mother is somehow 
naturally lodged in each child's mind. Both are learned in the same fashion, by 
repeated presentation of the pattern in a context where the child's emergent 
perception of category is tied to a socially appropriable response.
Some slowing down and unpacking is called for here. W hat I am proposing 
is a particular hermeneutic of learning based on connectionist principles and 
social practices. In this story the mother is the socially competent actor leading 
the child into competent activity by presenting experiences from which the 
child can learn. Like many teachers she acts chiefly out of affection and is 
largely unconscious of the full effects of her own activity. The mother knows, 
from her own experience and the lore of motherhood, that her child is 
uncomfortable in a sudden, cool breeze. At the same time she values fresh air 
and the image of her child's crib beneath the open window. She knows that 
reaching out and holding close is warming and comforting—a lesson first 
learned in her own mother's arms. Holding your arms out as the first portion of 
the act of holding is a well-established social practice in the world in which she 
lives, a practice that is habitually interpreted to call for a reciprocal response 
from the person being summoned by the gesture. And, reciprocally, all 
understand that the summons may flow in both directions; the child may 
summon her mother by the same gesture.
Enmeshed in this world, the mother enacts her role consistently. She goes to 
her child when she anticipates the child's discomfort and holds out her arms. 
She may hesitate at that moment, expecting this hesitation will somehow, as it 
does so often in her life, trigger an appropriate, reciprocal response of reaching.
274
The child, for her part, explores the use of her own body. She thrashes, and 
waves, and grasps at tilings. Sometimes the child holds both her arms out from 
her body. In this environment an ecology of behavior takes shape over the 
history of their interaction. When the mother infers that a child is 
uncomfortable she holds out her arms and picks her daughter up. She is often 
right about this and her daughter learns to associate the eminent cessation of 
discomfort w ith this part of her mother's repertoire of activity. Arms held out 
from the child's body are taken to mean a desire to be picked up, especially 
when the child is under conditions where she may be uncomfortable. In this 
dance of action and response it may be difficult for the outsider to locate the 
initiator of an activity; indeed it may be difficult to separate these as an actor. 
But as the pattern recurs and strings itself out over time, the action of both 
cohere into well-coordinated activity. The mother reaches out and the child is 
held close. Or, finally, the child reaches out and is softly gathered in. They have 
learned to hold each other and have learned what such an attachment means.
To tell this story in the current discursive context w ithout referring to a set of 
concrete material processes is to play into a hegemonic structure which, 
pleasantly and w ith heart-felt agreement that there is something profoundly 
correct in the story, easily consigns the recounting to the personal and to the 
irrational—to the particular. It is only "a" story. I want to claim that it is more 
than that. It is an analogy for all our stories about learning. It applies to the 
biologist as well as to the baby, and it applies to biology students be they in 
grade four or fourteen.
Learning is grounded in the central reciprocal relation between the 
malleable material organization of our body and the patterns which recur in the 
world. Humans are pattern completing animals. We seek pattern and insist on 
finding it; we have little choice—the basic architecture of our brain prepares us
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to categorize in particular ways. Many, on some accounts all, of these patterns 
are socially constructed in the activity between individuals.
To move toward reconceptualizing learning and knowledge in this way is to 
move away from general, eternal forms and toward particular, social patterns.
It is to move away from logic and toward poetry. We move from what Freire 
called a banking model of education to an image of education as the co­
construction of appropriable patterns.
This dissertation attempts to establish a basis within the current discursive 
structure for challenging our self-understanding as logical beings. By using the 
hegemonic tools of the discourse—proof, disproof, empirical evidence, and 
deductive logic itself—I attempt to establish a space where another image of 
our capacities may flourish. In using these tools and by arraying the privileged 
signifiers of science, logic, statistics, and empirical evidence, I hope to establish 
a claim that cannot be dismissed as simply romantic, particular, teleological, or 
"affective:" the traditional, hegemonic ways to dismiss the cognitive 
understandings that I have tried to establish. Admitting that such claims have a 
truth of their own but ghettoizing them in different, pointedly noncognitive, 
realms is a potent way to circumscribe their influence. In the story I wish to tell 
a m other's love in not "ineffable," "natural," or "intuitive;" it is effective action 
in the world continuous with and learned in the same fashion as the practices 
that establish a biologist's expertise in cellular identification.
Taking this tack allows us to see schools differently. We are used to thinking 
of the sedimented practices of schooling as a problem in teachers lives and for 
student learning. But here we have an opportunity to see practices as effective 
constituents of both identity and learning. And we are used to thinking of 
learning as a problem, separate from and more difficult to achieve than other 
constituents of effective activity. Here we have an opportunity to see learning
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as a social activity continuous w ith action and perception. In this context we 
can question the current assumptions of schooling and the practices which are 
produced by and which produce those assumptions.
This approach takes us to a place which may appear strange, a place where 
individuals are not discrete and where the change we call learning takes place 
as often between people as within. We move into a space constructed of 
networks of relations rather than causal chains and where constraints are more 
interesting than causes. In some ways, though, this is not a completely 
unfamiliar space for the educator. Teachers practice in a messy, contingent 
world where causal chains are seldom informative for practice. Teachers tend to 
see the classroom as a particular, unique setting, each one of which places its 
own constraints on the activity of the teacher. It is perhaps appropriate to move 
into a way of viewing the teachers' workspace through an analytic lens which 
does not do violence to their perception. Moving to the view of learning and 
knowledge advocated here can have large consequences in this regard.
Conclusion
In abandoning formal, axiomatic logic as the foundation of its perspective 
and adopting a perspective which depends on emergent structure in the face of 
experience to account for knowledge, a situated connectionist approach asks a 
fundamental question about the very nature of being human. Should its 
insights prove compelling its success will force an intellectual reconsideration 
of tremendous proportions on our society. Because the first and most important 
areas of success for this viewpoint appear to be in models of perception and 
learning, education will be one of the first areas to come under question. New 
primitive functions will replace the older store, search, and match operators
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upon which so much of our educational practice is founded. (Drill and practice 
is the most direct analog of this preunderstanding.) Operators such as 
associative recall, content-addressable memory, learning via exposure to 
example, context specificity, and the power curve of learning will all become 
first order primitives303. Such a perspective implies that attempting to teacher- 
proof a classroom by mandating the teaching of only "objective" facts in a 
lockstep order is doomed not only to failure but also to actually damage a 
student's ability to learn by separating the "fact" from its context, a context 
which is absolutely essential to its recall and productive use at even the lowest 
"level." This perspective implicitly argues that facts cannot be discrete and 
immutable because the distributed representations interact, the pattern in 
which they are embedded affects their recreation and use in actual practice, and 
they change, to some extent, each time an associated memory is stored. The 
implications for teaching of such a conception are profound: teaching the right 
answer would be recognized as futile enterprise, whereas symbolic logic 
implies that there is always a universal best response. Much of what is 
implicitly endorsed here is already a part of the repertoire of good teachers but 
it exists as an isolated result of their own experience, and one which is difficult 
to justify in a fully articulated way. This perspective would provide a consistent
303 As relaxation models are more extensively explored, even more fascinating primitive 
functions are coming to the fore. Rumelhart and McClelland (p. 126), for instance, discuss 
primitives for which we do not have simple names: "relax into a state that represents an 
optimal global interpretation of the current input" and "retrieve the representation in memory 
best matching the current input, blending it into plausible reconstructions of details missing 
from the original memory trace." See: David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, "PDP 
Models and General Issues in Cognitive Science," in Parallel Distributed Processing, Volume 1: 
Foundations, ed. David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and tire PDP Research Group (MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 1986), 110-149.
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understanding of such practice which would reach as far down to the roots of 
how we believe people think as has the rationalistic explanation traditionally.
To my m ind the opportunities for shaping our common vision of education 
loom large. The potential for reshaping an interpretation of how (and thereby 
what) it means to be hum an presents itself. Such an opportunity is not likely to 
be offered twice in anyone's lifetime. As educators we are obligated to examine 
our ow n experience and understanding of w hat education consists of and to 
honor that understanding. As one of the prim ary "consumers" of academic 
psychology we are an im portant part of the universe of discourse which will 
decide which perspective on knowing will prevail. We will vote with what we 
teach and, more importantly, with what we practice and how we justify that 
practice.
It is possible to understand how the child knows her mother, hr coming to 
that understanding we trade a presumed stability for a dynamic and unstable 
conception of ourselves. Any deep change carries risks and educators bear a 
special responsibility to our society for educating the young. It is my hope that 
a new common sense understanding of what it means to think may arise in  a 
space which this dissertation explores, and that the newer understanding will 
prove more valuable and less misleading in the practice of education than the 
understanding which it supplants.
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APPENDIX 
Category Learning Program
Instructions and System Requirem ents
This program is implemented as a HyperCard Stack. It illustrates a situated 
connectionist approach to learning bifurcated categories.
The program is on a Macintosh diskette in a pocket on the rear cover.
Upon launch you will be presented with an opening screen which briefly 
explains the purposes of the program. It is designed to track multiple users over 
time and requests your name in order to begin a record of your interaction with 
the program. After you enter your name you may click the button on the 
bottom of the screen and it will open to the first learning screen. Enjoy!
You will need:
An Apple Macintosh computer 
A 13 inch monitor or larger
The ability to display 8 or more levels of gray or color 
System 6.05 or higher 
HyperCard 2.0 or higher 
Approximately 800K of available RAM
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